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ABSTRACT 
The subject of this thesis is the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament during the period 1979 to 1987. 
It focuses specifically upon national CND, and 
seeks to fulfill three objectives: to provide an 
analysis of the internal workings of the Campaign, 
a discussion of its impact upon the British 
political system, and to relate these to recent and 
contemporary theories about social movements. 
The internal dynamics of national CND are 
discussed by way of an examination of its member-
ship, organisation, goals and tactics. The thesis 
includes the results of a sample survey of national 
CND's membership undertaken. in 1985, which reveals 
the structural location of the Campaign's support 
in British society, the attitudes and preferences 
of its membership in relation to the stated aims of 
CND, and their participation in other forms of 
political activity. Patterns of decision-making 
and the distribution of power within national CND 
are studied by an investigation of its Annual 
Conference, National Council and national commi t-
tees. CND's professed aims are described, utilising 
the Campaign's own publications and the resolutions 
emanating from its policy-making bodies. The 
varied tactics the Campaign has employed (both 
conventional and unconventional) are outlined, 
drawing upon internal documents and interviews with 
leading members of organisation. 
The impact of the Campaign on Britain's 
political system is assessed by an examination of 
the stances adopted by political parties, trade 
unions, churches and other institutions on the 
issue of unilateral nuclear disarmament, and a 
discussion of changes in public opinion and the 
coverage CND has received in the media. The thesis 
seeks to set the internal workings and external 
impact of the Campaign in a wider context by 
including an account of CND's experiences in the 
late fifties and early sixties, and a resume of the 
main principles underlying British defence policy 
in the post-war period. 
The thesis includes an overview of theories 
relating to social movements (in Britain and 
abroad) which attempts to identify the most 
important concepts, and comment upon their poten-
tial utility. It concludes by relating these 
concepts to the empirical material derived from 
this study, and argues that social movement theory 
needs further refinement. Specifically, it 
contends that the resource mobilisation perspective 
is much better suited than conventional pressure 
group theory for the study of moral campaigns which 
attract significant support from the middle class 
yet fail to change public policy, but that this 
perspective gives inadequate attention to the 
effect of the nature of the issue engaged by a 
social movement upon its organisation and tactics. 
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PREFACE 
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was 
formed in 1958, and has spent almost thirty years 
trying to persuade British governments, parties and 
voters to support the idea of the united Kingdom 
unilaterally renouncing nuclear weapons. Through-
out that period, its arguments and actions have 
never convinced a British government. Of Britain's 
major political parties, only the Labour Party has 
adopted a non-nuclear defence policy. Moreover, 
apart from a brief period at the beginning of the 
sixties, unilateral nuclear disarmament has been 
official Labour Party policy only since 1982, and 
Labour has performed badly in both the general 
elections since then. Public opinion polls between 
elections have indicated· fluctuating levels of 
support for unilateral nuclear disarmament among 
the electorate, but never a majority. 
Despite this apparent lack of success, CND has 
survived and resisted the temptation to enhance 
its populari ty by moderating its aims. Al though 
between 1963 and 1979 the Campaign was virtually 
moribund, numbering only a few thousand supporters, 
in its early years and then again in the eighties 
it has been by any standards a mass movement. Even 
when at its lowest ebb it has been one of the best 
known groups in British politics. Since 1980, it 
has seen its national membership rise to a peak of 
around 100,000 and at the time of writing (1987) 
numbers over 80,000. Including those who belong 
only to local CND and other peace groups, its total 
number of supporters is estimated to be in the 
region of some 200,000 people. Although it has 
never attracted many members outside of the 
particular social stratum of the educated middle 
class, it has been able to motivate its adherents 
to participate in public demonstrations of a 
magnitude very rarely seen in post-war Britain, and 
innovatory tactics such as peace camps established 
around military bases have received wide publicity 
both within Britain and abroad. 
CND may not have been able to inspire changes 
in governmental policy, but it can take some 
comfort from the way in which the issue of nuclear 
disarmament has been brought back onto the politi-
cal agenda. After the short-lived conversion of 
the Labour party at the beginning of the sixties, 
the nuclear dimension of Britain I s defence pol icy 
went virtually unquestioned for almost two decades. 
In successive general elections from 1964 to 
1979,none of the main parties chose to dissent from 
the consensus view that Britain should retain 
nuclear weapons, and that it was a policy area on 
which discussion was best kept within the executive 
branch of government. After 1979, however, the 
issue gained in salience to such an extent that 
commentators are generally agreed that it was 
second only to unemployment as a determinant of 
voting choice in the 1983 general election, and 
continued to play an important part in the 1987 
general election. Admi ttedly, opinion poll 
evidence suggests that a majority of those voters 
who did consider the issue to be of great impor-
tance were opposed to the idea of unilateral 
nuclear disarmament, but at least alternatives were 
being discussed and politicians who rejected 
unilateralism had to argue their case. 
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Of course, CND was not the only causal factor 
in this transition. International developments 
were important, as increased hostility between 
America and the Soviet Union in the eighties marked 
an end to the era of detente which had character-
ised much of the previous decade. Technical 
innovations were also a very significant factor, as 
new weapons (and especially new delivery systems) 
were introduced. Nevertheless, the size of the 
Campaign and the media coverage it received has 
been such that it would be nonsensical to argue 
that CND, and its counterparts in much of Western 
Europe, have had no role to play in the eruption of 
the nuclear issue onto the political agenda. 
This thesis examines the Campaign from its 
renaissance in 1979 through to the general election 
of 1987. It is not an account of the peace 
movement as a whole, which incorporates national 
CND, local CND and peace groups, and autonomous 
bodies such as the Greenham women and Cruisewatch. 
Its focus is national CND, which - although many 
activists in the peace movement might disagree 
arguably the single most important element in 
movement, if only because it is perceived 
pol i tical parties and the national media as 
- is 
the 
by 
the 
authoritative voice and organisational nucleus of 
the whole movement. What follows does not pretend 
to offer a definitive account of the peace move-
ment1 what it does attempt to provide is an 
analysis of national CND, on the grounds that it 
can be conceptualised as the 'peak' organisation of 
the peace movement. It is based partly upon 
secondary source material, but mainly upon docu-
ments kept at national CND's headquarters, to which 
the author was given access, interviews 
members of CND, national CND officials and 
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with 
staff 
members, observation of CND's Annual Conferences 
and meetings of its National Council, and a sample 
survey of the national membership (see appendix). 
A complementary aim of this thesis is to 
relate empirical material about 
particularly National CND, to 
the Campaign, and 
the theoretical 
arguments which have been constructed around the 
concept of social movements. There has been a 
resurgence of interest in this area since the 
sixties, as political scientists have come to 
realise that conventional pressure group theory 
could not incorporate the variety of organisational 
and tactical forms. exhibited by new movements and 
groupings over the last few decades. As a conse-
quence, new concepts have been developed, the most 
influential of which are amalgamated under the 
heading of 'resource mobilisation'. This thesis 
will seek to test the applicability to CND of these 
new insights. It will also attempt to explore the 
hypothesis that, although it is considerably more 
useful than conventional pressure group theory for 
understanding a movement such as CND, present 
thinking on social movement theory needs to be 
refined in such a way as to pay more attention to 
the implications of the nature of the issue which 
is engaged by any particular social movement. 
The starting point is an overview of recent 
theoretical insights into the phenomenon of social 
movements which are broadly similar to CND. This 
is followed by .an outline of developments in 
British defence policy since the fifties, and an 
account of CND's formation, campaigning and 
between the late fifties and early sixties. 
established the general context, the results 
decline 
Having 
of the 
national membership survey are analysed in an 
attempt to determine who is motivated to join the 
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Campaign, their political aff il iations outside of 
CND, and their opinions on a number of issues which 
have been discussed within the Campaign in recent 
years. The analysis then moves on to the organisa-
tional structure of national CND, and the way in 
which decisions are taken on matters concerning 
policy and tactics. This is followed by a discus-
sion of the Campaign's ideology as it has developed 
during the eighties, and the various strategies of 
both persuasion and protest which have been 
employed in an attempt to realise these goals. 
Finally, the stances adopted by Britain's political 
parties and other social institutions on the issue 
. of nuclear weapons are examined, with a view to 
determining how much progress the Campaign has 
made, and conclusions are drawn as to its strengths 
and weaknesses and the political opportunities 
which are open to it in the contemporary British 
political system. 
5 
Chapter One 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
In the account of CND in the eighties which 
follows, we shall be looking at how the Campaign 
operates and what it has achieved. Although not 
wi thout its problems, such an exercise does not 
present insurmountable difficulties. Far more 
problematic, however, is any attempt to derive a 
satisfactory explanation of why CND revived in such 
a dramatic fashion after some fifteen years in the 
political doldrums. Establishing causal relation-
ships between ideas, events and behaviour is a 
notoriously difficult undertaking in political 
science, when there are so many variables which 
cannot be controlled. A logical first step would 
seem to be to determine the nature of the Campaign 
- that is, whether it should be seen as a quasi-
party, an interest group, a movement or whatever -
and then draw upon the insights offered by 
analysis of similar groups or movements. In the 
case of CND, this will involve setting the Campaign 
within the context of the Peace Movement as a 
whole, but even the Peace Movement has qualities 
which set it apart from other movements in liberal 
democratic societies. 
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Clearly the Peace Movement is something other 
than a pressure group 
pluralistic politics. 
as def ined in conventional 
It is not a protect ional 
not limited to one section group: its adherents are 
of society, it offers no services to its supporters 
(unless one counts information under this heading), 
it is not primarily interested in the detail of 
governmental administration, and whilst it 
numbers amongst its ranks some with an impressive 
level of knowledge about nuclear weapons policy -
its expert knowledge is not sought after by 
British government. 
made for classifying 
group. Although its 
More of an argument could be 
it as a promotional pressure 
aims are more radical than 
most other promotional groups in Britain, and, if 
ev~r realised, would have a fundamental effect upon 
defence, foreign and economic policy, there are 
other promotional groups seeking far-reaching 
changes - the anti-poverty lobby is one example. 
The sheer size of the Peace Movement, however, the 
way in which it is organised and, above all, some 
(though not all) of the tactics that it employs 
clearly distinguish it from other promotional 
groups. The Peace Movement uses 'insider' tactics 
such as lobbying decision-makers and seeking to 
persuade and educate public opinion; what differen-
tiates it from other promotional groups is its 
persistent use overtime of 'outsider' tactics -
especially mass demonstrations and non-violent 
direct action. These are an integral part of the 
Peace Movement's tactical armoury, and this in 
itself is sufficient to justify classifying the 
Peace Movement as something other than a conven-
tional promotional group. 
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social Movements 
The Peace Movement is not the only societal 
grouping whose aims and tactics place it outside 
the ambit of conventional pressure group typolo-
gies. The post-war period, especially from the 
sixties on, has seen the rise of such phenomena as 
the student movement, the civil rights movement 
(especially in America) and second-wave feminism • 
This has prompted a resurgence of interest in the 
concept of 'social movements'. Like pressure 
groups, social movements involve purposive collec-
tive action but it is action of a specific kind, 
falling in between the spontaneity of mob or crowd 
behaviour on the one hand and the formalised 
structure of participation in political parties or 
conventional pressure groups on the other. Unfortu-
nately, there does not as yet exist anyone widely 
accepted and precise definition of what constitutes 
a social movement. Writing in the 1968 Interna-
tional Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Rudo1f 
Herber1e notes that the term 'denotes a wide 
variety of collective attempts to bring about a 
change in certain social institutions or to create 
an entirely new order' (1), a description which is 
symptomatic of the difficulties analysts have found 
in establishing a precise and tight definition. 
Nevertheless, drawing upon the literature that has 
been produced in response to the resurgence of 
political activity outside of normal institutional 
channels since the early sixties(2), it is 
to isolate certain defining features 
concept. 
possible 
of the 
It is generally agreed that for a social 
movement to exist, there must be a group conscious-
ness among its supporters, in the sense that they 
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must experience some sense of belonging and of 
solidarity. As Freeman has argued: 
of utmost importance is the consciousness that 
one is part of a group with whom one shares 
awareness of a particular concern. Individuals 
acting in response to common social forces 
with no particular identification with one 
another may be setting a trend, but they are 
not part of a movement. (3) 
There must then be agreement within the movement on 
what is the problem, on what is wrong, and a desire 
to communicate this vision.of society to others, to 
spread the message. This entails the development 
of an ideology, that is some kind of vision of how 
things could be made better in the future - al-
though, as Gerlach and Hine have noted ( 4), such a 
V1Slon may only ever be expressed in very general 
terms. All of this, of course, applies equally 
well to political parties, but there are further 
defining characteristics which set social movements 
apart from other forms of concerted political 
action. Firstly, 
about change by 
social movements aim to bring 
non-institutionalised means.(S) 
This is not to say that a social movement will shun 
any kind of participation in institutionalised 
channels of access: however, it will not restrict 
itself to these but will seek to develop and 
exploit means of exercising pressure that fall 
outside those channels. Secondly, social movements 
employ a looser and usually more decentralised form 
of organisation than do political parties or 
pressure groups, and concomitantly place more 
reliance on the commitment and activism of their 
members. Social movements often avoid any kind of 
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formal institutional structure, many not having any 
membership per se, only supporters and activists -
the women's movement is a good example of this. 
Thirdly, and following on from these two points, 
social movements experience a much greater degree 
of exclusion from governmental decision-making 
processes than their more conventional counterparts 
in the pressure group and party universe. Fourthly, 
social movements normally aim to bring about 
radical and fundamental changes in society which, 
whilst this is also true of some pol i tical par-
ties,distinguishes them from most pressure groups. 
Finally, most social movements are characterised by 
the emphasis they place upon combining social 
change with personal change. Attitudinal and 
behavioural change on a personal level is often 
seen by social movement activists as being at least 
as important as applying overt pressure on politi-
cal authorities as James Q. Wilson puts it, 
'showing by one's conduct ~ model for a new social 
order,.(6) 
This last point, however, raises the question 
of whether the concept of social movements pays 
sufficient attention to the nature of the issue 
involved. Where the issue does have a personal 
dimension as in, for example, the feminist 
contention that 'the personal is political' - the 
utility of the social movement concept is clear. 
Its emphasis upon group consciousness and network-
ing, and the importance of this rather than highly 
structured organisation as a means of mobilising 
and retaining support, is particularly valuable. It 
is able to incorporate, for example, the way in 
which a feminist may attempt to 'live out' equality 
by renouncing subservient behaviour in both the 
public and the private domains, even in the absence 
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of structured group activity. However,where the 
issue is one on which any substantive change is 
dependent upon action in the public sphere (i.e by 
the state), and behavioural change on the personal 
level is inappropriate or irrelevant, the concept 
of social movements does not appear to give 
sufficient attention to the effect this has upon 
the character of any movement taking up such an 
issue. 
The Peace Movement in Britain is a case in 
point. 
clearly 
movement, 
Its characteristics are such that it is 
appropriate to 
in the light 
define it as a social 
of the defining features 
listed above. Its adherents are united in their 
abhorrence of nuclear weapons, and have a shared 
belief that such weapons do not constitute an 
effective or acceptable means of national defence. 
There is a clear collective desire to convince 
others of this viewpoint, using both institutiona-
lised channels and less conventional tactics. 
Although it contains formal organisations, of which 
CND is by far the most important, CND does not and 
cannot claim to represent the whole movement. The 
Peace Movement as a whole is loosely organised, 
based to a large extent on local ised groups, and 
has no overall membership structure. Much of its 
internal communication is effected informally, via 
networks of adherents with cross-cutting membership 
of localised and sectoral groups. 
However, the peace movement is concerned with 
an issue on which change can only be effected at 
the public level. Peace campaigners cannot exclude 
themselves from public policy on nuclear weapons or 
pursue an anti-nuclear personal lifestyle in the 
way that feminists or environmentalists are able 
to. Were it the case that all those involved in 
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the peace movement espoused 'total' pacifism, then 
the stress laid by the social movement concept upon 
the personal as well as the public would be 
unproblematic. As it is, however, 'total' pacifi-
cism may well be a sufficient condition for 
adherence to the peace movement, but it is not a 
necessary condition. There are many in the 
movement whose only commitment is to 'nuclear' 
pacifism, and who reject the viability or wisdom of 
outright pacifism. 
There is one sense in which the peace movement 
may be thought of as combining the personal with 
the political. This is the rejection of hierarchi-
cal and bureaucratic attitudes which runs through-
out the movement from, at one extreme, the 
emphasis placed upon internal democracy within the 
most formal organisation in the movement (national 
CND) to, at the other extreme, the complete 
rejection of any practice remotely resembling 
hierarchy among the Greenham women. It is only 
amongst the Greenham women, however, that this has 
been elevated into a principle of almost as much 
importance as the anti-nuclear stance itself. Among 
the rest of the peace movement, there is a distinct 
preference for informality and egalitarianism, but 
it is seen as being tangential to the basic issue 
of opposition to nuclear weapons. 
The 'Rationality' of Participation 
This emphasis upon personal equality within 
the movement also offers some insight into why 
people participate in the Peace Movement. On first 
analysis, such a question may seem redundant 
people may have different reasons for their 
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oppos i tion to nuclear weapons (for example ~ moral 
or political), but these reasons could all be 
subsumed under a general heading of shared atti-
tudes. As Olson has argued, however(7), there is 
nothing inevitable about people with common 
atti tudes or interests joining a group to pursue 
them. On the contrary, if a sufficiently large 
group already exists - such that the individual 
contribution of anyone person will not have a 
.significant effect on the success of that group 
-then Olson argues it would be more 'rational' for 
that individual to devote their energies to their 
own specific interests, because they will receive 
any benef i ts secured by the group anyway - the 
'free rider' phenomenon. Therefore, group partici-
pation is something to be investigated and ex-
plained, it cannot be treated as unproblematic. 
Olson's own explanation, which is based largely on 
groups which seek material goods or services, 
centres around ideas about selective rewards or 
sanctions for group membership as incentives to 
participate. Olson argues that his theory is not 
very useful for the study of what he terms 'philan-
thropic lobbies' that is, groups which voice 
concern about some group or sector of society other 
than the group that supports the lobby, a defini-
tion which obviously encompasses the Peace Movement 
- because of the absence of selective rewards for 
those who participate. 
Gamson (8), however,· takes issue with Olson 
over this disclaimer. Gamson argues that one of the 
central points about Olson's theory is that it 
offers a new insight, which is that all groups 
(whether they are basically self-interested or 
philanthropic) face the same problem - how to get 
members to work for something that they will 
13 
-_/ 
receive or not receive independently of their 
individual efforts. Disputing Olson's distinction 
between groups which are seeking material benefits 
for their own members, and those which are seeking 
non-exclusive or collective changes, Gamson argues 
convincingly that: 
For the older group theorists whom (Olson) 
criticises, the distinction is relevant. They 
see it as entirely reasonable that individuals 
with common interests usually attempt to 
further their common interests while it 
requires an explanation 
should attempt to further 
that individuals 
someone else's 
interest or the interests of everybody. But 
in rejecting the 'naturalness' of pursuing 
one's common interests, Olson shows the 
distinction to be irrelevant. It is no more 
in one's personal interest to make sacrifices 
to achieve the goal of his particular group 
than it is for him to make sacrifices to 
achieve the good of the whole or of some 
disadvantaged 
belong. All 
group to which he does 
require an explanation.(9) 
not 
This is to some extent irrelevant to the present 
discussion, given that both 'old' and 'new' group 
theorists agree that participation in 'philan-
thropic' groups is a phenomenon which requires 
explanation. It is relevant, however, in that it 
makes the point that differential motives of 
participants in the Peace Movement do not remove 
the necessity to explain their participation. 
Whether people are participating because of 
apparently 'philanthropic' motives (e.g. a desire 
for world peace) or apparently more 'self-inter-
14 
ested' motives (e.g. to protect their own children 
from the threat of nuclear war, or to in some way 
advance the prospects of their favoured political 
party), their participation is still - in Olson's 
terminology 
explanation. 
'irrational', and thus requires 
One possible explanation is the dichotomy 
developed by Parkin between 'instrumental' and 
'expressive' politics.(lO) He defines 'instrumen-
tal' politics as activity directly geared to the 
attainment of concrete (usually material) goals, 
whilst 'expressive' political behaviour is more 
concerned with the benefits and satisfactions which 
the activity in itself affords. In his analysis of 
CND's supporters in the sixties, Parkin argues 
that they showed a distinct preference for expres-
sive politics, which was related to their adherence 
to deviant values deviant in the sense of 
alienation from the dominant values in British 
society at the time (such as support for the 
monarchy, capitalism, the established church and 
nationalism). Parkin's thesis is that participa-
tion in CND was not simply a result of an individ-
ual's opposition to nuclear weapons, but also a 
'capsule statement' of the individual's attitudes 
on a variety of other issues - CND membership was 
symbolic of a generally 'progressive' value 
orientation which was at odds with the more 
established and conventional values in society at 
the time. Thus, Parkin argues: 
Those who subscribe to deviant values, 
particularly of a religious or political kind, 
will have to seek outlets for their expression 
and re-affirmation since they are not firmly 
institutionalised in the social system in the 
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way that dominant values are. Expressive 
political activity could therefore be regarded 
as functionally necessary for the maintenance 
of deviant values. 
tions, vigils and so 
expressive politics 
The marches, demonstra-
forth which characterise 
provide a means of 
re-inforcing values which are not securely 
integrated in the social structure in the 
sense that they lack the support and the legi-
timating effect of major institutions.(ll) 
This raises two points. Firstly, the incentive for 
participation in group acti vi ty is that it offers 
the individual a specific if intangible reward -
the personal satisfaction to be derived from par-
ticipating with others who are like-minded. As wil-
son(12) has put it, such participation involves 
both collective solidarity and purposive incen-
tives; the former involves: 
the fun and conviviality of coming together, 
the sense of group membership or exclusive-
ness, and such collective status or esteem as 
the group as a whole may enjoy 
whilst the latter 'derive from the sense of 
satisfaction of having contributed to the attain-
ment of a worthwhile cause'. By including in their 
tactical armory an emphasis upon collective public 
events, social movements such as the Peace Movement 
can integrate movement and individual needs; only 
by actually participating, and not remaining a 
'free rider', can the individual experience the 
sense of satisfaction that group activity can 
offer. Secondly, Parkin's analysis draws our 
attention to the oppositional character of most 
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social movements, and certainly the Peace Movement. 
Participation can alleviate the feeling of aliena-
tion and powerlessness that individuals can experi-
ence when their values run counter to those in 
political 
meaningful 
authority; 
incentive 
environment. 
group solidarity 
when operating in 
becomes a 
a hostile 
This may offer some clue as to why CND rather 
than other 
rapidly at 
'oppositional' 
the beginning 
groupings expanded so 
of the eighties. The 
seventies had seen a Labour government degenerate 
into immobilism, and the trade .union movement 
castigated for the pursuit of 'self ish' sectional 
interest. For people holding left-wing views and 
wishing to register their opposition to the return 
to power of right-wing governments in the West, CND 
offered a relatively trouble-free opportunity to 
make a statement of opposition. Whilst support for 
environmental causes might involve difficulties 
with the established left over economic growth, and 
whilst 'moral' causes such as the anti-aparthe id 
campaign, Amnesty or the various Third World groups 
might be seen as worthy but to some extent irrele-
vant to domestic politics, nuclear disarmament was 
both relevant (especially so, given the 'independ-
ent' deterrent) and did not involve any head-on 
confrontation or questioning of traditional 
socialist beliefs. Membership of or support for 
CND did not entail renouncing membership of any 
other groups or parties, was not open to the 
accusation of pursuit of self-interest, and did not 
involve any adjustment of personal life-style. 
Moreover, by virtue of its earlier activities, CND 
was well established in the political culture as a 
'protesting' group, but one which was generally 
accepted as being sincere (if misguided, in the 
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opinion of many outside the left) and thus re-
spectable rather than revolutionary. When talking 
with younger supporters of the Campaign in the 
eighties, it is remarkable how often one finds that 
they are under the impression that the Campaign 
enjoyed its zenith in the late sixties and early 
seventies - in other words, it is seen as synony-
mous with the wave of student protest at that time, 
and part of an unbroken strand of radical dissent 
throughout the sixties and seventies. For these 
supporters, adherence to the Campaign was an 
obvious first step in establishing their creden-
tials as part of the opposition to the right of 
British politics, and the emphasis laid upon 
collective action made it even more attractive. 
Social Movement Organisations 
Prior to the sixties, a common assumption among 
social scientists was that social movements were a 
product of social stress. The argument was that a 
perceived deterioration in social conditions led 
individuals to experience a sense of relative 
deprivation, that this led to the formation of a 
collective view among the aggrieved on possible 
remedies for the discontent, and that social 
movements grew on this base. Consequently, much of 
the work done on social movements concentrated 
upon a social psychological perspective, investi-
gating the attitudes and perceived grievances of 
participants in social movements. Over the last 
twenty years ,however , a considerable shift in 
perspective has occurred. Working from the basic 
premise that there is usually sufficient stress and 
perceived grievance in society to generate social 
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movement activity, scholars have sought to explain 
the rise and fall of social movements by looking 
outside the social psychology of the individuals 
involved, to the question of how social movements 
mobilise resources. In other words, the new 
perspective discounts the idea that feelings of 
relative deprivation and grievance are a sufficient 
cause for social movement activity, and argues that 
such activity can only be understood by the study 
of organisations which mobilise resources for 
social movements (the social movement organisation: 
SMO), and the relationships between SMO's and other 
institutions and processes in society as a whole. 
To oversimplify: the new approach moves away from a 
concentration upon the individual participant in a 
social movement, and directs our attention towards 
the organisational and structural factors which are 
involved. The social psychology of the individual 
is not ignored in this new perspective - commonly 
termed the Resource Mobilisation approach - but it 
is relegated to a position of secondary importance. 
The traditional relative deprivation approach 
assumed that movements grew on a basis of individ-
ual grievance. whilst this may have had obvious 
relevance for such movements as the early Labour 
movement or the Black Power movement in America, 
its applicability to an essentially 'philanthropic' 
group such as the Peace movement is less clear. The 
resource mobilisation approach, however, argues 
that social movements are not necessarily based 
upon individual grievances. As McCarthy and Zald 
have argued(13), 'conscience constituents' 
supporters who do not stand to benefit directly or 
exclusi vely from a soc ial movement attaining its 
goals - are often major sources of support for 
social movements. Moving the analysis away from 
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just those with perceived grievances and who are 
direct beneficiaries of social movement activity 
also directs our attention to the varied strategic 
tasks faced by SMO's. They not only have to 
organise any direct beneficiaries. They also have 
to mobilise conscience constituentsl seek to turn 
those who are not supporters of the movement but 
are also not opposed to it (commonly termed 
'bystander publics') into supporters 1 and deal with 
those who are opponents. All of this activity has 
to be studied in the context of the attitudes of 
the political authorities in society, because these 
atti tudes will affect the readiness of people to 
alter their own status and commitment, their 
readiness to become bystanders rather than oppo-
nents, or supporters rather than bystanders. 
In seeking to effect these changes, SMO's are 
not just competing with opponents. The resource 
mobilisation perspective draws our attention to the 
phenomenon of competition between SMO's. The 
argument is that any social movement will typically 
have more than one SMO operating within its 
boundaries. Thus, even in the case of the British 
peace movement (which is unusual because it has one 
predominent SMO, CND) other SMO's exist the 
Freeze movement and END, for example. Although 
these different SMO's may pursue similar goals and 
use similar tactics, the resource mobilisation 
approach makes the point that they are competing 
for limited resources (e.g. time and money) from 
those segments of the population who agree with the 
overall goals of the movement in question. McCarthy 
and Zald term a cluster of SMO's that are working 
towards broadly similar goals a Social Movement 
Industry (SMI) - 'the organisational analogue of a 
social movement'(14). The importance of this 
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concept in the present context is that it draws our 
attention to the interplay not just between CND and 
its closest SMO's (e.g. the Freeze movement), but 
also to the relationship between CND and allied but 
more distinct SMOs for example, those in the 
environmental sector. Resource mobilisation 
theorists would make the point that, although 
friendly and cooperative relations may well exist 
between, for example, CND and Friends of the Earth 
and Greenpeace, they are all effectively in 
competition for scarce resources - the time, money, 
knowledge and commitment of those in British 
society who agree with the broad preferences 
espoused by these kind of SMOs. Indeed, in this 
context, the boundaries of this SMI are unclear. 
One could easily justify the inclusion of the 
Labour Party, other left parties and the Green 
party under the general heading of an anti-nuclear 
SM!. Where the boundaries are drawn is dependent 
upon the particular characteristics and structure 
of a society at anyone time. The point remains, 
however, that by directing our attention away from 
the social psychology of individuals and towards 
the broader organisational perspective, the 
resource mobilisation approach offers the potential 
for a considerably better understanding of social 
movement activity. 
The essence of the resource mobilisation 
approach, then, is the interplay between SMOs and 
society as a whole. As is the case in this thesis, 
most empirical studies which take the resource 
mobilisation approach as their starting point tend 
to concentrate attention on the level of individual 
SMOs. Before doing this, however, it is worth 
noting some of the insights that the resource 
mobilisation perspective offers about the societal 
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context of SMO activity. McCarthy and Zald offer 
the concept of the Social Movement Sector (SMS) 
which consists, quite simply, of all the SMls in a 
society, regardless of which social movement they 
are championing. This concept is used to make the 
point that the size of an SMS in a society at any 
one time is largely dependent on the amount of 
discretionary wealth and time available in that 
society. The more time and money that individuals 
have uncommitted and at their disposal, the greater 
the likelihood that SMls and SMOs will develop to 
compete for these resources(15). Of course, this 
is not a straightforward causal relationship. Other 
variables are involved, such as the extent of 
political freedoms in a society, the means of 
communication available, 
by political authorities, 
the extent of repression 
and so on - all of which 
will have effect upon the growth of the SMS in a 
society. 
remains; 
Nevertheless, 
the more wealth 
the basic hypothesis 
that is available in 
society, the more time that is available (and 
education is important in this context, as the more 
highly educated are more likely to give time), then 
the more likely it is that SMls and SMOs will 
develop. 
There is a clear link to be made here with the 
work of Inglehart( 16) and his concept of 'post-
materialism'. Using a nine-nation European survey 
in 1973, Inglehart has developed the thesis that 
the post-war generation in Europe has a different 
set of value preferences from the preceding 
generation. Drawing on the work of Maslow(17), he 
argues that the relative prosperity of Europe after 
1945 has meant that people are less concerned about 
basic material needs (food, shelter, etc.) and 
consequently more concerned with higher order 
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needs' (such as preserv ing freedom of speech in 
society, or giving people more say in decision-mak-
ing). Although Inglehart acknowledges that such 
'post-materialists' are still in a minority in 
Europe, he predicted in the seventies that the rise 
of post-materialism would lead to changes in 
political behaviour - a post-materialist/materia-
list cleavage developing to co-exist with (but not 
replace) the traditional class cleavage in pol i-
tics, and an increase in the number of 'new left' 
parties. It is a similar argument to that advanced 
by Habermas, who draws our attention to the way in 
which 'old' conflicts over the allocation of 
material resources in 
establ ished parties and 
society, 
interest 
co-exist with 'new' conflicts caused 
mediated via 
groups, now 
by individuals 
seeking greater participation and more opportuniti-
es for 
ety.(18) 
realising their 
This is not 
own potential 
the context in 
in soci-
which to 
embark on 
ments(19), 
any lengthy assessment of such argu-
al though in general terms the rise of 
the Peace Movement and Green parties in certain 
parts of Europe would seem to substantiate these 
arguments 
The Political Opportunity Structure. 
The point remains, however, that the political 
expression of post-materialist values is uneven 
throughout Europe 1 this draws our attention to 
other, potentially constraining factors. Whilst 
both McCarthy and Zald and Inglehart are presenting 
general arguments about the potential for social 
movement activi ty to occur, the extent to which 
this potential is realised will of course depend 
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upon the particular political configurations in a 
society. Useful in this respect is the concept of 
a 'political opportunity structure' - the institu-
tional arrangements (e.g. electoral and party 
systems) and cultural attitudes which form the 
political context within which social movements 
have to operate. 
impact on the 
These will have a 
strategies employed 
significant 
by social 
movements and their impact on society. Thus, for 
example, Kitschelt(20) has argued that political 
systems which are both 'open' in input terms 
(multi-parti, influential legislature, good access 
for pressure groups), and 'weak' 
(decentralised state apparatus, 
independent political arbiters), 
in output terms 
the judiciary as 
will encourage 
social movements to adopt 'assimilative' strategies 
(lobbying, petitioning, participating in public 
inquiries and possibly elections); whereas those 
which are 'closed' in input terms and 'strong' in 
output terms will lead social movements to adopt 
'confrontational' strategies (demonstrations, 
varieties of direct action). Such a framework may 
be lacking in precision - the British political 
system, for example, does not seem to fit neatly 
into the strong/weak, open/closed dichotomies, and 
the Peace Movement utilises both assimilative and 
confrontational strategies - but it does remind us 
of the necessity to examine the tactics of social 
movements within the context of the political 
opportuni ties open to· them. The point has been 
made on a more general level by Tilley( 2l), who 
argues that the key to success for a social 
movement lies in it being able to form alliances 
with established groups in the political system. 
The particular relevance of the idea of a 
political opportunity structure to a discussion of 
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CND is that it highlights the differences between 
the Campaign and other social movements. Our 
argument is that the peace movement is faced with a 
different political opportunity structure from that 
which obtains for other social movements, and that 
this has a significant impact upon the structure, 
tactics and survival chances of the movement. 
Feminists and environmentalists are, of course, 
concerned to make issue-specific impacts, but they 
are also engaged upon developing and propagating 
wider philosophies concerned with fundamental 
cultural and institutional change in 
can look to changes in personal 
contribute towards achieving this. 
significant influence upon these 
organisation and tactics. Although 
society, and 
lifestyle to 
This is a 
movements' 
the peace 
movement is concerned with an issue which has many 
ramifications for thinking on defence and foreign 
pol icy generally, its whole orientation is much 
more issue-specific. It is not the case that it 
chooses to seek alliances with established members 
of the polity because this will enhance its chances 
of success, but that the nature of the issue it is 
concerned with is such that it has no alternative 
but to do this. This is one of the reasons why the 
peace movement has an organised nucleus in .the form 
of CND (although, as we shall see, there are also 
historical reasons), and why CND itself is· so 
concerned to elicit support among established 
members of the polity as well as among the general 
public. The dilemma CND has to face is to what 
extent it can build such alliances without compro-
mising what many of its supporters see as non-
negotiable principles. This has been a particular 
problem for CND during the eighties, as the British 
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political system has undergone some substantial 
changes. 
The Structure of Social Movement Organisations 
As social movements, and their concomitant social 
movement organisations grow, so the structure of 
SMOs evolves. Organisational development has been 
a focus of interest for sociologists and political 
scientists for many years now, and a traditional 
view has evolved, typified by the arguments of 
Weber and Michels. This view argues that an 
organisation will, over time, become oligarchic and 
bureaucratic. An elite group will emerge within 
the organisation who, in order to ensure the 
survival of the organisation and thus their own 
position, will moderate the original goals of the 
organisation, so as to 'minimise opposition from 
outside the organisation. Bureaucratisation will 
develop, initially in an effort to make the 
organisation I s work more effective (by taking 
advantage of specialisation, division of labour and 
clear internal hierarchy), but this will eventually 
result in rules and procedures being observed for 
their own sake rather than their relevance to the 
overall goals of the organisation. Despite these 
apparent drawbacks, bureaucratisation is seen as 
inevitable as it is the most rational form of 
organisation. 
This traditional view of organisational 
structure is well known in social science, and is 
reflected in the work of social movement theorists. 
Perhaps the best known is the work of Gamson(22), 
who argues that centralisation and bureaucrat is a-
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tion in an SMO increase its chances of success. 
Based on a study of 53 'challenging groups' in 
America, Gamson identifies two broad dimensions of 
success: the extent to which a challenging group is 
accepted by its antagonists as being a valid 
spokesman for a legitimate set of interests, and 
the extent to which the group wins new advantages 
for its beneficiaries. He goes on to argue that 
bureaucratisation helps a group with the problem of 
'pattern maintenance' (i.e. the routine performance 
of necessary tasks, which makes the group more 
ready for action), and that this will enhance the 
group's chances of being accepted. Centralisation 
also increases combat readiness by reducing 
internal conflict in the group, and this tends to 
increase the group's chances of winning new 
advantages.(23) 
This is a superficial account of a complex 
argument which Gamson himself qualifies in many 
respects, and which has been subject to detailed 
criticism by other authors.(24) However, it will 
suffice to note in this context the broad thrust of 
Gamson's argument - that organisations which are 
both centralised and bureaucratic are most likely 
to succeed. An alternative argument has been 
developed by Gerlach and Hine(25), who dispute the 
idea that centralisation and bureaucratisation are 
the most efficient organisational form for SMOs to 
adopt. on the contrary, they argue, movements that 
utilised a decentralised and essentially informal 
organisational structure are likely to be more 
effective. Gerlach and Hine offer a model, 
or ig inally des igna ted SPIN ( segmented, polycepha-
lous, interaction networks) and then reformulated 
as SPR (segmentary, polycephalous and reticulate). 
Segmentary denotes a structure in which a movement 
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is composed of a range of diverse groups or cells -
for example, the local groups in the British peace 
movement. Polycephalous means that the organisa-
tion is many-headed in other words, it is 
decentralised, with no one central command or 
decision-making structure,and no single authorita-
tive leader - so a leader in one group may have no 
influence in other groups. Reticulate means that 
these groups are not an amorphous collection, but 
are organised into a network partly through 
formalised links, and partly through cross-cutting 
memberships, the work of 'travelling evangelists' 
(i.e. spokesmen) who go from group to group making 
speeches and so on, and partly through informal 
personal links and friendships among the movement's 
supporters. 
The advantages of this SPR structure are held 
to be that it makes for a highly adaptive movement, 
which is able to experiment with different tactics 
and which is less vulnerable than a centralised 
organisation to suppression by authorities. Because 
the movement consists of many groups or 
can 'do it's own thing' which 
cells, each 
facil i tates 
penetration into a variety of other groups and 
institutions in society. It is also argued that, 
precisely because there is no central authority 
imposing specialisation and division 
there will occur duplication of effort 
between groups - but that this actually 
of labour, 
and overlap 
contributes 
to 'system reliability' in the movement because it 
makes it more likely that if one group fails or 
contracts, another group can quickly take its 
place. Moreover, the relative autonomy of the 
multiple groups means that some may experiment with 
radical or innovative tactics; if these work, 
others are encouraged to follow - but if they fail 
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and attract adverse comment, then the failure will 
only affect the groups most directly concerned, and 
the whole movement will not be dragged down by the 
failure of a few groups. Finally, mUltiplicity of 
leadership 
that the 
and lack of centralised 
authorities in society 
control means 
cannot easily 
predict what will happen next in the movement, and 
cannot easily suppress it or seek to coopt it into 
the establishment because there is no single, 
centralised leadership to target. 
It should be noted that the 
Gamson and Gerlach and Hine are 
arguments of 
not strictly 
comparable, in that Gerlach and Hine are drawing on 
work concerned with social movements which empha-
sise personal change as well as social change in 
their ideology. This entails a concept of personal 
power being emphasised by such movement adherents, 
and it is the expression of this which gives rise 
to many of the distinctive features of the SPR 
organisational form. One may question the relevance 
of the model to the British peace movement on this 
basis. It might also be argued that the assumption 
that multiple local groups enjoy a large degree of 
effective autonomy is problematic, given the 
tendency of the media to treat them as a collecti-
vity, and visit the perceived sins of one upon all 
(the relationship between the Greenham women and 
the Peace Movement is a case in point here). 
Nevertheless, as with Gamson, it will suffice to 
take the broad outline of Gerlach and Hine's 
argument, which suggests that decentralisation and 
informal organisation may well' have concrete 
advantages to offer to social movements. 
Obviously, these two arguments have not been 
the only contributions to the debate on social 
movement organisation in recent years, but they do 
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represent the two opposing poles in the discussion. 
Others have offered more intermediate arguments. 
Zald and Ash(26) have made the point that a social 
movement will have more than one SMO within it, and 
that these different SMOs can adopt differing 
organisational forms to 'fit' their varying 
strategic aims. Similarly, drawing upon a study of 
the anti-nuclear movement in America, Dwyer(27) 
makes the point that a movement with a varied 
structure enjoys a great strategic flexibility 
-local groups having the ability to act spontane-
ously and encourage participation, larger and more 
formal groups being able to mobilise more resources 
in the form of money, staff and expertise. 
It would be easy to assume from this discus-
sion that it ~as open to any SMO to decide upon its 
strategic objectives - for example, a centralised, 
hierarchical structure if the objective was 
specific policy changes, or a decentralised 
structure if personal change was thought more 
important. In the real world, of course, things 
are not that simplel social movements attract 
adherents who come to the movement with already 
existing values and past experiences which will 
obviously affect the kind of organisational 
structure which develops. Freeman(28) explains this 
well in her work based upon the women's movement in 
America. She starts from the premise that virtually 
every social movement must have both tangible 
resources (e.g. money, office space, a means of 
publicis ing the movement's ideas) and intangible 
resources (primarily people - either their exper-
tise or, more importantly, their time and commit-
ment). She makes the point that social movements 
are typically very dependent on intangible re-
sources - people who are prepared to make an effort 
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on behalf of the movement. However, as she argues, 
the way in which people will be prepared to give 
expression to their commitment will be influenced 
by those people's values, past experiences, 
expectations for the future, and reference groups 
(i.e. others against whom people measure their own 
behaviour and attitudes). Thus, in the context of 
the women's movement, Freeman identifies two broad 
groups the younger and older branches. The 
younger branch had past experience in radical 
politics, had developed radical values and hence 
were only prepared to work within an organisational 
context that stressed decentralisation and equal 
participation, and rejected any kind of hierarchi-
cal structure. The older branch had experience in 
party politics and more traditional interest 
groups, saw formalised organisational structure as 
a help not a hindrance and argued that "getting 
equality was more important than living it". So the 
younger branch developed its organisation very much 
along the decentralised lines outlined in Gerlach 
and Hine's SPR model, while the older branch 
established more formalised, centralised national 
organisations. 
Conclusions 
Nei ther of the broad approaches to the study of 
social movements that are outlined above - relative 
deprivation and resource mobilisation offer a 
completely satisfactory solution to the problem of 
structuring research on the Peace Movement in 
Britain. The relative deprivation approach may 
suggest some guidance on the level of individual's 
feelings of discontent leading to participation. 
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This would require an interpretation of relative 
deprivation terminology which saw individuals as 
feeling that they had a legitimate right to live 
in a society free from weapons of mass destruction, 
and that this right was being withheld from them. 
There may be some validity in this, but it does not 
allow for the possibility that such feelings will 
arise as a consequence of participation in the 
Peace Movement or similar organisations, rather 
than being a cause of it. Poli tical experience 
prior to participation in the Peace Movement may be 
just as much of a spur to involvement as any 
perceived feeling of deprivation. The resource 
mobilisation perspective is more attractive, 
because it has a much wider scope - it is founded 
on the idea that one must look beyond the individ-
ual, to the societal context in which movements 
arise and operate, and the ways in which movements 
and 'their' groups can and do interact. 
It is precisely because the resource mobilisa-
tion perspective offers this greater breadth that 
it must be treated with caution. Many of the 
concepts employed - not least, the central concept 
of 'resources' - are open to a variety of interpre-
tations. It is not clear, for example, to what 
extent the parameters of what is seen as 'legiti-
mate' protest activity within a specific political 
culture can be accommodated within the resource 
mobilisation perspective. If, however, we are 
content to work with the broad thrust of such 
approaches, then the resource mobilisation perspec-
tive does offer significant advantages. It directs 
our attention towards the processes involved in the 
creation, strategy, tactics and interactions of 
social movement organisations within social 
movements. In the case of the British peace 
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movement - unusual among social movements in that 
it is dominated by just one such SMO - these are 
clearly central questions which have to be ad-
dressed. 
In what follows, we shall be looking at the 
organisation, membership, tactics and impact of the 
Campaign. We shall be asking why people partici-
pate in what is apparently a 'philanthropic' group. 
We shall be examining how CND seeks to maintain the 
commitment and enthusiasm of its supporters 
(especially in the face of competition from related 
groups) via a variety of campaigning tactics whilst 
not letting these tactics alienate potential 
supporters and 'bystander' publics. We shall be 
questioning whether it is possible for the Cam-
paign's leadership to run the organisation on 
democratic and decentralised lines whilst also 
retaining enough of an authority structure to deter 
infiltration from outside and give a sense of 
coherence to the Campaign as a whole. Not least, 
given the nature of the issue involved, we shall 
be analysing how CND has reacted to changes in the 
poli tical opportunity structure during the eight-
ies, and to what extent the Campaign can change its 
priorities and build alliances with established 
parties and institutions in the light of what many 
of its supporters see as non-negotiable principles. 
Firstly, however, we shall set the general context 
of Britain's defence policy, and relate this to the 
Campaign's first wave of activity in the fifties 
and sixties. 
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Chapter Two 
DEFENCE POLICY: THE GENERAL CONTEXT 
Bri tain' s first atomic weapon was tested in 
Australia in 1952. The decision to manufacture a 
British atomic device dated back to 1947, when 
Attlee's Labour government decided to commence work 
on a nuclear weapons programme. Then, as since, 
the decision was taken by only a small group of 
Ministers (1); it was not a matter for discussion 
by the full Cabinet, let alone Parliament, the 
media or the public. This desire for secrecy was 
partly motivated by a desire to keep the United 
States unaware that Britain was developing its own 
atomic weapons. Britain and the United States had 
cooperated fully on the 'Manhattan Project' during 
the war, spurred by a common fear that Germany 
might win the race to develop a nuclear capability. 
The British, however, had been a junior rather than 
full partner in the proj ect, and in any case the 
united States had withdrawn its cooperation shortly 
after the war ended. The Attlee government and its 
civil service and military advisers were concerned 
not to allow the United States to acquire a 
monopoly over this new development in weaponry (the 
Soviet Union did not produce an atomic device until 
1949), not least because it would signify Britain 
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conceding that it was no longer a world power. It 
must be remembered that in the immediate post-war 
period it was far ~ from clear to the British 
government whether the united States would adopt an 
isolationist foreign policy, which would effec-
tively mean that Britain would have to rely on its 
own resources to defend itself. 
The Formation of NATO 
Cooperation between Britain and America did 
not resume until the fifties, when Soviet expan-
sionism in Eastern Europe and the Korean War 
convinced the two Western powers of the desirabil-
ity of a more coordinated approach to defence. The 
development of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe 
prompted the formation of NATO (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation) in 1949. Originally this was 
no more than an agreement between the Western 
powers that an attack on one would be treated as an 
attack on all - in effect, that American involve-
ment in any future hostilities would be more 
immediate than it had been in the two World Wars, 
and could entail use of America's nuclear capabil-
i ty. The experience of the Korean War, however, 
which demonstrated that conventional war need not 
necessarily escalate onto the nuclear level, 
prompted the development of NATO into an organis-
ation rather than just an agreement. Military 
thinking in the aftermath of the Second World War 
tended to the viewpoint that the development of 
nuclear weapons made it very unlikely that global 
conflict would re-occur on a conventional level. 
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The Korean experience suggested that; on the 
contrary, this was indeed a possibili ty. The NATO 
countries responded by constructing a military 
organisation in which most of the conventional 
forces of the European members of NATO, and a 
substantial number of American forces, were 
commi tted to NATO and placed under a NATO command 
structure. 
The cost of conventional re-armament in the 
early fifties, however, together with the knowledge 
that the soviet union now had a nuclear armoury, 
quickly convinced NATO of the economic and military 
benefits of a strategy which rested on both 
conventional and nuclear weapons. From 1953 on, 
NATO strategy rested not on matching Soviet 
conventional forces, but rather upon relying on 
American nuclear superiority to deter attack. This 
strategy was enthusiastically endorsed by Britain's 
Conservative government at the time, not least 
because it enabled the government to argue that the 
nuclear deterrent removed the need to maintain 
large conventional forces, so conscription (nation-
al service) could be brought to an end. American 
possession of a nuclear deterrent was not consid-
ered to be a sufficient guarantee of Britain's 
security, however. The Suez affair in 1956, which 
harmed Anglo-American relations and offered a 
graphic reminder of Britain's declining world-power 
status, increased the determination of the Conser-
vative government to maintain an 'independent' 
nuclear deterrent. From 1958 on, the V-Bomber 
force (designed and built in Britain) was deployed 
to fulfil this role. Doubts about the capability 
of the V-Bombers to penetrate Soviet defence 
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systems led Britain to attempt to develop its own 
ballistic missile as an eventual replacement for 
the Bomber force - the 'Blue Streak' - but this 
programme was cancelled when it became clear that 
it would prove too costly and (given the rate of 
technical advance in America and the Soviet Union) 
probably ineffective by the time it came into 
service. The British government's solution was to 
turn to America: between 1958 and 1962, the two 
government's concluded a number of agreements which 
resulted in uniquely close links over nuclear 
matters. American intermediate-range nuclear mis-
siles were based in Britain from 1958 on, and 
America was given permission to base its new 
Polaris submarines at Holy Loch in Scotland in 
1960. In return, America agreed to sell its 
'Skybolt' air-launched ballistic missile system to 
Britain as a replacement for the ill-fated 'Blue 
Streak' • The British government received a nasty 
shock when the new Kennedy administration cancelled 
the 'Skybolt' programme, but the problem was 
resolved in 1962 when Macmillan and Kennedy 
concluded the Nassau agreement, whereby America was 
to supply Britain with Polaris missiles which would 
be fitted with British warheads and deployed in 
British-built submarines. 
MAD and Flexible Response 
Bri tain thus maintained its 'independent' 
deterrent, thought this independence was qualified 
by a dependence upon American technology and had 
the political cost of causing the French government 
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to become even more inimical to the idea of British 
membership of the European Community. However, 
Britain remained convinced of the need to commit 
the bulk of its defence resources to NATO, the 
'independent' deterrent being seen as 
weapon of last resort. It also 
very much a 
represented 
something of an insurance should the NATO Alliance 
ever develop problems. There was some indication 
that this might happen in the early sixties, when 
the soviet expansion of its nuclear arsenal - to 
the point where it developed the capability to 
retaliate in kind to any nuclear attack - caused 
some doubts within NATO about the extent of the 
American commitment. Superpower nuclear parity 
meant the development of the MAD (mutual assured 
destruction) and 'counter-value' strategies 
deterrence resting on the ability of either side 
to wreak immense destruction on their opponent's 
cities and industrial. base. American military 
thinkers became concerned that a defence strategy 
which rested upon the willingness of an American 
President to risk nuclear annihilation of American 
ci ties in order to defend Europe from a conven-
tional Soviet attack would not be seen as credible 
by the Soviet Union. The Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations began to argue the desirability of 
expanding NATO's conventional forces. This worried 
the European partners in NATO, partly because of 
the cost involved and more importantly because they 
thought that the new American approach signalled a 
greater reluctance 
Europe's security. 
these concerns led 
to act as nuclear guarantor of 
Discussion within NATO about 
in 1967 to its adoption by NATO 
of the doctrine of 'flexible response' - whereby 
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NATO was to maintain strategic nuclear forces; 
build up its conventional forces; and most 
importantly introduce a new element, American 
intermediate and short-range nuclear weapons based 
in Europe. For the Americans, flexible response 
meant it was less likely that they might have to 
respond to a conventional soviet 
Europe by inter-continental nuclear 
offensive in 
war. For the 
Europeans, the crucially important feature of 
flexible response was that it strengthened the link 
between European and American security. The 
introduction of intermediate and short-range 
('tactical' or 'theatre') nuclear weapons gave NATO 
a "ladder of escalation" from conventional to 
'limited' nuclear exchanges to all-out nuclear war. 
This quelled doubts among Europeans that America 
was becoming more sanguine about the possibility of 
conventional war in Europe. Then, as in the late 
seventies and again in 1986/7, it was European 
rather than American official opinion which 
stressed the desirability of deploying American 
nuclear weapons on European soil. 
As we shall see, NATO has remained committed 
to a strategy of flexible response for the last 
twenty years. The concept of flexible response 
rests upon not just maintaining certain capabili-
ties and resources, but also upon making clear 
certain intentions. In NATO's view, its mix of 
conventional and strategic and intermediate nuclear 
weapons can only fulfil its purpose of deterring 
Soviet aggression (and NATO consistently _sees 
itself as a defensive alliance) if NATO retains the 
option of being the first actually to use nuclear 
weapons in the event of war. NATO's reasoning is 
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that if it were to enter into any commitment to 'no 
first use' of nuclear weapons, this would open the 
way to the Soviet Union using its apparently 
superior conventional forces to launch a conven-
tional attack on Western Europe secure in the 
knowledge that if they refrained from employing 
nuclear weapons, so would NATO. Thus, while NATO 
has made it clear that it would be likely to meet 
any conventional 
it has made it 
attack with conventional defence, 
equally clear that this is not 
certain and, more importantly, that such restraint 
may be short-lived. NATO has spelt this out in 
unambiguous language 1 the purpose of the flexible 
response strategy is: 
to permit a flexible range of responses 
combining two main capabilities: to meet any 
aggression by direct defence at a level judged 
to -be appropriate to defeat the attack,and to 
be prepared to escalate the level deliber-
ately, maintaining firm political control,if 
defence at the level first selected is not 
effective. An aggressor must be convinced of 
NATO's readiness to use nuclear weapons if 
necessary, but he must be uncertain regarding 
the timing or the circumstances in which they 
would be used.(2) 
Whether or not the strategy of flexible response 
has been responsible for preserving the peace' in 
Europe since the sixties is impossible to deter-
mine. What is certain is that it has enabled NATO 
governments to avoid the need to match the Soviet 
Union in terms of conventional weaponry and forces, 
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• 
wi th all the economic and pol i tical consequences 
such a policy might involve. In terms of their 
relative destructive power, nuclear weapons are 
much less costly than an equivalent conventional 
force 
offer 
argued 
- as the Americans put it , nuclear weapons 
'more bangs per buck'. Similarly, it is 
by advocates of the flexible response 
doctrine that any move towards conventional-only 
defence would have substantial political implica-
tions, as it might well entail a return to some 
form of conscription or national service - much 
more of a political problem for western governments 
than their Communist counterparts. Flexible 
response ,wi th its combination of nuclear and 
conventional weaponry and the refusal to enter into 
any preconditions as to the use of all or any of 
that weaponry, has relieved NATO governments of the 
need to divert resources in order to obtain a 
position of parity with the Warsaw Pact's conven-
tional forces. There can be little doubt that this 
has been of considerable economic and political 
benefit to the west European governments in NATO. 
The other perceived benefit of flexible 
response as far as the European members of NATO 
have been concerned was that it provided 'linkage' 
between Europe and the United States. The presence 
of American intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe 
meant that NATO had an escalatory option which was 
short of all-out intercontinental nuclear war, and 
this was felt to enhance the credibility of NATO's 
deterrent strategy. During the seventies, however, 
many in NATO (and particularly the European 
partners) became concerned that a gap was appearing 
in Nato's capabilities. NATO had short-range 
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('battlefield') nuclear weapons in place - although 
there was concern that by their very proximity to 
Warsaw Pact forces they were vulnerable to surprise 
attack, which might place NATO commanders in a 'use 
or lose' situation. NATO also had intermediate 
nuclear weapons, but these were based on airborne 
delivery systems (e.g. Fl 1l aircraft) which were 
ranged against improving air defence systems in the 
Warsaw Pact. These apparent deficiencies were in 
themselves enough to prompt a debate within NATO 
about the need to modernise its intermediate 
nuclear capability, a debate which became even more 
pressing when the Soviet Union started to deploy a 
new generation of intermediate weapons - notably 
the Backfire bomber and the SS-20 missile, which 
was both more accurate and more destructive than 
its predecessor. 
The TWin-Track Decision of 1979 
The Europeans were worried not only by these 
new technical developments on the Soviet side, but 
also by the apparent trend towards some political 
accommodation between the superpowers (via the SALT 
11 disarmament talks) on intercontinental weapons, 
which might have the ei'fect of reducing the 
American commitment to Europe. 
commented 
As Wi11iams has 
Until the invasion of Afghanistan in December 
1979 the primary concern in Europe was how to 
prevent superpower collusion. And the SALT 11 
treaty, far from alleviating these worries, 
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may have intensified them. The omission from· 
SALT 11 of Soviet missiles aimed only at 
Western Europe, together with the agreement on 
limiting the range of the Backfire bombers 
(which effectively meant that they would only 
threaten Western Europe and not the united 
States homeland) seemed to offer further 
evidence of American unreliability.(3) 
These concerns culminated in the 1979 decision to 
modernise NATO's intermediate forces by the 
introduction of Cruise and Pershing 11 missiles to 
NATO's armoury. They offered significant tactical 
advantages over the existing airborne systems. 
Although Cruise was relatively slow and thus had a 
flight time of several hours to reach its targets 
in the East, its abil i ty to fly very low and the 
accuracy promised by its TERCOM navigation system, 
made NATO planners confident that any attack based 
on a wave of Cruise missiles would be certain of 
enough missiles 
defence systems. 
evading 
Pershing 
the 
II 
Warsaw Pact's air 
had a more conven-
tional flight pattern, but was extremely fast and 
accurate; provided it could be based near to its 
targets, its sheer speed was thought to be suffi-
cient to pose severe problems for any air defence 
system. 
The decision in 1979 to modernise was not only 
intended to redress a perceived military imbalance 
between East and West in Europe, but also to 
signify that NATO could agree on major innovations. 
This was something which the protracted debate over 
the deployment of the ' neu tron bomb' in Europe 
between 1977 and 1979 had cast into doubt. The 
45 
neutron bomb, designed primarily as an anti-tank 
weapon, was distinguished by its enhanced radiation 
capability - that is to say, compared with other 
nuclear weapons which emit a similar amount of 
radiation, the neutron bomb's lower levels of blast 
and fallout mean that it has a relatively less 
destructive effect on buildings.(4) Because of 
this, it quickly became dubbed the 'capitalist' 
bomb, a weapon which killed people while leaving 
property intact. As Freedman has argued, this was 
something of an exaggeration, there being no 
question of buildings being left intact after a 
neutron bomb attack(5). Nevertheless, it proved a 
sufficiently powerful political argument such that 
nei ther the United States nor the major European 
allies in NATO were prepared to take a lead in 
arguing for its deployment in Europe. President 
Carter decided against deployment in 1978, but the 
Reagan administration started 
weapon in 1981, stockpiling 
States. 
production of the 
it in the United 
At the same time as deciding to deploy Cruise 
and pershing II, NATO indicated that it would be 
willing to enter into negotiations with the Soviet 
Union to remove all such weapons from Europe -hence 
the term 'twin-track' which was coined to describe 
the 1979 decision. The United States did offer its 
European all ies the option of a 'dual-key' (i. e. 
joint) control over the new weapons, but this was 
declined by the Europeans - partly because it would 
have entailed a significant financial contribution 
to the costs of the new systems, and partly because 
one of the main concerns of the Europeans was to 
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reinforce the American commitment to Europe. As 
Freedman has argued 
The whole point about the Cruise and Pershing 
missiles was that they were designed to 
increase the nuclear risk to the United States 
of a land war in Europe.(6) 
The West 
concerned 
German government was 
to maintain this linkage, 
particularly 
and agreed to 
the siting of the pershing 11 missiles in Germany, 
which would maximise the tactical advantage offered 
by the missile's speed. When it came to the 
decision on where Cruise was to be based, however, 
the German government was insistent that Germany 
should not be the only recipient in NATO. There 
was apprehension in the German government that were 
both new systems to be based solely on their 
territory, they would be singled out for undue 
pressure from the Soviet Union. Consequently, 
Britain, Belgium, Holland and Italy were designated 
. as recipients for the 464 Cruise missiles which 
were to be deployed. 
Cruise and Pershing are part of the new 
generation of nuclear missiles which emerged during 
the seventies. Together with the American MX system 
and the Soviet SS-l~ and SS-20 systems, they are 
distinguished from their predecessors primarily by 
their delivery systems, which are much more 
accurate and better able to penetrate defensive 
systems. This was the focus for much of the 
criticism levelled against Cruise and Pershing 11. 
Their apparent ability to strike at the opposi-
tion's missile sites rather than civilian or 
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industrial targets has led some to label them as 
'first-strike' weapons, and to argue that their 
deployment has opened the way for NATO to adopt a 
war-fighting strategy. pershing II was also seen 
as destabilising because its speed necessitates 
defensive systems which are based on a 'launch-
on-warning' capability - with all the possibilities 
of human and technical error that this involves. 
These technical innovations might not have been 
sufficient in themselves to prompt the wave of 
protest which has erupted in Europe following the 
1979 twin-track decision, but the changing interna-
tional climate at the end of the seventies put 
these technological developments in a new light. 
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the 
arrival in office of the Thatcher government and 
the Reagan administration, signalled the end of the 
era of detente which had characterised much of the 
seventies. Relations between the superpowers 
deteriorated amidst talk of 'evil empires', and it 
came as no surprise that the u.s./Soviet negotia-
tions over intermediate nuclear weapons (which 
started in 1981 as a result of the twin-track 
decision> finally ground to a halt in 1983 with no 
agreement being reached. The failure of these 
talks meant that in December of 1983 NATO went 
. 
ahead with its plans to begin the deployment of 
Cruise and Pershing II in Europe. 
Not the least "of the problems encountered in 
these talks was that whilst the Americans conceptu-
alised Cruise and Pershing II as intermediate 
weapons, the Soviet Union argued that they were no 
different from America's strategic weapons as 
"they had the ability to strike at the Soviet 
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homeland. Consequently, the Soviet Union made it 
clear that it would regard any European-based 
strike by Cruise or Pershing 11 as tantamount to 
direct aggression by the Uni ted States, and thus 
liable to result in a retaliatory strike against 
both Europe and the United States itself. This 
was,of course, precisely the kind of linkage 
between America and European security which the 
major European partners in NATO had wanted to 
achieve by modernising the intermediate forces. 
Developments and Divisions in the eighties 
No sooner had the Europeans established this 
new dimension of linkage, 
over the reliability of 
however, than 
the American 
concern 
nuclear 
guarantee arose once again, when the Reagan 
administration outlined its intention to pursue a 
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI - 'Star Wars'). 
In announcing SDI, Reagan conjured up a vision of a 
defensive system which would erect an impenetrable 
umbrella over the US as a whole, and thus open the 
way to the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons 
throughout the world. Since the President's 
announcement in 1983, the claims for SDI from 
members of the Reagan administration have become 
more muted1 they have tended to concentrate on the 
prospect of SDI protecting America's home-based 
missile sites rather than American cities, although 
the President himself appears to retain faith in 
his original vision of the project. As the project 
is in its infancy, it is impossible to judge 
whether or not protection of missile sites is the 
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real rationale behind the initiative, or whether it 
is in any case feasible. (At the time of writing, 
there seems to be a consensus among most European 
commentators that, even if the concept of defensive 
systems in space was realised, it would be unlikely 
to offer much protection against submarine-based 
attacks, given the ability to mount these from 
relatively close to the target). Whatever the 
technical merits or defects of SDI, it has assumed 
a major political significance in the East-West 
relationship. The United States has remained 
firmly committed to the idea, despite scepticism 
being publicly voiced by West European leaders, 
and has required its NATO partners to support the 
proposal by effectively making it an issue of 
loyalty to the NATO Alliance. The Soviet Union is 
sufficiently concerned by the prospect of a system 
which might offer its potential adversary the 
ability to shield its weapons from attack (and 
almost certainly involve the Soviet union in an 
expensive SDI programme of its own) that Gorbachev 
was moved to offer the prospect not only of deep 
cuts in the superpower intercontinental arsenal but 
also of the removal of all intermediate missiles 
from Europe, East and West - but initially this 
offer was made dependent upon the United States 
agreeing to confine research on SDI to the labora-
tory phase, and preferably to abandon the project 
completely. 
As with the deployment of Cruise and pershing 
11, the Americans can argue with some justification 
that it took an initiative on their part to bring 
the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. At both 
the superpower meetings in 1986, however at 
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Geneva and Reykjavik negotiations broke down 
because of Soviet insistence on an effective 
abandonment of SDI as a precondition of other arms 
control measures, and Reagan's insistence on 
continuing with a -project which he sees as capable 
of leading to a world free of nuclear weapons. In 
1987, the USSR amended its offer, removing the 
preconditions on SDI~ before this happened, 
however, it was interesting to note the reactions 
of NATO's European partners to the superpower nego-
tiations in 1986. 
Although far from enthusiastic about the 
concept of SDI, the Europeans voiced serious 
concerns and reservations about any deal which 
might involve the removal of all intermediate 
nuclear weapons from Europe. Almost as soon as the 
possibility was mentioned by Reagan and Gorbachev, 
the West German and (to a lesser extent) British 
and French governments argued that no such move 
should be contemplated whilst the Soviet union 
retained a substantial numerical advantage in 
short-range nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and, 
most importantly, - conventional forces in Europe. 
(The French were also worried that Reagan' s 
initiative could lead to the Soviet union develop-
ing its own version of SDI, which could well mean 
that the French independent nuclear deterrent could 
no longer penetrate Soviet defences. The British 
government, anticipating the arrival of the 
submarine-based Trident system, were much more 
confident that it could breach virtually any 
defensi ve system. As far as they were concerned, 
the furore over SDI only served to demonstrate the 
sagacity of opting for the most sophisticated 
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deterrent available; because it is difficult to 
predict future technological and political change). 
Nor was European concern limited to the question of 
intermediate nuclear weapons. The prospect raised 
in the superpower meetings during 1986 of deep cuts 
in intercontinental nuclear weapons met with a firm 
insistence from European governments that any such 
reductions should only be undertaken in conjunction 
wi th similar cuts in conventional weaponry. Mrs 
Thatcher was echoing the concern of other European 
NATO allies (especially West Germany) when she 
argued that 
We can never forget that the frontier of 
freedom cuts right across our continent, and 
renders Western Europe vulnerable to attack by 
conventional forces and chemical weapons in a 
way which the United States is not.(7) 
and she 
might 
made it clear that whatever the superpowers 
speculate about a non-nuclear future, 
Europeans would continue to rely on nuclear weapons 
for their defence unless there was a dramatic 
reduction in the Soviet Union's other offensive 
capabilities. 
The Gorbachev Initiatives 
The initative passed from European hands in 
1987, however, when Gorbachev announced that an 
agreement to remove intermediate nuclear weapons 
from Europe was no longer dependent upon agreement 
over SDI. European governments welcomed the 
revival of the 'zero-zero' option, but also 
52 
immediately voiced scepticism and concern over the 
apparent Soviet superiority in short-range nuclear 
weapons, the imbalance in conventional forces, and 
the problems of verification which would be 
involved in any INF agreement. Gorbachev' s 
response to Western concern over short-range 
nuclear weapons was to offer to negotiate over the 
removal of these from Europe as well. 
In Britain, the initiatives were welcomed by 
all the major parties, but with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm. Mrs. Thatcher, for example, seized the 
opportunity to argue that it was NATO's 'strength 
and re sol ve' in deploying Cruise and 
the first place which had brought 
response from the Soviet Union, but 
insistent that any agreement on 
Pershing in 
about this 
was equally 
intermediate 
weapons in isolation from one on short-range 
weapons (which might pose severe problems when it 
came to verification procedures) would reduce 
rather than enhance Britain's security. 
argue within 
Despite 
Europe American pressureon Bri t"ain 
the case for reductions in 
to 
both medium and short-
range missiles (the Reagan administration being 
mindful of Mrs. Thatcher's standing in Western 
Europe as one of the few senior politicians to have 
been in power throughout the period since NATO's 
1979 modernisation), the Thatcher government 
continued to insist that substantial concessions 
would have to be secured over the balance of 
conventional forces before this could be considered 
a realistic possibility. Even if the Thatcher 
government was to lend its support to Reagan' s 
desire to reach an agreement on both intermediate 
and short-range weapons, it was made very clear 
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that this should not threaten the status of 
Britain's 'independent' deterrent. It was notewor-
thy that the White Paper on the Defence Estimates 
published just before the 1987 general election 
went to unusual lengths to spell out what appeared 
to the government to be the advantages of retaining 
a nuclear deterrent. 
The Labour Party hastily (and with little 
evidence of intra-party consultation) announced 
that it was prepared to shelve its commitment to 
remove Cruise from Britain whilst negotiations 
took place between America and the soviet Union, 
albeit with the proviso that, if the negotiations 
were not successfully concluded within a reasonable 
time, a Labour government would go ahead with the 
removal of Cruise anyway. This apparent reversal 
of party policy was given a guarded approval by 
CND, which wanted to see a firm time limit set on 
how long the negotiations would be given to reach a 
successful conclusion, but was more concerned to 
see. that the INF negotiations did not founder on 
any insistence that they be linked to a parallel 
agreement on short-range weapons. The SDP/Liberal 
Alliance (and particularly David Owen) interpreted 
the initiative as yet further evidence that, while 
Britain should remain committed to NATO, there was 
a growing need for more European cooperation in 
defence, and a more assertive European attitude 
towards the United States within the NATO frame-
work. 
For the Europeans it is an old dilemma. On 
the one hand, they wish to preserve the linkage 
which exists between American and West European 
securi ty. Moreover, so long as the Sov iet Union 
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maintains strong conventional forces in Eastern 
Europe - which, given the Soviet Union's relation-
ship with its Warsaw Pact allies, is unlikely to 
change in the near future - and the Europeans find 
it politically and economically difficult to match 
those forces, the major European partners in NATO 
would prefer that linkage to have an explicit 
nuclear dimension in the form of American nuclear 
weapons based in Europe. On the other hand, all 
the European partners in the Western Alliance have 
found it necessary, to varying degrees, to distance 
themselves from at least some aspects of American 
foreign policy in recent years. European reluctance 
to follow the American lead in boycotting partici-
pation in the Soviet gas pipeline project and the 
Moscow Olympics are both cases in point, although 
the most serious rift came over the American raid 
on Libya in 1986, when only Britain was prepared 
to give the sort of cooperation the Americans 
wanted. Of all the major European governments in 
NATO, the Thatcher administration has been the 
most reluctant to criticise the United States, but 
even Britain has tended to side with its European 
partners over the basic issue of maintaining the 
U.S./West European nuclear linkage. 
Conclusions 
Despi te the ideological affinity between the 
Thatcher 
clearly 
strategy 
and Reagan administrations, 
continued to conceptualise 
in terms of NATO membership 
Britain has 
its defence 
rather than 
any exclusive Anglo-American arrangement. Britain's 
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main NATO commitments - the British Army forces in 
West Germany and Britain's key role in securing the 
Eastern Atlantic (Britain providing some two-thirds 
of NATO's naval and air-maritime capability) - have 
remained a central part of overall defence strat-
egy. Although protection of Britain's 'independent' 
interests has also been part of that strategy, this 
has been accorded less importance than the NATO 
commitment. It was significant that the most 
graphic demonstration in recent years that such 
interests still existed - the deployment of the 
Falklands task-force in 1982 could only be 
undertaken by dint of an agreement among NATO 
allies that Britain be allowed temporarily to 
suspend its NATO deployments. There is a clear 
consensus among Britain's political elite that this 
commitment to NATO is fundamental and effectively 
non-negotiable~ even the Labour party makes a point 
of stressing its commitment to NATO, albeit from a 
non-nuclear perspective. 
Britain's commitment to NATO is such that 
successive governments have. argued that even the 
, independent' deterrent should be seen as part of 
our contribution to the Western Alliance. This is 
qualified, however, by the proviso that Britain 
reserves the right to use its deterrent unilater-
ally, should the situation demand it. As such, 
Britain is in a unique position among the European 
allies in NATO; participating fully in NATO, unlike 
the French, but also possessing its own interconti-
nental nuclear capability. Unless the Labour Party 
is returned to power in the next decade - with a 
clear majority and the resolve to implement its 
defence policy this situation is likely to 
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persist. Despite some unilateralist leanings among 
Liberal activists, the SDP/Liberal Alliance 
leadership has made quite clear its commitment to 
maintaining the 'independent' deterrent, unless 
there is a fundamental change in the balance of 
forces between East and West. David Owen's 
virulent repudiation during the 1987 election 
campaign of the Conservative charge that the 
SDP/Liberal Alliance should be seen as uni1atera-
lists leaves this in no doubt although, of 
course, this may be 
parties merge. The 
ment to Trident has 
open to question should the 
Thatcher government's commit-
never been seriously in doubt, 
at least among those closest to the Prime Minister. 
It was amply demonstrated by Thatcher's visit to 
Reagan after the Geneva and Reykjavik summits, 
which she undertook in order to obtain an explicit 
undertaking from the Americans that their negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union would not result in 
Trident no longer being. available to Britain. 
Maintaining and modernising one's own nuclear 
arsenal might well be an effective method of 
bringing one's opponents to the negotiating table, 
but in the case of Britain the events of 1986/87 
make it clear that most British politicians view 
superpower accommodation as a potential threat to 
British security. In this sense, the essentials of 
Bri tain' s defence policy have remained unchanged 
over the last twenty five yearSl a commitment to 
NATO, certainly, but one which is underpinned by 
the ability, in· the last resort, to deploy nuclear 
weapons independently of any allies. Thus while 
protest in other European NATO countries has 
centred on the issue of American weapons in Europe, 
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protest in Britain has also been directed towards 
'British' nuclear weapons. It is this which gives 
the British peace movement a distinctive character, 
as there has always been more potential for 
unilateralist decisions. Although Britain's peace 
movement in the eighties has expended at least as 
much (if not more) effort on opposing American 
weapons in Britain and Europe as it has on Brit-
ain's 'own' nuclear weapons, the futil i ty of an 
'independent' nuclear deterrent is a central plank 
in CND's platform, and was a crucial argument 
during the movement's first wave of popularity in 
the fifties and sixties. It is to this first wave 
that we now turn. 
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Chapter Three 
CND: THE FIRST WAVE 
The birth and growth of CND can only be appreciated 
in the context of the world balance of nuclear 
weapons at the time. During the late fifties, 
Britain was still indisputably a force to be 
reckoned with in nuclear terms. It was one of only 
three nuclear powers, and whilst the other two had 
nuclear arsenals which were superior to Britain IS 
both in size and the technical capabilities of 
their delivery systems, Britain 
far behind them as it is today. 
was not nearly so 
The leaders of the 
newly formed anti-nuclear movement in the fifties 
could argue with some credibility that unilateral 
nuclear disarmament by Britain would constitute an 
influential example which might open the way for 
America and the Soviet Union to follow suit. This 
gave the campaign a motivation which, whilst not 
lacking from the movement in the eighties, no 
longer has quite the same force because of the 
proliferation of nuclear-armed states. 
Anti-nuclear protest on any significant scale 
did not emerge in Britain until the mid-fifties. 
Presumably to some extent this was the result of a 
legacy of patriotic feeling after the war, and a 
belief that the American nuclear attacks on Japan 
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had shortened the course of the conflict. Domestic-
ally, of course, there was little public awareness 
of Britain's developing nuclear capability, as 
successive governments kept their policy shrouded 
from Parliamentary and public scrutiny. The Labour 
governments of 1945-51 may have pursued a compara-
tively radical strategy with regard to the domestic 
economy and 
policy was 
society, but their foreign and defence 
much more conventional. Under the 
guidance of a leading member of the right-wing in 
the Labour party - Ernest Bevin,· noted for his 
pragmatism and anti-communism - Labour implemented 
a foreign and defence policy which centred upon the 
development of British nuclear weapons and a 
determination to forge close: links between British, 
American and European security. Although there was 
some disquiet among the left of the party at this 
apparent lack of a 'socialist' dimehsion to 
Labour's defence and foreign pol icy, this never 
developed into any cohesive or significant opposi-
tion. 
As was the case with the second wave of 
protest, the first wave was prompted by a combina-
tion of political and technical developments. On 
the technical front, Britain was developing its 
hydrogen-bomb capability during the fifties, and 
this necessitated a series of atomic tests. These 
attracted more public attention than the on-going 
development of weapon delivery systems, not least 
because the RAF did not obtain a viable delivery 
system until 1956. On the political front, the 
virtually simultaneous events of the Suez debacle 
and the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian 
uprising prompted a resurgence of. interest on the 
left in a radical reappraisal of Britain's role in 
the world, the nature of Communist society and the 
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impact of nuclear weaponry on international 
relations. Disillusioned British communists found 
common cause with those in the Labour party who saw 
Suez as irrefutable proof that Britain needed to 
make radical changes in its foreign and defence 
policy. 
The Birth of CND 
When protest did develop, it centred around 
the issue of nuclear tests. In 1957, the National 
Committee for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapon Tests 
(NCANWT) was formed to coordinate local groups 
which had started to campaign on the issue. In the 
same year the Emergency Committee for Dire.ct Action 
against Nuclear War (DAC) was also formed, with the 
aim of coordinating and encouraging non-violent 
direct action (NVDA) against nuclear tests. 
Although neither organisation attracted much public 
support in numerical terms, they did ensure that 
the issue became part of the agenda for discussion 
in British politics, at least among the left. 
COncern over testing was not reflected in the major 
parties, however. 1957 saw the Conservative 
government ~give explicit support in its Defence 
White Paper to the concept of British nuclear 
weapons. It was also the year in which the Labour 
party Conference defeated by a 7-1 majority a 
resolution rejecting the testing, manufacture or 
use of nuclear weapons. It 
Conference that Aneurin Bevan -
was during this 
the leading figure 
on the left of the party, and shadow Foreign 
Secretary caused surprise and dismay among 
unilateralists by arguing against them, on the 
grounds that unilateral nuclear disarmament by 
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Britain would severely weaken its influence in any 
international arms talks. As he put it, Labour 
should not adopt a policy which would mean a 
Bri tish Foreign Secretary 'going naked into the 
international conference chamber'. 
Such an attitude on the part of Labour's 
leadership meant that anti-nuclear protest devel-
oped in the extra-parliamentary sphere. It became 
a phenomenon on the national political scene when 
some notable intellectual figures gave their 
support. In 1957, the New-Statesman published an 
article byJ.B. Priestley which argued the unilat-
eralist case. The response to this article was 
such that meetings were convened between interested 
members of Britain's intelligentsia (notably 
Bertrand Russell, Sir Julian Huxley, Priestley and 
the New Statesman's editor, Kingsley Martin) and 
leading members of the NCANWT, which led to the 
formation in January 1958 of the. Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament, the NCANWT merging with the 
new organisation. Bertrand Russell became Presi-
dent, Canon Collins the Chairman, and Peggy Duff 
(from NCANWT) the organising secretary. As Taylor 
and Pritchard have observed 
there is no doubt that the CND leadership 
constituted a glittering array of the nation's 
progressive intelligentsia. Elitist and 
unrepresentative of the Movement's rank and 
file it may have been, but nobody could deny 
its immense and charismatic impact.(l) 
It seems debatable whether the founding members of 
the new Campaign actually expected to attract a 
considerable rank and file following, but the 
response to their first public meeting was such 
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that from that moment on it was clear that CND was 
to be something other than a conventi.onal elite 
pressure group. As Rose has noted, most of the 
newly appointed executive approached this first 
meeting with the expectation that the campaign 
would be calling for general nuclear disarmament by 
all the nuclear powers. ( 2). In the event, however, 
enthusiasm for a campaign based on unilateral 
disarmament by Britain was such that this became 
adopted as the new movement's principal aim. 
Although the statement of policy aims included a 
call to other nuclear powers to renounce their 
weapons, clear priority was given to the demand 
that Britain should renounce unconditionally the 
use or production of nuclear weapons, and refuse to 
allow their use by others in its defence. This 
latter aspect was given additional weight by the 
Campaign's Annual Conference in 1960, which backed 
a resolution calling for Bri tish withdrawal from 
any alliance based on the use of nuclear weapons 
( i. e. NATO). 
The Committee of 100 
One of the first tactical' decisions the new 
Campaign had to take was what stance it would adopt 
towards the type of protest activities being 
mounted by the DAC. As Taylor and Pritchard have 
argued, CND's executive was reluctant to become 
involved in what it saw as "street politics".(3) 
The DAC organised a march from London to Alder-
maston, which CND endorsed but stressed should not 
be seen as a CND demonstration. This first 
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Aldermaston 
( attracting 
march was such a success, however, 
up to 10,000 participants) that CND 
took over the 
marches; during 
between 50,000 
organisation of subsequent annual 
the early sixties, these attracted 
and 150,000 supporters, although 
there was a sharp decline after 1963. The tension 
between those who preferred advancing the unilater-
alist argument via the conventional channels of 
access to decision-makers (which were relatively 
open, given the social position of the intelligent-
sia at the head of CND( 4), and those who were 
convinced of the necessity to adopt NVDA tactics to 
make their case, did not disappear. In 1960, it 
erupted into public conflict. Persuaded by the 
arguments of primarily the younger supporters of 
CND, Bertrand. Russell resigned his Presidency of 
the Campaign and formed the Committee of 100 for 
the specific purpose of organising NVDA on a 
national scale. The manner in which Russell 
resigned led to public acrimony between himself and 
Canon Collins, which was given considerable 
exposure by the media. Many of the DAC's leading 
activists switched their support to the Committee 
of 100 immediately, and the DAC effectively merged 
with Russell's organisation within a year of its 
formation. The Committee of 100 mounted a number 
of actions during 1960-61, which attracted thou-
sands of supporters willing to participate in NVDA 
(normally taking the form of 'sit-down' protests in 
public places) and resulted in hundreds of arrests. 
Taylor and Pritchard have argued convincingly 
that the Committee of 100 incorporated a number of 
different ideological 
those like Russell 
perspectives, ranging from 
who took the essentially 
pragmatic view the NVDA was a good way of demon-
strating the urgency of the nuclear issue, to those 
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like the young and influential American; Ralph 
Schoenman, who conceptualised NVDA as leading to 
the eventual paralysis of the political system.(5) 
Whatever their internal divisions, the Committee of 
100 was united in its rejection of the strategy 
adopted by those who remained in CND. The Commit-
tee of 100 was a pacifist organisation, and many of 
its supporters saw nuclear weapons as a direct 
consequence of a particular form of social struc-
ture - one which legitimised violence. They were 
anarcho-pacifists, who saw little point in pursuing 
their argument through the conventional channels 
and placed their faith in persuasion at the 
grass-roots level(6); propagation of NVDA could 
eventually bring about the creation of a non-
violent society. 
Under the leadership of Canon Collins, CND was 
distinguished from the Committee of 100 not only by 
its insistence that it was not an exclusively 
pacifist grouping, but also by its view that 
unilateral nuclear disarmament was a single and 
distinct issue best pursued within the existing 
political system. On the basis of extensive 
interview evidence, Taylor and Pri tchard offer a 
persuasive argument that most of the leadership of 
CND not only failed to anticipate the transforma-
tion from an elite pressure group into a mass-based 
campaign, but actually viewed this development with 
some trepidation and considerable unease(7). 
Nuclear disarmament was seen as primarily a moral 
issue, and to the.extent that CND's leaders had a 
poli tical strategy, it was to convince by 
reasoned argument - leadin-g members of the Labour 
party (and, if possible, of the 'Establishment') of 
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the moral rectitude of unilateralism. Even if they 
had wanted to, CND's leaders would have found it 
very difficult to organise any systematic effort to 
recruit support within the Labour party. The 
movement had no formal membership (this was not 
introduced until 1966), and little in the way of 
organisational resources. Arguably, this lack of 
bureaucratisation and formalised structure was 
attractive to many of the movement's adherents, who 
welcomed the opportunity to make a public demon-
stration of their personal beliefs in a way which 
was not so possible in conventional party politics. 
It did mean, however, that CND's leadership had 
little alternative but to pursue their preferred 
strategy of seeking to win over Labour's leadership 
rather than mount a campaign throughout all levels 
of the party. In the event, this strategy was soon 
rendered largely irrelevant, as the issue of 
unilateral disarmament was taken up at all levels 
of the Labour party as part of the on-going 
struggle between different factions of the party 
during the late fifties and early sixties. 
Labour and unilateralism 
The disagreements between the 'fundamenta-
lists' (in favour of retaining Labour's explicit 
commitment to large-scale nationalisation) and the 
'revisionists' (who argued the electoral advantages 
of a more moderate approach) have been too well 
documented elsewhere to bear repetition in this 
context. As is common in the Labour Party, a 
debate which was ostensibly about ideological 
issues also incorporated disagreements about the 
relative authority within. the party of its leader 
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(Hugh Gai tskell), the parliamentary Labour Party 
and the Party Conference, Gai tskell angered those 
on the left of the party when, after the Conserva-
tives' third election victory in a row in 1959, he 
attempted but failed to persuade the party to tone 
down Clause Four of the party constitution (commit-
ting the party to' large-scale nationalisation). 
This caused those on the left to question 
Gaitskell's suitability as a leader of a socialist 
party, and many of those in the centre to become 
apprehensive about the effect of Gaitskell's style 
of leadership on party unity. Unilateralism was 
taken up by the left in the party not least because 
it was known that Gaitskell was anti-unilateralist. 
Al though many left-wingers within the' party were 
disposed to favour unilateralism anyway, the issue 
was only pursued with any enthusiasm once it 
assumed symbolic importance in the more general 
intra-party conflict. As Parkin notes 
The case for unilateralism henceforth became 
not merely the case for ridding the country of 
the Bomb, but for ridding the Party of 
Gaitskell and the revisionist and anti-
Conference tendencies with which he was 
identif ied. It was mainly for this reason 
that the unilateralist conflict was conducted 
with such venom and bitterness throughout the 
early nineteen-sixties in comparison with the 
period before Labour's election defeat. • • 
The party unilateralists' attitude towards 
Gaitskell contrasted markedly with their 
attitude towards Bevan when he had opposed 
them in the previous confrontation in 1957. 
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Although Bevan's defence of the Bomb certainly 
created a sense of shock and disappointment 
among the Left, it did not engender the kind 
of hostility which was loosed upon Gaitskell • 
• • It was only when the anti-Bomb movement 
inside the Party became linked with the 
defence of traditional socialism and Party 
democracy (the threat to which was symbolised 
in the person of Gaitskell) that it became 
powerful enough to mount a definite challenge 
to the leadership.(8) 
unilateralism became the focus of this discontent 
in the party during 1960-61. In the summer of 1960, 
four of the six largest unions affiliated to the 
Labour Party voted at their national conferences to 
support the unilateralist line - the Transport and 
General Workers, the engineers, the shopworkers and 
the railwaymen. This prompted the British Communist 
Party to reverse its previous policy of endorsing 
the Soviet union's campaign for a moratorium on 
testing rather than unilateralism, and to encourage 
its supporters within the trade union movement to 
throw their weight behind the unilateralist cause. 
As Parkin argues, the Communist party saw the 
possibility of mobilising enough support around the 
unilateralism issue to force the defeat and 
resignation of Gai tskell, which was their primary 
motive, and their conversion to unilateralism ended 
their isolation as the only significant organis-
ation on the left in British politics not to have 
adopted the twin stances of pro-unilateralism and 
anti-Gaitskellism.(9) 
A combination of those who accepted the moral 
arguments of CND and those whose support was more 
tactically motivated (with a considerable degree of 
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overlap between the two) was sufficient to see the 
1960 Trades Union Congress pass a unilateralist 
motion, followed by the famous victory for the 
unilateralists at Labour's 1960 Conference, when a 
multilateralist policy was rejected and a unilater-
alist resolution from the Transport and General 
Workers' Union approved. Gai tskell' s reaction was 
to make a stand on the issue, not least because it 
had become a test of where effective authority over 
party· policy rested - with the Conference or with 
the parliamentary party and its leader. There was 
little enthusiasm for unilateralism within the 
parliamentary party: Rose notes that there was a 
hard' core of only some 50 unilateralists in the 
PLP.'( 10) Gaitskell openly rejected the Confer-
ence's endorsement of unilateralism, pledging 
himself to 'fight and fight and fight again' 
against the decision, and finding support among the 
right in the party who saw unilat"eralism as a good 
issue on which to take a stand asserting the 
qualified independence of the PLP from the Confer-
ence. 
The debate which ensued in the party did not 
rest solely upon the merits or otherwise of 
unilateral nuclear disarmament: the tactic of those 
seeking to reverse the 1960 Conference decision was 
to put more emphasis upon what they perceived as 
the over-riding need to re-establish party unity. 
Ordinary members of the party found themselves 
faced with two conflicting claims upon their sense 
of values: the moral absolutism of unilateralism as 
against the traditional importance of unity within 
, 
the Labour movement. In the event, unity proved to 
have a stronger claim, and Gaitskell was successful 
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in persuading enough delegates to the 1961 Labour 
Conference such that the unilateral decision was 
overturned. The crucial constituency in this 
struggle was the trade union movement, with its 
predominantly working class membership - a movement 
with a socio-economic profile very different from 
that of CND. The moral emphasis of CND's arguments 
may well have served to unite otherwise disparate 
elements among the radical middle class, but there 
was little evidence to suggest that it commended 
itself to a working class that was enjoying the 
benefits of economic 
Gaitskell 
on the 
recovery and a welfare state. 
resisted any attempt to 
issue, and turned the whole 
Moreover, 
compromise 
debate into an issue of confidence in his 1eader-
ship - and so the union leaders were left in no 
doubt that an endorsement of the 1960 decision 
would serve only to prolong Labour's internal 
divisions. In Parkin's view, it was not surprising 
that union leaders abandoned unilateralism as 
readily as they had endorsed it the previous year -
whereas in 1960 a vote against the Bomb 
entailed a salutary rap on the leader's 
knuckles for his revisionist flirtations, a 
similar vote in 1961 would have entailed the 
complete disruption of the Labour party.(ll) 
Whilst there had been some effort made to argue the 
mu1tilateralist case purely on its merits within 
the party during 1961, there seems little doubt 
that those arguing this case (primarily the 
Campaign for Democratic Socialism) were in effect 
fighting on the wider ground of establishing who 
ran the party rather than just the specifics of 
nuclear disarmament. Parkin offers the convincing 
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argument that events within the party following 
Gaitskell's death and Wilson's accession to the 
leadership in 1963 confirm this thesis that 
unilateralism was little more than a peg on which 
much wider intra-party disagreements rested. 
Although Labour's defence policy did not change 
significantly once Wilson became leader, enthusiasm 
for unilateralism was substantially diminished 
under a new Party leader whose political 
record and attitudes were far more attractive 
to the Left, the latter with surprising haste 
dropped their militant posture on the Bomb and 
became apologists for the same defence policy 
they had opposed under Gai tskell • • • The 
anti-Bomb 
with Hugh 
crusade in the Labour Party died 
Gaitskell and the open challenge to 
traditional socialist concepts with which he 
was identified.(12) 
The very small majority of the first Wilson 
Government from 1964-66 would have appeared to 
offer the opportunity for unilateralists within the 
Parliamentary party to bring pressure to bear on 
that Government. In the event, however, Wilson's 
only gesture towards unilateralism (reducing the 
number of Polaris submarines to be deployed from 
five to four) was met with acquiescence within the 
party. 
The Decline of CND 
Not surprisingly, Labour's downgrading of the 
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importance of unilateralism in the year preceding 
its electoral victory, its subsequent espousal in 
office of multilateralism and Atlanticism, and its 
maintenance of Britain's nuclear deterrent, all 
served to confirm the suspicions of those commit-
ted to Direct Action that the Parliamentary avenue 
was inherently flawed. In the Campaign itself, the 
level of energy and commitment declined sharply 
after 1962, with much lower levels of attendance on 
demonstrations and actions. Although it is diffi-
cult to establish a firm causal relationship, 
changes in the international climate in the mid- to 
late sixties would seem to have had some impact. 
The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 dramatically 
highlighted the potential dangers of the nuclear 
age, but its resolution also seemed to suggest that 
super-power leaders could ultimately be relied upon 
to avert disaster. The conclusion of the Partial 
Test Ban Treaty in 1963 (banning nuclear tests in 
the atmosphere) lent credence to the idea that 
multilateral agreements on significant matters were 
attainable - an argument further strengthened by 
the Non-Proliferation treaty of 1968 (as part of 
which the existing nuclear powers pledged them-
selves to seek an end to the nuclear arms race via 
multilateral negotiation) and the SALT-l agreement 
of 1972 which committed the United States and the 
Soviet Union to limiting their deployments of 
Anti-Ball istic missile systems. Closer to home, 
the escalation of protest over the Vietnam war 
meant that many of Bri tain' s middle class youth 
devoted their energies to this issue rather than 
nuclear disarmament - as with the Labour party, it 
was not that they came to reject the unilateralist 
message, but that they were no longer prepared to 
prioritise it. Media coverage of Vietnam (espe-
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cially on television) demonstrated the horrors of 
modern conventional warfare. The 'new Left' became 
preoccupied with imperialism and the Third World, 
and Che Guevara seemed a more relevant figure than 
Canon ColI ins or Bertrand Russell.Active support 
for the Campaign shrank to a few thousand by the 
mid-sixties, and stayed at this level thoughout the 
seventies. Among political and social institu-
tions, only the Communist party and the Quakers 
continued unabated their efforts within and on 
behalf of the movement - neither institution being 
noted for attracting much support or sympathy among 
those who spawned the 'student revolution' of the 
late sixties. 
Opinions vary as to the underlying causes of 
the Campaign's decline during the sixties and 
seventies. Writing in the mid-sixties, before the 
real nature of the Campaign's demise was clear, 
Parkin argued that the largely middle class 
composition of the Campaign's supporters led it to 
adopt an 'expressive' rather than 'instrumental' 
style of politics - that is, one in which adherence 
to principle was more important than concrete 
achievements. He acknowledged that this could well 
have been functional to the survival of the 
movement in the face of a lack of specific achieve-
ments, but went on to stress the 'symbolic' nature 
of the Campaign' sprotest. He argued that Labour 
Party activists were not alone in seizing upon the 
unilateralist issue as a symbol for wider dis-
contents - for example, Marxists employed the Bomb 
as a symbol of all the worst ills of capitalist 
society and activists within the Churches could use 
the moral force of the unilateralist message to 
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prompt their leaders into public pronouncements 
upon national rather than purely personal issues of 
morality. The clear implication of his argument was 
that the issue of the Bomb was one that was always 
susceptible to being replaced by newer and more 
potent symbols of alienation and protest. writing 
at the end of the seventies, Taylor and Pritchard 
argued that the Campaign's failure (and, indeed, 
disinclination) to develop a mass base of support 
among the working class, particularly the trade 
unions, was a crucial debilitY1 they concluded that 
the lesson that is evident • • • is that moral 
action and motivation alone and divorced from 
a political strategy are always ineffective in 
achieving political change.(13) 
Conclusions 
Expressive politics, a middle class membership 
and an insistence upon a moral dimension may all 
have contributed to the Campaign's failure to 
promote radical change in Britain's defence policy, 
but equally they ensured that unilateral nuclear 
disarmament never completely lost its attraction as 
a rallying point and symbol for those who espoused 
radical causes in British politics. CND's impact 
on the political culture from the late fifties 
onwards far outweighed its impact on the policy 
agenda, and its symbolic importance was such that, 
despite its shrinking support, it remained a widely 
known reference point in British political life. 
When technological and pol i tical developments 
occurred in the late seventies which once again 
brought the nuclear issue to the forefront in 
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British politics, CND was the obvious repository 
for protest on the issue, and it is on this 'second 
wave' in the movement's existence that we now focus 
our attention. 
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Chapter Four 
CND'S MEMBERS: THE 1985 NATIONAL MEMBERSHIP SURVEY 
It is generally agreed that any social movement has 
to rely heavily upon its membership as its main 
'resource'. It may have other resources - money or 
offices, for example - but in the final analysis a 
social movement depends upon converting nonadher-
ents into supporters, and looks to those supporters 
to use their time ,energy, contacts and status in 
other organisations to impress the movement's case 
upon political authorities. Some movements are 
fortunate enough to include among their membership 
recognised experts in their field I this expertise 
not only enhances the status of the movement, but 
may prompt the political authorities into granting 
recognition or concessions to the movement in order 
to benefit from such expertise. This is not the 
case with CND. It does include among its member-
ship some with an impressive technical knowledge of 
the whole field of nuclear weapons and indeed 
nuclear energy as a whole. The best example is 
SANA (Scientists Against Nuclear Arms), an inde-
pendent organisation of scientists formed in 1981 
which works closely with CND, and which is highly 
, 
influential in CND's campaigning to persuade Local 
Authorities to pursue a Nuclear Free Zone po1i6y 
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and not participate in national civil defence 
planning. Its members also provide the technical 
material for much of CND's publicity work. Its 
expertise is not sought after by the government, 
however, which considers itself to be the sole 
source of authoritative information in this area. 
Aside from subjective impressions gained 
through contact with local groups and individual 
members, national CND has very little information 
on its own membership. It does not attempt to 
impose any conditions upon joining, and its records 
are limited to names, addresses and certain basic 
subscription payment categories. Even these are 
regarded as conf idential, and such information is 
never disclosed if it would enable individuals to 
be identified. All that can be said about the total 
membership of national CND at the end of 1986 is 
that it numbered around 85,000, was based very 
largely in England rather than the rest of the 
U.K., and contained a sizeable number of young 
people. According to CND's own records, 89 per cent 
of its national members lived in England; 6 per 
cent in Scotland, 5 per cent in Wales and, less 
than 1 per cent in Ireland. A third of the total 
membership lived in London and the South-East. 
Just under 20 per cent fell into the Student/Youth 
category, and a further 12 per cent were unwaged. 
More information than this is simply not available. 
In order to obtain more information, a sample 
survey was undertaken at the end of 1985. This 
comprised a postal questionnaire (see appendix) 
sent to a randomly generated 1 per cent of the 
national membership, which produced a response rate 
of around 65 per cent. CND's membership has, of 
course, been surveyed before. Parkin has provided 
an impressive account of the movement in the 
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sixties (I): Taylor and Pritchard have surveyed the 
subsequent experience of the sixties' member-
ship( 2): more recently, CND itself commissioned a 
survey of its current membership in 1982(3). CND's 
rapid growth in the eighties, however, meant that 
even between 1982 and 1985 the membership had grown 
by almost 200 per cent, so clearly there was the 
possibility that the nature and character of 
group had changed as it had grown. 
the 
In general terms, all three of 
surveys produced very similar findings. 
previous 
As in the 
sixties, CND's members in 1982 were overwhelmingly 
middle class and predominantly potential labour 
voters. Data are not available for the sixties, but 
in the early eighties members were also fairly 
evenly balanced between the sexes, and concentrated 
in the 25-40 age-group. Most national members were 
active in other movements or groups - for example, 
about one-third belonged to a trade union, about 
one-quarter to a political party (mainly Labour), 
and about one-f ifth to a church and overall, 
nearly two-thirds were also members of at least one 
other organisation. Educational work and big 
public events were considered by members to be of 
more importance than non-violent direct action. In 
short, Parkin's portrayal of CND membership in the 
sixties as being comprised largely of the educated 
middle class clustered in a comparatively narrow 
range of occupations (especially the welfare, 
education and creative sectors) still held true 
some twenty years later. 
The first point to note about the 1985 results 
is that the massive influx of new members between 
1982 and 1985 has had little or no impact on the 
character and nature of the movement. In short, 
CND has attracted many more people, but they have 
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come from the same social strata as before 
middle-aged, middle-class and well-educated. CND 
has indubitably been successful in tapping an 
already rich vein of recruitment, but has had 
little return on its efforts to attract more 
support outside the educated middle class. Having 
said that, one should not be left with the impres-
sion that CND's membership is an entirely homo-
geneous group: it does attract some working class 
support, it does have substantial representation 
from both the young and the elderly, it does 
contain Alliance and Green supporters as well as 
Labour voters, levels of activism and commitment to 
the cause of unilaterialism do vary among the 
membership, and so on. These differences are exam-
ined in more detail below, but the second striking 
point to emerge from the 1985 survey is just how 
little variation in attitudes arises from these 
different components in the movement. Most of 
CND's members are involved with movements and 
groups other than CND, and thus may be subject to 
cross-pressures, yet relatively little evidence 
emerges to suggest that this is the cause of any 
serious internal divisions within CND. 
Demographic Data 
Just under half of the 1985 respondents were 
in'the 25-40 age band, as was the case' in 1982. 
Participation by this age group in other protest or 
social movements is common, both in the U. K. and 
throughout Western Europe. Analysts have termed 
them the 'protest generation', referring to the 
wave of protest activity among (largely middle-
class) youth in the sixties, the assumption being 
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that this experience paved the way for the growth 
of new social movements in the seventies and 
eighties. As we shall see, this generation is now 
well integrated into the social and economic 
structure. CND also attracts many young people, 
who have yet to attain the economic security 
enjoyed by their older counterparts. Despite this, 
however, younger members (those under 25) do not 
appear to be alienated from mainstream politics, 
only 3 per cent of them indicating that they would 
abstain in a general election, and a majority (61 
per cent) opting for Labour. Only 4 per cent 
identified their parents as their main reason for 
joining CND, whilst 13 per cent cited moral 
reasons and 12 per cent friends' influence. Amongst 
the older members (those over 40), although 20 per 
cent were members before 1980, only 11 per cent of 
them (a mere 2 per cent of all respondents) had 
joined during CND's first wave of activity in the 
fifties and sixties. 
The sex balance has also remained unchanged 
since the early eighties, there being an almost 
perfect 50/50 split between men and women. This 
high proportion of women is a distinctive feature 
of CND, and, unlike some other similar movements in 
other countries, is also reflected in the distribu-
tion of offices in national CND. Table 4.1 
illustrates the breakdown by age and sex of the 
1985 respondents: 
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TABLE 4.1 
Age and Sex (in %) 
16 or under 3 4 4 
17 - 24 21 19 20 
25 - 40 47 47 47 
41 - 59 15 19 17 
60 or Over 14 11 12 
Total 100 100 100 
n = 310 306 620 
As can be seen, the parity between the sexes 
remains virtually constant throughout the age 
range. Reflecting the growth in 
cent of the respondents had 
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membership, 58 per 
joined since the 
beginning of 1983. A third of this new membership 
came from the under 25 age group, but otherwise 
there are no significant differences in terms of 
age or sex between this group and the whole sample 
population. 
Education and Occupation 
In his study of the membership in the sixties, 
Parkin discovered clear evidence to support his 
hypothesis that the main basis of support for CND 
was located in the educated middle classes. The 
growth in the membership since then has not altered 
this. In 1985, 57 per cent of respondents held 
either a .degree or diploma; only 15 per cent 
completed their education at or before the age of 
16. Sex is not a significant area of difference -
56 per cent of women held diplomas or degrees and 
14 per cent completed their education at or before 
16. Compared with Taylor and Pri tchard' s data 
relating to the 1958-1965 membership, not only has 
the proportion of women in the contemporary CND 
risen from a third to a half, they are also now as 
well educated as their male counterparts ~ whereas 
in the sixties "women did significantly less well 
in educational terms".(4) 
As might be expected with this kind of 
educational profile, CND's members are predomi-
nantly middle class. 85 per cent of respondents 
provided information on their present or previous 
occupation. Of these, 74 per cent (63 per cent of 
all respondents) were classified as having middle 
class occupations -
point in the past. 
skilled manual or 
either at present or at some 
A further 22 per cent had 
manual occupations (skilled 
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manual outnumbering manual in a ratio of four to 
one), and 5 per cent were unemployed or retired. In 
terms of the broad middle class/working class 
divide, there was no significant difference between 
men and women - the latter have apparently been 
able to translate their improved educational 
performance into similar work experience to their 
male equivalents. Of all those respondents holding 
a degree and/or a diploma, only 6 per cent fell 
into the skilled manual/manual category: for the 
non-graduates, the corresponding figure was 51 per 
cent. Excluding those under 25 (almost half of whom ," 
did not give a response on this question), age had /" 
little impact on the occupational distribution. 73 
per cent of those aged between 25 and 40 held or 
used to hold middle class occupations, and 72 per 
cent of those aged over 40. 
In the light of both Parkin's findings and 
more recent research on voting behaviour generally 
in Britain it was hypothesised that public sector 
occupations would be a significant feature of the 
sample, and that moreover occupations in what 
Parkin termed the "welfare and creative" sectors 
would predominate. The 1985 data illustrates that 
there has been relatively little change since the 
sixties. Asked which sector they were employed in, 
37 per cent responded by indicating the public 
sector, 26 per cent the private sector, with a 
further 37 per cent not responding to this ques-
tion. Women were more likely than men to be 
employed in the public sector. Excluding non-
responses to this question (35 per cent of men, "39 
per cent of women), then 67 per cent of women 
indicated the public sector as compared with 52 per 
cent of men. Those lower down the occupational 
scale were more likely to have worked or be working 
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in the private sect'or. Excluding the 31 per cent 
who did not respond to this question, 64 per cent 
of the skilled manual/manual category were employed 
in the private sector - the equivalent percentage 
for those in the middle-class occupational group 
being 35 per cent. 
Given this clustering of (past or present) 
middle-class occupations in the public sector, it 
was decided to sub-divide the occupational data 
into four categories - education (teachers, lec-
turers, etc.) caring (social workers, the medical 
profession, etc.), scientific and other profes-
sional. This produces a breakdown as shown in 
Table 4.2. There is a clear concentration of 
membership in non-commercial occupations. The high 
number of respondents employed in education is 
striking. Women outnumbered men in this category 
(57 per cent to 41 per cent), and perhaps surpris-
ingly 12 per cent of this group were employed in 
the private educational sector. Less surprising was 
the result that 75 per cent favoured Labour as 
their electoral choice, 29 per cent being members 
of the Labour Party and a further 12 per cent past 
members. Taking just the two most obvious non-
commercial categories - education and caring - then 
(excluding the 15 per cent non-respondents) no less 
than 44 per cent of all respondents fall under this 
heading. Given that at least some respondents in 
other occupational. categories are likely to be 
involved in non-commercial work, then it seems 
reasonable to hypothesise that about half of the 
respondents are or were involved in noncommercial 
work. 
In short then, the data analysed so far 
suggests a preponderence of CND members who are 
well educated and middle class, and more likely 
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than not to be employed in non-commercial work in 
TABLE 4.2 
CND Members Past or Present Occupation (%) 
Education 25 20 28 
Other Professional 22 27 17 
Caring 13 10 15 
Scientific 3 5 2 
All Middle Class 63 62 62 
Skilled Manual 15 16 14 
Manual 4 4 4 
Unemployed/Retired 4 4 4 
No response 14 14 16 
Total 100 100 100 
n = 620 310 306 
the public sector. This offers further confirma-
tion of the observations made by both Parkin and 
Taylor and Pritchard that support for CND should 
not be equated with alienation or exclusion from 
'respectable' positions in the economic and social 
structure. On the contrary, CND's members are 
concentrated in occupations which may not be among 
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the most highly remunerated in society; but which 
are generally held to involve considerable respon-
sibility and commensurate social status. 
Political Affiliations 
In terms of current thinking on voting 
behaviour, it is hard to know what party preference 
to expect from such a group - different methodo-
logical approaches could all lead to different 
hypotheses. In the case of CND members, however, 
any lengthy discussion of these competing ap-
proaches would have little point; most students of 
electoral behaviour would agree that, at least for 
some voters, issue salience is likely to be the 
main determinant of voting choice - and it seems 
reasonable. to hypothesise that those who have 
expressed their commitment to a single cause group 
like CND are likely to figure among such voters. 
Nuclear disarmament is an issue on which there are 
important divisions am~ng the parties, at least to 
the extent of it producing a clear cleavage between 
the Conservative party and the other major parties. 
The cleavage between Labour and the Alliance 
parties on this issue is less clear-cut, but there 
can be little doubt that Labour is perceived, both 
inside and outside CND, as the party most clearly 
identified with the aims of CND. The Green party 
may have a manifesto and ideology which is in fact 
a closer match to CND's position than the Labour 
party's, but Labour is still seen as the party most 
likely to deliver the desired outcome on nuclear 
disarmament. The breakdown of voting preference 
among the 1985 sample, therefore, contains few 
surprises - see Table 4.3. 
86 
TABLE 4.3 
CND Membership - Voting Preferences (t) 
Labour 
Alliance 
Green 
Communist 
Other (e.g. Nat.) 
Don't Know 
Wouldn't Vote 
No response 
TOTAL 
n = 
67 
15 
10 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
100 
620 
65 
18 
10 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
100 
310 
The first point to note is 
number of respondents who are 
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11 
10 
1 
2 
4 
1 
1 
100 
306 
67 
17 
9 
1 
2 
2 
1 
o 
100 
386 
the very 
unsure of 
71 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
2 
o 
100 
118 
small 
their 
voting intention or who would abstain. As we shall 
see in more detail subsequently, CND members 
participate avidly in what might be termed 'con-
ventional' political activity. The clear majority 
preference for Labour is unaffected by class or 
sex; similarly, age makes little difference, sup-
port for Labour staying within the 60-70% band 
across all the age groups. Neither is education a 
significant differentiator; graduates and non-
graduates proffer virtually identical support for 
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Labour (68 per cent and 69 per cent respectively). 
Support for the Alliance and Green parties shows a 
little more variation. Alliance support tends to be 
found amongst the older, male, middle-class group, 
whereas Green supporters tend to be found in the 
younger age groups. Even these variations are 
relatively slight, as Table 4.4 demonstrates, and 
in any case the variations are in accordance with 
the pattern of national support for these parties. 
TABLE 4.4 
Alliance,Green and Labour Voters in CND (in %) 
Q) 
U 1-1 
I'i I'i ::l 
It! Q) 0 
• .-1 Q) ..Q 
.-I 1-1 It! 
.-I l'l .cl 
~ 
Age 
24 and under 17 26 22 
25-40 37 57 48 
Over 40 47 17 30 
Sex 
Male 61 51 48 
Female 39 49 52 
Class 
Middle 73 56 63 
Working 12 19 20 
n = 91 61 415 
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Support for the Conservative Party is minimal, 
as expected. Perhaps more noteworthy ~ in view of 
the claims sometimes made about left-wing influence 
in CND, is the equally low level of support for the 
Communist Party although, of course, data on 
voting preference does not provide an indication of 
the strength of left-wing commitment among Labour 
supporters. 
Party membership, as distinct from support, 
reveals a similar pattern. Labour again predomi-
nates, with 25 per cent of the 1985 respondents 
being Labour party members: membership of other 
parties is insignificant (e.g. Green Party - 3 per 
cent, Alliance parties - 2 per cent). Most Labour 
party members (71 per cent) held middle-class 
occupations, with only 17 per cent being skilled 
manual or manual workers. Very few seemed to have 
taken their party membership as a cue for joining 
CND - only 3 per cent cited the Labour party as 
their main reason for joining the Campaign1 more-
over, only 39 per cent claimed to work on behalf of 
CND within the party. Just under 10 per cent of 
the respondents had been members of the Labour 
Party, but had relinquished their membership. Only 
one had joined another party (the Greens), and most 
(63 per cent) still gave Labour as their voting 
choice. Amongst those who had deserted Labour 
completely (only some 3 per cent of all respon-
dents), the Green party attracted twice as many 
as the Alliance. More interesting than the distri-
bution between parties is the result that two-
thirds of the' respondents did not belong to, any 
political party. Given the decline in party mem-
bership across the major parties in national terms 
over the last twenty years, this is perhaps 
understandable. Nevertheless, it raises the 
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question of to what extent CND members are moti-
vated to join or support organisations other than 
CND. 
Membership of other groups and campaigns 
Respondents were 
of institutionalised 
organised campaigns. 
belonged to a trade 
asked about their membership 
groups and more loosely 
37 per cent of respondents 
union, and a further 24 per 
cent to a professional association. Union member-
ship was actually slightly higher among those with 
middle class occupations than among those with 
skilled manual or manual employment, as (predicta-
bly) is membership of a professional association. 
Given the growth in middle class trade unionism in 
Britain from the seventies on, this is not an 
unexpected result. 65 per cent of trade unionists 
had obtained a degree or diplomas, and 50 per cent 
were employed in education or the caring profes-
sions. 78 per cent were Labour voters, and 40 per 
cent members of the party. Only two respondents 
were members of the Communist party. 30 per cent 
of the respondents belonged to a voluntary organi-
sation of some kind, and 9 per cent (17 per cent of 
women) to a women's group. Asked whether they 
utilised membership of these organisations to work 
wi thin them for the cause of nuclear disarmament, 
the majority of respondents offered no answer. Only 
8 per cent claimed any such activity within trade 
unions, 7 per cent within voluntary organisations, 
and less than 5 per cent within women's groups or 
professional associations. This contrasts with 
the 1982 survey, when Nias found that a third of 
his sample claimed to work actively for CND in the 
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other organisations they belonged to. 
It is impossible to derive from the data 
available any satisfactory causal explanation for 
this apparent lack of proselytising enthusiasm 
among CND members. One contributory factor may be 
the nature of the organisations themselves, trade 
unions and professional associations in particular 
choosing to operate in a more formalised and 
bureaucratised manner than CND members are used to 
in the peace movement. CND members certainly 
display a marked enthusiasm for campaigning 
activity similar to that mounted by CND. 60 per 
cent of respondents had supported public campaigns 
other than those mounted by CND in recent years, 
with gender, occupation and class making little 
difference to this participation rate. The most 
popular campaigns were those associated with 
protection of the environment (for example, 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth) and what might 
loosely be termed moral campaigns (for example, 
Anti-Apartheid and Third World groups) - the former 
attracted 22 per cent of those responding to the 
question and the latter some 29 per cent. Left-wing 
poli tical campaigns (for example, against cuts in 
the education or welfare services) and trade union 
campaigns (especially the miners' strike) attracted 
significant levels of support - 16 per cent and 11 
per cent of those responding respectively - but 
these figures do not bear out the popular image of 
CND members as the agit-prop element of the left, 
in Britain. Very few CND members who did support 
other campaigns were prepared to prioritise them 
over the cause of nuclear disarmamentl 9 per cent 
of respondents were engaged in other campaigns more 
important to them than CND, whereas 34 per cent 
considered their work for CND to be more important 
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than any other campaigning, and 13 per cent gave 
all their campaigning activity an equal priority. 
Religious Belief 
One social institution for which one might 
expect to find a significant level of support among 
CND members is the church. Surveys in the sixties 
found that around 40 per cent of their respondents 
in CND professed active religious beliefs. Nias, 
however, found only 21 per cent of his respondents 
in 1982 to be church members, and only 23 per cent 
of the 1985 respondents were practising members of 
any church or religious denomination. Of these, 37 
per cent were members of the Church of England, 25 
per cent Roman Catholics and 10 per cent Quakers. 
The Methodist Church might rank among its numbers 
the present chair of CND, but they only account for 
6 per cent of the actively religious in CND. The 
religious element in CND, however, do demonstrate 
some willingness to work for nuclear disarmament 
within their Churches - 30 per cent indicated that 
they were active in this way, and Christian CND is 
certainly one of the more active sections within 
CND. There was relatively less enthusiasm for the 
Labour Party, 53 per cent being Labour voters and 
16 per cent party members, a further 11 per cent 
be ing ex-members of the party. Al though 41 per 
cent of this group were aged over 40, only 9 per 
cent were long-standing members of the Campaign, 
with the vast majority (89 per cent) joining 
during the eighties. 
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Pacifism 
Pacifism is another attribute which one might 
expect to find among CND's membership, although it 
must be remembered that complete pacifism is not a 
part of CND's ideological aims, which are concerned 
only with weapons of mass destruction. Almost half 
of the 1985 respondents pronounced themselves to be 
pacifists, without any qualifications. There was a 
slight bias towards women within this sub-group' (58 
per cent female, 42 per cent male), but otherwise 
no significant variations in terms of age, class, 
education or voting 
the total sample. 
preference when compared with 
One might expect to find a 
correlation between pacifism and religious belief, 
but only 28 per cent of those espousing pacifism 
were also practising church members. 
Participation in 'Conventional' politics 
Whatever their beliefs, CND's members are 
generally active in what might be termed 'conven-
tional' politics. There has been a tendency in the 
past to assume that people who became involved in 
protest politics were, almost by definition, 
alienated from more conventional avenues of 
political participation. More recent research, 
however - in particular, the work of Barnes and 
Kaase(5) - has argued the opposite. Their thesis is 
that 'conventional' and 'unconventional' political 
activity is, at least to some extent, cumulative 
rather than mutually exclusive. The data from the 
1985 survey support this argument. Around 97 per 
cent read about and discussed politics generally 
(either 'often' or 'sometimes'). On the same 
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criteria, 61 per cent attempted to convince others 
to vote as they did, around 57 per cent attended 
political meetings and contacted officials or 
politicians, and 39 per cent campaigned for 
candidates in national or local elections. This is 
a far greater frequency of participation in 
'conventional' politics than Marsh discovered in 
his survey of the electorate at large in the 
seventies (6) • CND's national membership are not 
uncritical of the mainstream political systeml 
asked to what extent, in general terms, they 
trusted a British government to do what was right, 
68 per cent replied 'sometimes' and 23 per cent 
indicated 'never' although many of this latter 
group indicated that this distrust only ~pplied to 
Conservative governments. Such dissatisfaction, 
however, does not lead most of national CND's 
membership into turning their backs upon participa-
tion in national and local politics. Overall, only 
about one-third of the 1985 respondents restricted 
their involvement in political activism to work on 
behalf of the Campaign. 
Reasons for Joining 
In an attempt to ascertain what ~rompted their 
membership of national CND, respondents were asked 
an open-ended question about who or what most 
influenced their decision to join. This produced a 
wide variety of responses, with 91. per cent of 
respondents offering an answer. Of those, 18 per 
cent cited moral grounds, particularly moral 
revulsion at the whole concept of waging war with 
weapons of mass destruction, and a further 2 per 
cent cited their own personal experience of 
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warfare, usually adding some comment upon the 
futility of war itself. Just over half of these 
respondents classified themselves as pacifists, and 
a third of them were actively religious, indicating 
that moral concern was by no means limited to these 
groups. More men than women emphasised moral 
reasons for joining (60 per cent male) 1 overall, 
however, there were virtually no significant 
differences between the motivations noted by men 
and those by women. 
Given the emphasis laid upon the moral dimen-
sion by the Campaign and the apparent enthusiasm of 
respondents for other moral issues, it might appear 
surprising that only one in five respondents cited 
a moral motivation, but this would appear to be 
because many respondents took the question to refer 
to some specific event which tipped the balance in 
favour of taking out a membership subscription. 
Thus 8 per cent indicated that they had been 
persuaded by friends, and another 7 per cent by 
seeing a film (usually the War Game) or hearing a 
talk organised by a local peace group, or simply 
through being inspired by the personal example of 
leading figures in the Campaign (Bruce Kent being 
the most frequently mentioned). Relatively few 
respondents cited specific issues which the 
Campaign itself. has sought to publicise1 6 per cent 
gave Cruise as their main motivation (rising to 8 
per cent if one includes those who mentioned 
Greenham Common or Molesworth) and only 1 per cent 
singled out Trident. However, 5 per cent said that 
Mrs. Thatcher and the experience of her administra-
tion had persuaded them to join1 indeed, Thatcher 
and Reagan were relatively frequent one-word 
answers, with 10 per cent of those responding to 
this question offering just this response (normally 
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accompanied by a number of exclamation marks). 
Reagan himself was singled out by 4 per cent of 
respondents, and a further 7 per cent cited the 
arms race and the apparent increase in internation-
al tension. 
Few respondents gave reasons which might be 
thought of as relating only to themselves or those 
close to them: 6 per cent said that fear for the 
future safety of their children was their main 
motivating factor (4 per cent of male respondents 
and 7 per cent of female respondents), and a 
further 7 per cent simply cited fear as their 
reason. Only 1 per cent mentioned economic grounds, 
and this is clearly a matter of secondary impor-
tance. Similarly, very few respondents had been 
prompted into joining by the attitudes of groups 
outside the Campaign: 2 per cent cited the influ-
ence of their Church, and only 1 per cent that of 
the Labour Party. The vast majority of respondents 
seemed to have made the decision to join without 
reference to others: for example, only 2 per cent 
indicated that they had been influenced by their 
parents. However, 7 per cent said that they had 
joined specifically because it would offer them the 
opportuni ty to translate t,heir beliefs into action, 
and that membership of the Campaign was the best 
avenue for this. 
One might expect reasons for joining to differ 
according to the year in which respondents joined 
and their length of membership of the Campaign. The 
survey results do not bear this out, however, the 
only significant difference between those with a 
long-standing membership and those who joined in 
the mid-eighties being that more longer-standing 
members cited moral reasons. Those who joined 
between 1980 and 1983 did so for a wide variety of 
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reasons: very few of them were primarily motivated 
by specific issues like Cruise and Trident; despite 
these being the main issues on which CND campaigned 
during this period, and the same holds for those 
who joined after 1983. Whatever the year of entry, 
however, more respondents 
prompting their decision 
reason. 
ci ted moral grounds. as 
than any other single 
Activism within the Campaign 
As one might expect, not all individual 
national members of CND are prepared or able to 
participate in the Campaign's activities to the 
same degree. Crucial to any discussion of differen-
tial rates of activism are the local CND and other 
peace groups. One must remember that national CND 
does not mount any kind of activity that is 
restricted to the national membership. On the 
contrary, national CND relies upon the network of 
local groups to mobilise members. Even in the 
context of 'national' events, such as large 
demonstrations, most of national CND's organisa-
tional effort is directed towards local groups 
rather than establishing contact with individual 
members. When mounting longer-lasting campaigns, 
national CND pursues a strategy of exhorting local 
groups to mobilise their members into participation 
rather than making direct appeals to their national 
members. The local groups are the organisational 
nucleus of the Campaign, which is why CND's 
leadership continually encourage all national 
members to participate at the local level as well. 
Unfortunately for the Campaign, such appeals 
are not always effective. Whilst there are many 
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paid-up members of national CND who are also active 
at the local level, the 1985 survey suggests that 
there are just as many who are not. Questioned on 
whether they were members of a local CND, anti-
nuclear weapons or similar peace group, only 44 per 
cent said that they were. A further 8 per cent said 
that no such group existed in their locality, and 
they are consequently excluded from the following 
discussion. No less than 48 per cent, 
indicated that, although such groups did 
however, 
exist in 
their locality, they were not members. It is, of 
course, impossible to establish with certainty from 
the survey evidence why this is. It may be that 
some respondents were physically incapable of any 
participation other than subscribing to the 
national organisation - although, given the age 
profile of the national membership, this seems 
unlikely. It may be that domestic commitments 
preclude participation but given the class 
background of respondents, and the high proportion 
of both men and women in employment, it again seems 
improbable that this would be a major causal 
factor. It may be that some respondents used to be 
active at the local level, but were no longer 
motivated to take part. Unfortunately, the survey 
only investigated current (Le. 1985) activity in 
local groups; as we shall see in Chapter 7, there 
is subjective evidenc~ to suggest that many in the 
Campaign experienced a decline in commitment after 
the deployment of Cruise in 1983, so it is probable 
that at least some of the 48 per cent who were not 
in local groups had been involved some years 
earlier. The boundaries between activists and 
non-activists are not clear-cut, therefore, and the 
following discussion should be read with this 
proviso in mind. 
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Whatever the reasons, however, the evidence 
remains that in 1985 almost half of CND's national 
membership were not involved at the local level. It 
does not seem unreasonable to hypothesise that many 
of these are individuals who wish to register their 
agreement with CND's broad unilateralist message, 
but are reluctant to express their agreement in any 
more demanding fashion. This group will be termed 
'sympathisers', on the assumption that their 
membership of national CND is largely a symbolic 
act. 
Among those who are members of a local group, 
a further distinction is necessary, as membership 
does not necessarily equate with participation. 
Respondents who belonged to a local group were 
asked how often they participated in the group's 
meetings or events. Again, this data related only 
to the 1984/85 period, but it does reveal that 21 
per cent had participated in no local activities at 
all, a further 51 per cent had participated in six 
or less such meetings or events, and only 26 per 
cent had participated in more than this. Given that 
it is the practice of local groups to hold monthly 
meetings (at least) in addition to campaigning 
activities, then only this latter 26 per cent could 
be considered to be particularly active at the 
local level. This group will be termed 'acti-
vists'. Those who were members of local groups, but 
participated on six or less. occasions (including 
those who had not participated at all, on the 
assumption that they may have participated before 
mid-1984, and had at least maintained their 
membership of a local group) will be termed 
'participants'. 
Table 4.5 shows the differential participation 
rates of these sub-groups and the whole sample. As 
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might be expected, activities which involve direct 
communication with the general public are dis-
tinctly less popular than group or mass actions 
which do not usually entail any dialogue with the 
unconvinced. Face-to-face contact with members of 
the public, on the streets or on the doorstep, not 
only requires an ability to present the unilateral-
ist argument to what may well be a hostile audi-
ence, it also means being deprived of the security 
of solidarity that is experienced on mass actions. 
As can be seen from the table, only the activists 
pursue canvassing and lobbying to any marked 
degree. If the proportion who engage in some of 
these activities seems small, it should be remem-
bered that we are discussing a large movement. 
TABLE 4.5 
Activities Undertaken on behalf of CND (%) 
Ul Ul 
1-1 .j.J Ul 
Q) a .j.J 
Ul III Ul 
. .-\ P. . .-\ 
.-t .<:: . .-\ > 
.-t .j.J 0 . .-\ 
..: III . .-\ .j.J 
P. .j.J 0 
~. 1-1 ..: 
---.-_ .. --_.- .111 . 
Ul Po. 
wearing Badges 83 79 86 97 
Demonstrations 66 55 73 93 
Leafletting 33 17 41 90 
Canvassing 23 8 27 80 
Lobbying politicians 19 11 20 53 
Contacting local press 17 9 16 54 
Attending peace camps 18 9 22 46 
Public speaking 8 5 9 24 
n = 620 295 209 ·70 
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Although not all CND members are prepared to take 
the unilateralist argument onto their neighbour's 
doorsteps ~ the proportions above suggest that in 
the Campaign as a whole there are some 5,000 
(perhaps even 10,000) people who are active in this 
way - an achievement which can only be matched in 
the political arena by the major parties. 
In socio-economic terms, the survey reveals 
few differences between the more and less active in 
the Campaign. Men and women were found in all 
three sub-groups in almost exactly equal propor-
tions. Activists tend to be more concentrated in 
the older age bands, middle-class rather than 
working class occupations and to have been involved 
in the Campaign for longer, but in all cases the 
differences are relatively slight, as shown in 
Table 4.6. 
TABLE 4.6 
Demographic and Social Factors (%) 
Sex 
---Male 50 
Female 49 
Age 
Under 25 24 
25-40 47 
Over 40 29 
occupation 
Middle Class 63 
Working Class 19 
joined·CND 
Before 1980 9 
1980-83 43 
1984-85 34 
n = 620 
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50 
49 
27 
49 
24 
58 
22 
5 
54 
41 
295 
51 
49 
21 
39 
40 
64 
19 
14 
60 
26 
209 
47 
53 
11 
54 
34 
69 
16 
11 
64 
24 
70 
In short, whilst one may discern certain defining 
socio-economic characteristics of national CND 
members in general, such factors do not appear to 
underly differential rates of activism within the 
Campaign. 
The survey does suggest that those who are 
more active in CND are also likely to be more 
active in conventional politics and other cam-
paigns. 39 per cent of activists and 41 per cent of 
partic ipants belonged to a political party, 
compared with 25 per cent of sympathisers - most 
belonging to the Labour Party in all three groups. 
Membership of a trade union or professional 
association was more evenly spread - 62 per cent of 
sympathisers, 59 per cent of participants and 65 
per cent of activists. However, support for other 
public campaigns is clearly more marked among the 
more active; 53 per cent of sympathisers supported 
other campaigns, rising to 63 per cent of partici-
pants and 79 per cent of activists. Moreover, 
activists placed a higher priority on CND than 
their other campaigning commitments - whilst only 
25 per cent of sympathisers considered other public 
campaigns which they supported to be definitely 
less important to them than CND, the proportion 
among activists was 61 per cent. Activists were 
also more likely to be involved in voluntary 
organisations - 36 per cent, compared with 34 per 
cent of participants and 25 per cent of sympa-
thisers. 
This trend towards activism in CND being a 
reflection of political and campaigning activism in 
general is also apparent in the responses to the 
question on conventional political activism. We 
have already noted the generally high participation 
of CND members in such activities, compared with 
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the general public, but Table 4.7 demonstrates that 
activists in Campaign provide yet more support for 
the thesis of cumulative participation. As is the 
case for respondents as a whole, most of this 
participation is directed towards work on behalf of 
the Labour Party. Table 4.8 on voting preferences 
demonstrates some variation in support for the 
Alliance and Green parties (support for the 
Communist party being minimal in all three groups), 
but Labour is still the choice of most. 
The more active do show some tendency to think 
differently from their less active colleagues when 
questioned about their attitudes on various issues 
relevant to the Campaign. Activists are more 
inclined to conceptualise America rather than the 
Soviet Union as a potentially destabilising 
influence on world affairs (and this was before the 
American bombing of Libyan targets in 1986). Asked 
who they considered to bear the main responsibility 
for the arms race in recent years, none of the 
respondents in any of the three groups identified 
the Soviet Union. Among sympathisers, 50 per cent 
attached blame to the United States and 46 per cent 
to the USA and USSR equally. 54 per cent of 
participants identified the USA as the main 
culprit, and 41 per cent indicated the USA and USSR 
as being jointly responsible. Among activists, 
however, opinion was more sharply divided; 63 per 
cent considered the USA to be mainly responsible 
whilst the proportion allocating blame equally 
among the super-powers fell to 33 per cent. A 
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TABLE 4.7 
participation in 'Conventional Politics' 
III III 
~ .j..l 
Q) IC:: 
III crJ 
-..-I P< 
~ .c:: -..-I 
~ .j..l U 
.0: crJ -..-I 
~ .j..l ~ crJ 
Cl) p.. 
- - -. - . - . - . . - . "- - .. . . - - - . . - - - - - . 
% who: 
Read about politics 98 98 96 
Discuss politics 97 98 96 
Convince others to vote 61 58 62 
Attend political meetings 58 49 64 
Contact politicians 56 51 57 
Campaign for candidates 39 32 43 
n= 620 295 209 
TABLE 4.8 
Voting Preference (%) 
~ 
~ 
.0: 
. . - . - - - . .r: . 
Labour 67 
Alliance 15 
Green 10 
n = 620 
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~ 
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67 
12 
14 
209 
69 
10 
13 
70 
(%) 
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.0: 
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67 
73 
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similar trend was apparent when respondents were 
asked . whether they thought the Soviet union 
represented a real military threat to the UK. 26 
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per cent of sympathisers thought that it did, 
compared with 19 per cent of participants and only 
13 per cent of activists. 55 per cent of sympathi-
sers thought that it did not, rising to 64 per cent 
of participants and 79 per cent of activists. One 
cannot infer from this data that activists are in 
some way 'pro-Soviet'; the questionnaire referred 
only to the potential military threat from the 
Soviet union, and did not investigate attitudes 
about the Soviet economic and political system. Nor 
can one assume that activists (or indeed the less 
active) were more interested in campaigning against 
American rather than Soviet nuclear weapons policy; 
the overwhelming majority in all three groups 
thought that CND should campaign more actively 
against the nuclear strategy of both super-powers, 
with hardly any respondents making a distinction 
between the two. Nevertheless, a desire to reduce 
Britain's defence and foreign policy links with the 
United States was indicated by over 90 per cent of 
respondents in all three groups. One alternative 
which was offered to respondents was that Britain 
should pursue a strictly non-aligned defence and 
foreign policy. This did not receive such an 
enthusiastic endorsement, but still attracted a 
majority of positive responses. Among sympat~isers, 
64 per cent agreed and 15 per cent disagreed; among 
participants, 59 per cent agreed and 24 per cent 
disagreed, while among activists 67 per cent agreed 
and 14 per cent disagreed. 
The question of British withdrawal from the 
NATO 
among 
evenly 
that 
alliance prompted clearer cut differences 
the sub-groups. Sympathisers were fairly 
split on the issue, 37 per cent agreeing 
Britain should withdraw and 31 per cent 
disagreeing. Opinion hardened among the partici-
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pants, 45 per cent endorsing withdrawal and 25 per 
cent disagreeing. Among activists, 56 per cent 
supported the idea of withdrawal; with only 14 per 
cent disagreeing. The fact that only among the 
latter group does one find a majority in favour of 
withdrawal may seem surprising, given that CND has 
a clear pol icy commitment to arguing the case for 
Britain leaving NATO~ as we shall see in subsequent 
chapters, however, this has been a highly conten-
tious issue both inside and outside the campaign 
during the eighties. 
Activists are also more inclined to 
the moral dimension of the Campaign's 
This can be observed both obliquely and 
emphasise 
ideology. 
directly. 
Thus, for example, when asked whether money saved 
by nuclear disarmament should go primarily on 
overseas aid, 35 per cent of sympathisers agreed 
whilst 27 per cent disagreed. Among participants, 
opinion was more evenly balanced, with 41 per cent 
agreeing and 39 per cent disagreeing. Activists' 
opinions were almost a mirror image of the sympa-
thisers' position~ 47 per cent of activists agreed, 
and 31 per cent disagreed. In an attempt to secure 
more direct evidence on this aspect of the Cam-
paign, a question used by Parkin in his 1965 survey 
was replicated with slightly different wording(7). 
Respondents were given two economic reasons and two 
moral reasons for oppositfon to British possession 
of nuclear weapons, and asked to indicate which one 
of the four carried the greatest weight with them 
personally. Table 4.9 shows the comparison between 
the 1965 and 1985 results. Parkin, in interpreting 
his results by way of a breakdown of respondents' 
social class, comments that this shows that: 
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Whilst CND may certainly be regarded as a 
radical movement, the radicalism of its 
followers is centred primarily upon broad 
moral concerns of a basically non-class kind, 
rather than on the more traditional left-wing 
preoccupation with economic change and class 
conflict. (8) 
In general terms, the same is largely true of CND 
in the eighties, as Table 4.9 suggests, and the 
trend for activists to incline towards the moral 
dimension can also be observed, although it is 
slight in this case. 
There are limits on the emphasis placed upon 
the moral basis for unilateralism by activists, 
however, in the sense that it does not lead most 
activists into espousing complete disarmament or 
pacifism. There is a solid minority in all groups 
which favours an increase in conventional armaments 
should Britain dispose of its nuclear capability, 
and pacifist sentiments actually decline when one 
compares the active with the less active. Asked 
whether Britain should increase its conventional 
weaponry in the event of unilateral nuclear disar-
mament, 25 per cent of sympathisers agreed and 59 
per cent disagreed; similarly, 25 per cent of par-
ticipants agreed. and 58 per cent disagreed, whilst 
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TABLE 4.9 
Most Important Argument against 
British nuclear weapons 
(in %) 
Inefficient means of defence 4 
Waste of economic resources 10 
Morally unacceptable/evil 68 
Britain able to give moral lead 14 
Don't Know/No response 4 
7 
18 
61 
12 
2 
100 100 
(n= 341 620) 
the activists produced almost identical responses, 
with 27 per cent agreeing and 54 per cent disagree-
ing. Asked to react to the statement 'I am a 
pacifist', 53 per cent of sympathisers agreed and 
34 per cent disagreed; 43 per cent of participants 
agreed and 42 per cent disagreed, whilst among 
activists opinions swung the other way, with 39 per 
cent agreeing and 46 per cent disagreeing. Acti-
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vists are also less inclined to be actively 
religious: 16 per cent of them classified them-
selves as such, compared with 21 per cent of 
sympathisers and 28 per cent of participants. 
Conclusions 
It is inevitable that any analysis based upon 
a sample survey and a postal questionnaire must be 
approached with caution. Nevertheless, there is 
very strong evidence from the 1985 survey that the 
main socio-economic characteristics of the Cam-
paign's membership have not changed significantly 
over the last thirty years. The bulk of CND's 
members are still to be found in a quite specific 
class location, which in itself suggests at least a 
degree of structural determinism. It is still the 
educated middle-class, and particularly those 
wi thin that class who are employed in non-commer-
cial occupations and/or the public-sector, who are 
motivated to join the Campaign. It remains debata-
ble whether this is because, as Parkin has argued, 
such people have a predisposition towards radical 
values, and this lies behind both their support for 
the Campaign and their choice of occupation, 
although there is certainly little evidence in the 
1985 survey to refute such an argument. Like 
Inglehart's thesis on post-materialism, Parkin's 
argument has an intuitive validity; both conceptu-
alise membership of social movements as a manifes-
tation of fundamental values which are at variance 
with the 'dominant' or 'old' value order based upon 
materialism and support for capital ism. Both are, 
however, very hard to prove given the difficulties 
of ascertaining individuals' values on the basis of 
survey evidence. 
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We are not only interested in what motivates 
people to join CND, however, but also in how they 
behave and the attitudes they espouse once they 
have become members. The striking impression 
obtained from the survey results is the degree of 
unanimity among members and their loyalty to the 
Campaign. CND's members are not al ienated from 
conventional political life or other social 
movements; yet there is little evidence to suggest 
that their involvement in causes and campaigns 
outside of CND leads to divisions and ideological 
schisms within the Campaign. Among those who 
responded to the questionnaire, there was a very 
high level of agreement about both the tactics and 
the aims of the Campaign, with factors such as age, 
gender, class and even political affiliation 
causing little or no variation. It is only when 
one draws a distinction between active and passive 
members of the Campaign that differences start to 
appear, and even then the correlation between 
activism and support for more militant aims and 
tactics seems considerably weaker than it commonly 
is in political parties. The Campaign is highly 
cohesive; the question remains as to whether this 
cohesion is dependent upon the Campaign refusing to 
compromise its moral integrity, and whether this 
inhibits its impact on parties, public opinion and 
public policy. 
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Chapter Five 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE : DECISION-MAKING AND 
DEMOCRACY 
CND's membership is overwhelmingly middle-aged, 
middle-class, well-educated and presumably articu-
late. Given this, and the fact that they have 
taken the step of joining a group which is not 
dedicated to the pursuit of their exclusive 
self-interest, it is unlikely that those of the 
Campaign's paid-up members who do take an active 
interest in its running will do so in a subservient 
manner. Having taken a stand on what most of them 
see as an issue of moral principle, CND's members 
are unlikely to give blind and unquestioning 
obedience to their leadersl their sense of personal 
responsibility is too great for that. It poses a 
challenging problem for tho'se entrusted with the 
overall direction of the Campaign. On the one 
hand, they have to devise a decision-making 
structure which is sufficiently egalitarian to 
attract and maintain the support of their member-
shipl on the other hand," some demarcation of 
responsibility and some degree of legitimised 
authority is desirable to facilitate coordination 
of the Campaign's activities and prevent it being 
used by outside groups for their own purposes. The 
problem is compounded if the impact of the Campaign 
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on parties and public opinion reaches a plateau (as 
is arguably the case since 1982/3), and leaders and 
members have to decide upon new directions and 
initiatives in an attempt to make another break-
through. Organising a Campaign during a period of 
explosive growth is one thingl keeping it together 
once it has become a mass organisation is quite 
another. 
CND: a half-way house 
A variety of organisational forms are to be 
found within the contemporary British peace 
movement, reflecting the different ideological 
outlooks, tactics and objectives of those involved. 
Some participants in the movement adhere to formal 
democratic structures I this is most 
the organised poli tical left. 
however, are groups which emphasise 
tion and profess an abhorrence of 
notable among 
More common, 
decentra1isa-
any kind of 
hierarchy or, bureaucracy. These groups see 
themselves as operating in a hostile political 
environment, and argue that adopting a highly 
decentralised, po1ycepha1ous organisational 
structure means that they present no easily 
identifiable target group of key decision-makers 
and information-holders to those who might wish to 
inf il trate, coerce or control a group. This kind 
of tactical thinking is most often found in those 
groups who are primarily committed to non~vio1ent 
direct action. For example, both the Greenham 
women and the Cruisewatch network (neither of which 
are integral parts of CND) stress the tactical 
advantages of a network, non-bureaucratic form of 
organisation when faced with what is seen as 
virtually constant harassment by the political 
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authorities. Tactical decisions are not the only 
determinants of organisation structure for these 
groups. Decentralisation and non-hierarchical 
structures are also adopted for ideological 
reasons, as a concrete express ion of the groups 
conception of meaningful democracy. They argue that 
nuclear weapons policy is a classic instance of the 
lack of real democracy in British politics, crucial 
decis ions being taken by Governments without 
consultation with Parliament, let alone the 
electorate. Some go further: the Greenham women 
argue that the possession of nuclear weapons 
epitomises the structural violence endemic in 
Bri tish society, which is be ing perpetuated by a 
small elite of decision-makers. For them, the 
struggle against Cruise has widened out into an 
advocacy of the values of cooperation and tolerance 
in society as a whole.(l) For such groups as the 
Greenham women, an emphasis upon decentralised, 
non-hierarchical organisation has developed from a 
tactic into an important principle, and has become 
an integral and essential component of their 
ideological thinking. 
In its choice of organisational structure, CND 
falls somewhere between conventional democracy (as 
practiced by established political parties) and the 
more direct democracy of some peace-activist 
groups. Tactically and ideologically, it shares 
much common ground with the latter, endorsing and 
participating in direct action, and criticising 
government for the lack of democratic input into 
nuclear weapons policy. Simultaneously, however, 
it pursues more conventional tactics, and numbers 
many in its ranks who are accustomed to working 
within hierarchical party and group structures. On 
the one hand, CND wishes to be seen as a democratic 
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grouping and one that is open to participation by 
all. This not only facilitates recruitment; it also 
serves to reinforce CND's argument that it is an 
autonomous entity (a "broad church") and should not 
be associated exclusively with the radical left. On 
the other hand, CND has to maintain a constant 
vigilance against take-over attempts from smaller 
but more cohesively organised groups, and needs 
enough of an authority structure to prevent this. 
As a voluntary group, however, there are distinct 
limits on the degree of hierarchical control which 
could be imposed even if this was thought desira-
ble. Most of CND's campaigning work is undertaken 
by local groups; national CND may advise, guide and 
exhort local activists but it does not have the 
rewards and sanctions necessary to instruct them. 
The result of this mix of tactical and ideological 
factors is that CND has adopted an organisation 
structure which, in outline, -resembles the formal 
representative structure of the Labour party but 
which in its day-to-day operation lays the same 
kind of emphasis upon personal contact and infor-
mality which is found among the more unconventional 
peace activists. 
MEMBERSHIP 
CND has two types of membership: national members 
who pay an annual subscription to national CND, and 
local members who subscribe to their local group. 
The dramatic growth in both categories of member-
ship after 1980 prompted several attempts within 
CND to introduce 
this has always 
a unified membership. scheme, but 
been resisted by the financial 
planners within CND because of compl ications over 
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VAT. The basic unit of organisation is the local 
group, but these (together with individual members 
not in local groups) are coordinated in a structure 
of national, regional and area organisations. 
Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales have their own 
organisations; the English membership is subdivided 
into some twelve regional and area organisations. 
National, regional and area organisations may all 
hold their own Annual General Meetings and elect 
. their own executive committees, but their role is 
seen as promoting and facilitating local group 
activity, and acting as a feedback channel from the 
groups to the national level. 
In addition to individual national and local 
members, CND also has some special ist sections. 
These are groups of members within particular areas 
in society, which have been established as CND's 
membership grew. There were five such specialist 
sections by the end of 1985; Labour CND, Green CND, 
Liberal CND, Trade Union CND and Christian CND. 
Their theoretical function is to further the work 
of CND within their own particular party, group or 
church. In practice, however, especially between 
1980 and 1983 when the sections were being estab-
lished in an ad hoc fashion they posed some 
problems for CND. Both Labour and Green CND were 
considered by some within national CND to be more 
concerned with importing political disagreements 
and stances into CND rather than exporting the 
unilateralist message. These difficulties are 
discussed in more detail below; 
in this context is that these 
the point to note 
difficulties led 
national CND to clarify the status and responsi-
bilities of specialist sections from 1983 onwards. 
National CND decided then that it should formalise 
its right to create or disband specialist sections, 
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to make rules governing their activities, and to 
require them to submit regular reports and forward 
plans. Specialist sections are required by CND's 
constitution to further the aims of CND within 
their own area of interest, and national CND 
reinforced this in 1983 when it passed a motion 
that any specialist section "must not promote 
political, social or religious aims of its own".(2) 
In constitutional terms, therefore, specialist 
sections are a fully integrated part of CND's 
national organisationl in practical terms, however, 
they still enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy 
in choosing how they will work on behalf of CND. 
They hold their own annual general meetings and 
elect their own executive committees, in the same 
way as regional and area organisations, but as 
their campaigning is more specialised, they 
demonstrate more independence in their choice of 
issues and activities to prioritise. 
Similar, but distinct from the specialist 
sections is Youth CND. This enjoys a unique 
organisational status in CND, having its own annual 
conference and regional group structure. It also 
caused problems for CND in 1983, when it was 
subject to entryism from far-left political 
groupings. The result of this was the same kind of 
reminder about responsibil i ties from national CND 
that the specialist sections received at that time. 
A motion was pas'sed to the effect' that Youth CND 
could not make changes in policy or its own 
organisational structure without approval from 
national CND, and reaffirming that Youth CND should 
reflect the broad based nature of CND and should 
not be dominated by any particular political or 
religious group.(3) 
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Finally, and to a much greater extent outside 
the formal organisational framework of CND~ there 
are a large number of affiliated bodies. Many of 
these are trade unions, reflecting the marked 
success CND has had in recruiting support in this 
area during the eighties. Another area in which 
CND has attracted support is among the professions • 
. Included among the affiliated organisations are 
such bodies as SANA (Scientists Against Nuclear 
Armaments), JANE (Journalists Against Nuclear 
Extermination), Lawyers 
the Medical Campaign 
for Nuclear Disarmament and 
against Nuclear 
Affiliated organisations enjoy virtually 
Weapons. 
complete 
autonomy from national CND, although they do have a 
small input into the decision-making process. 
It can be seen from this that membership of 
CND is essentially reticulate. Over-lapping 
membership is relatively common, especially amongst 
the more active members. Even allowing for a 
degree of double-counting, however, the totals of 
membership remain impressive. 
Decision-Making 
Whatever avenue of participation is employed, 
members of CND are bound to follow the general 
policy directions of the Campaign as a whole. In 
consti tutional terms, the ultimate authori ty for 
overall policy rests with the Annual Conference. 
This forum consists of delegates from the national, 
regional and area organisations, the local groups, 
specialist sections and Youth CND, and affiliated 
organisations; unusually, there is also provision 
for individual members of national CND not only to 
attend, but also enjoy voting rights. National, 
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regional and area organisations are entitled to 
five votes each as, in practice, are most local 
groups. (4) Specialist sections are entitled to 
five votes, affiliated organisations to two votes 
each. This means that two individual members 
(representing no-one but themselves) have equal 
voting power in the Annual Conference to the two 
delegates that an affiliated organisation like the 
Transport and General Workers Union (representing 
around a million affiliated members) may send to 
the Conference. It has been suggested to the 
Conference that individual's voting rights be 
removed, but Conference delegates have consistently 
rejected this. It is seen by many in the Campaign 
as an important matter of principle to maintain 
this stress on individualism and internal democ-
racy, and an important distinguishing feature from 
the more formally political groupings in British 
politics. 
In practice, very few of the national member-
ship actually attend Conference in an individual 
capacity - normally, some two or three hundred. 
More disconcerting for CND is the fact that less 
than half of the local groups send delegates to the 
Conference - in recent years, local group represen-
tation has averaged around 35 per cent. National 
CND surveyed its local groups about their reasons 
for non-attendance in 1983 and 1984; on both 
·occasions, the response indicated lack of time and 
money and a perceived lack of relevance of the 
Annual Conference to local campaigning to be the 
main causes of non-participation. Even so, 
delegates from local groups still enjoy an over-
whelming majority of the available voting power in 
the Conference. 
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Although it would be unfair, it is tempting to 
characterise the proceedings of the Annual Confer-
ence as schizophrenic. Strenuous efforts are made 
by the Chairperson to encourage participation from 
alII Conference delegates have come to expect the 
Chair to try to distribute time on a roughly equal 
basis between male and female, old and young, and 
so on, and will make a point of v01c1ng their 
discontent if this doesn't happen. Whilst this 
enhances the image of the Campaign as a fully 
democratised organisation, it is by no means 
uncommon for Annual Conferences to become enmeshed 
in procedural 
many delegates 
objections 
find to 
and manoeuvres, which 
be a frustrating and 
al ienating experience. Despite this, the two-day 
Conference normally manages to discuss some 10 to 
12 major resolutions each year, proceedings usually 
being marked by their informality and friendliness 
rather than sectarianism. Nevertheless, there have 
been persistent criticisms from some activists that 
the Annual Conference spends too much time on 
procedural motions, and not enough on actual 
campaigning work. CND has responded to this, and, 
from 1986 on, half of the Conference's time will be 
spent on workshops organised around specific 
campaigns, with the time spent on resolutions cut 
accordingly. 
The relative harmony of the Annual Conference 
is not surprising, given that many of the resolu-
tions presented to Conference are uncontentious, 
as they reaffirm the Campaign's opposition to 
particular nuclear weapons systems or support for 
such causes as arms conversion, nuclear-free zones 
or protection of civil liberties. This is not to 
imply that the Conference is no more than a 
stage-managed rally. As will be seen below, the 
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national leadership has some control over the 
choice of resolutions to be debated; but by no 
means complete control. Moreover; the distribution 
of voting rights is such that there are no large 
bloc votes which the leadership can influence or 
predict in advance. It is because of this that 
Conference proceedings can never be predicted with 
complete confidence. A good example was the 1985 
election of Paul Johns as Chairperson (succeeding 
Joan Ruddock). It was known quite widely within 
the Campaign before the Conference that many of the 
more influential figures in the campaign favoured 
another candidate1 yet (at least in this observer's 
opinion) the outcome of the election was determined 
to a large extent by the candidates' performance on 
the floor of the Conference on the day. 
When contentious issues do arise, the distri-
bution of voting power, the fact that many dele-
gates have long experience of committee and public 
meetings and are skilled in the creative use of 
points of order, the alleg iances that some dele-
gates have to other campaigns or parties, and the 
concern for individual rights which is part of 
CND's ideology - all these combine to produce a 
situation in which the leadership of CND would find 
it very difficult to persuade the Conference not to 
engage in potentially embarrassing disagreement. A 
good example of this was the debate at the 1984 
Conference on a resolution calling for CND 'to 
campaign vigorously against Soviet nuclear weapons 
"and policies'. In the long and at times acrimoni-
ous debate which followed, it was argued by 
delegates sympathetic to some Soviet disarmament 
initiatives (e.g. no first use, a nuclear weapons 
freeze) that this would amount to campaigning 
against policies which were similar to some of 
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those espoused by the Campaign 
delegates argued that to reject 
itself. Other 
the resolution 
would be tantamount to limiting the Campaign to the 
Western hemisphere, and would be seen by those 
outside the campaign (especially the media) as 
evidence of a pro-Soviet bias in CND. The debate, 
almost wholly monopolised by past and present 
supporters of the CPGB, degenerated into an 
involved procedural wrangle which was only resolved 
by not taking a vote on the resolution at all. 
Despite a reminder from the Chair that CND remained 
firmly opposed to nuclear weapons of both East and 
West, media reports on the Conference presented the 
debate as a sign of CND 'going soft' on the Soviet 
union - something the leadership knew would almost 
certainly happen, but were powerless to prevent. 
The National Council and Committees 
Conference may well be difficult to keep in 
order at times, not least because of a spirit of 
independence' among delegates, but the concomitant 
of this is that there is little evidence of 
Conference being able to exercise concerted and 
consistent scrutiny and control over executive 
action in the Campaign. Conference may be constitu-
tionally supreme in terms of policy formulation, 
but responsibility for implementation lies outside 
the Conference with CND's National Council. This 
body, which meets four times a year, offers 
guidance and advice to the Conference over policy -
which is normally accepted by Conference and 
oversees the general running of the Campaign. 
National Council is composed of around 100 people: 
the chairperson, four vice-chairpersons, the 
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treasurer and twenty ordinary members (all 26 
directly elected by Conference), five delegates 
each from the national, regional and area organisa-
tions, one from each of the specialist sections, 
and six from Youth CND. One marked feature of the 
, 
Counci I' s composition is the number of women, the 
balance between the sexes being virtually even. 
This is a phenomenon that runs throughout all 
levels of the campaign, including Conference, 
Council, Committees, elected officers, staff and 
the membership at large. 
Although turnover of membership on Council is 
high, there is a core group of around fifteen to 
twenty people who tend to appear on National 
Council year after year whether as directly 
elected officers or representatives, or represent-
ing a region or specialist section. By virtue of 
their experience, such people tend to speak the 
most often in council meetings - something which 
has prompted the Council to experiment with its 
procedure in an 
participation. 
attempt to encourage more diverse 
The real problem in terms of 
effective participation, however, lies in the way 
in which most. proposals coming before Council 
emanate from CND's system of national committees. 
In a situation analogous to the relationship 
between the full cabinet and cabinet committees in 
national politics, proposals from committees tend 
to be put forward for council's approval rather 
than discussion and further input. Discussion is 
not enhanced by the tendency for committee propos-
als to be circulated only a relatively short time 
before Council meetings - allowing little time for 
delegates to digest the proposals, let alone 
discuss them with their colleagues in the regions 
or sections. In this sense, National Council is 
123 
similar to the Annual Conference - both tend to be 
largely reactive bodies, passing judgement on 
proposals coming from more specialised sub-sections 
of the movement. 
The most significant input to council delib-
erations comes from the national committees. Most 
of these have been created in an ad hoc manner as 
the campaign has grown; by 1985, there were eight 
in existence. The most important is the National 
Executive Committee, which meets monthly and is 
responsible for coordinating the day-to-day 
operations of the Campaign. It consists of some 
25-30 members; some are directly elected by 
Council, but most are present as representatives 
from other national committees, the national 
organisations or as national office-holders. The 
other national committees are as follows, together 
with their main areas of responsibility. Finance 
and General Purposes (financial planning and 
control, budgeting, fund-raising, funding of 
regions and areas); Projects (planning national 
events, developing on-going campaigns, liaising 
with other peace groups and autonomous activist 
groupings involved in campaigning initiatives e.g. 
the Greenham Women and the Cruisewatch network) -
International (developing international contacts, 
raising international issues at national level, 
stimulating internationalism within the Campaign); 
Publications (overseeing all printed material 
produced for sale by CND - works closely with CND 
Publications Ltd, which, for financial reasons is 
organised separately from national CND); Sanity 
Editorial Board (overseeing production of CND's 
monthly magazine); Parliamentary and Elections 
(information service for M. P. s and ParI iamentary 
candidates, constituency monitoring of M.P.s, 
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organising CND's input into national and local 
elections and, from 1986 on, coordinating their 
work of the political party specialist sections) 1 
Conference Arrangements (organising Annual Confer-
ence, compositing resolutions). All of these 
commi t tees are elected by Council, although only 
places on Projects and International committees are 
normally contested. There are also a Press and 
Public Relations Committee and a Staffing Commit-
tee, the responsibilities of which are selfevident, 
but these are sub-committees of the National 
Executive. 
The National Executive Committee 
The work undertaken by these committees is 
discussed in more detail elsewhere, in the context 
of CND's campaigning activities in the eighties. As 
far as the organisational context of CND is 
concerned, the National Executive is the key 
committee. Much of its time is spent on sorting 
out problems and disputes which occur between the 
other commi t tees, and the reg ions, areas and 
specialist sections. This is a significant task, 
given the tendency for Conference, and indeed 
National Council, to endorse new campaigning 
initiatives without thinking through the subsequent 
organisational problems. The decentralised nature 
of much of CND's campaigning only compounds the 
coordination problems faced by the National 
Executive. It is not uncommon for criticism to be 
voiced 
between 
internally about a 
committees (and 
lack 
the 
of communication 
full-time staff 
servicing them). To date, national CND has been 
unable to devise an institutional means of resolv-
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ing these problems (which is not surprising, given 
the scale of their activities when compared to 
other voluntary associations), other than repeat-
edly extolling the. virtues of good communication. 
At the time of writing, plans are afoot to streng-
then the position of the National Executive by 
streamlining the number of committees, and having 
them report to the National Executive rather than 
the National Council. Even without this, 
when faced with serious problems the 
however, 
National 
Executive has not hesitated to act in a firm and 
authoritative manner, most notably when some of the 
specialist sections have attempted to impose their 
own political orientations onto CND. 
We have already noted the problems which arose 
with Youth CND in 1983, and the corrective action 
undertaken by the Campaign's leadership. Youth CND 
was not the only section in which there was 
disagreement resulting from members having commit-
ments and loyalties outside the Campaign. For 
example, Labour CND was beset by sectarian argument 
in 1983 to such an extent that the National 
Executive Committee of Labour CND became 
unworkable during the latter half of 
virtually 
1983. The 
Committee was split between those 
Left of the Labour Party, who saw 
allied to the 
the election 
defeat as no reason to soften CND or the Labour 
Party's line oh such issues as NATO, and those 
allied to the centre of the party and its new 
leader, who were concerned to conso1 idate recent 
success in committing the party to unilateralism 
rather than seeking to push it any further in the 
short term. The split culminated in threats of 
resignation from the more moderate element, which 
prompted CND's National Executive (four of whose 
members were among the moderate faction) to step 
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in, effectively suspend temporarily the activities 
of Labour CND and appoint an interim committee to 
run the section until new elections could be held. 
Less dramatically, Green CND was censured for 
seeking to affiliate with Solidarity in Poland 
without consulting the National Executive - (and, 
indeed, there has been dissatisfaction expressed on 
a number of occasions since 1983 that Green CND is 
more concerned to work for Green policies within 
CND rather than for CND's policies in the Green 
Movement, although the National Executive has' not 
acted on this). 
Whilst the National Executive may be in a 
position to resolve internal disputes of a politi-
cal nature, it has found it much more difficult to 
coordinate the expanding range of campaigning 
activi ties which CND has spawned as the Campaign 
has grown. As one senior staff member argued in 
1984, the tendency was for Council's campaigning 
initiatives to be passed straight to the national 
committees, who each decided on their input with 
minimal consultation.(S) The result was a lack of 
synchronisation in the planning of campaigns. One 
response to this is that from 1986 onwards, the 
agenda for National Executive meetings is arranged 
so as to ensure that there is a specific slot for 
discussion of on-going and future campaigns. 
Coordination problems have not been helped by the 
growth of a second-tier of Working Groups, again 
established in an ad hoc fashion to concentrate on 
specific aspects of the Campaign. Groups have been 
created on such topics as Non-violent direct 
action, Molesworth, Nuclear-Free Zones, Fund-
raising, Forward Planning, and the campaign's 
Regions and Areas - in all, there were over twenty 
working groups in operation by the end of 1984. In 
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theory, each working group is responsible to one of 
the national committees, though the relationship 
between committees and working groups has been 
ambiguous at times. As CND's General Secretary 
commented in 1984, working groups had shown a 
tendency to proliferate and to create for them-
selves an on-going functionlthe National Executive 
agreed that it had become necessary to review the 
growth and functioning of working groups. (6) By 
1987, there appeared to be widespread agreement 
that a streamlining of the committee and working 
group structure was desirable but little in the way 
of concrete changes had been implemented. 
CND's Staff 
An increasingly important element in this 
attempt to coordinate campaigning work has been the 
full-time staff who work for national CND. Between 
1979 and 1985, the number of staff employed by the 
Campaign grew from only three to forty 1 although 
all are paid the same (rather low) salary, staff 
costs by 1985 were accounting for around 25 per 
cent of national CND's income. Staff are allocated 
among five separate departments: projects, Publica-
tions, Press and Public Relations, Groups and 
Organisation, and Finance and Membership. The 
Projects department works on events, campaigns, 
nuclear-free zones, international contacts and 
generally services the activities of Youth CND, 
Christian CND and Trade Union CND. The Groups and 
Organisation department is a recent creation 
(1986), merging the old Administration department 
(which works on the Annual Conference and general 
administration at the national headquarters) with 
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new staff appointments to oversee and stimulate 
local groups in the regions and areas. The respon-
sibilities of the other departments are self~ 
evident. In most areas, staff are assisted by a 
fluctuating population of volunteer workers, some 
of whom have been working on this basis for a 
number of years. Each department has a head, who is 
responsible to the General Secretary. Prior to 
1985, this post was occupied by Bruce Kent, who 
combined his administrative duties with a hectic 
schedule of public speaking and public relations 
work. The increase in staff and administrative 
work led CND to appoint Meg Beresford as the new 
General Secretary in 1985, with a new job descrip-
tion which emphasised that the role of General 
Secretary was now to be primarily internal adminis-
trative work. 
The influence that full-time staff exert on 
decision-making in national CND is impossible to 
determine without participant research. The 
National Executive acknowledged in 1985 that it was 
difficult even for them to see how and by whom de-
cisions were being made.(7) One may only observe 
that having a number of full-time staff to service 
part-time elected officers and committees must 
facilitate internal communication, but inevitably 
creates the potential for staff to exert a signifi-
cant influence on the options presented to commit-
tees and their subsequent decisions. What is clear 
is that the relationship between Council members 
serving on national committees and the full-time 
staff has not always been good. The major problem 
seems to be one of deciding on the right degree of 
delegation from Council members to staff. It is 
acknowledged that in the more 'technical' areas of 
CND's work - for example, finance, publications, 
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administration elected members and staff work 
well together. It is in the more 'political' areas 
(i.e. campaigning work) that difficulties have 
arisen, as elected members have struggled to hit 
the right balance between exercising democratic 
control over staff without seeming to interfere in 
the details of their work. One response has been 
to create a system of linkpersons among the 
elected members (one for each national committee), 
whose function is to represent their committee 
between meetings and cooperate with Heads of 
Department to monitor progress, but even this does 
not seem to have fully resolved the ambiguities 
and confusions which exist over the distribution 
of responsibilities in the national headquarters. 
It should be stated quite clearly in this context 
that many of these problems arise from the very 
real commitment and enthusiasm of both elected 
members and staff, it is an abundance of zeal, not 
a lack of it, that contributes to these coordina-
tion problems. One consequence of these difficul-
ties is that the elected national officers of the 
campaign play a vital role as arbitrators of last 
resort. Whilst the Treasurer is fully occupied 
with financial planning and control, both the 
Chairperson and the four Vice-Chairpersons have to 
combine general public relations work with a lot of 
internal administration. 
Centralised Control? 
There is not just disquiet about the internal 
functioning of CND's organisation, but also about 
the relationship between the national headquarters 
as a whole and the other elements within the 
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Campaign. Complaints about growing central isa tion 
and a neglect of local and regional initiatives 
outside London and the South East have been a 
recurring feature of Conference and Council 
meetings since 1983. It was noticeable in the 
Conference hustings for the elections of Chair-
person in 1985 that all five candidates made at 
least passing reference to the desirability of more 
decentralisation in the Campaign, the importance of 
local groups' work, and the need to avoid becoming 
a bureaucratic organisation. Most criticism within 
the Campaign is directed towards the proportion of 
resources devoted to the regions and areas. 
National Council decided in 1983 to give a greater 
priority in new spending to the regions, and 
decided in principle that the regions and areas 
should henceforth have up to 9 per cent of the 
total budget devoted to them. In practice, the 
take-up of funds has fallen below this. National. 
CND has made some effort to stimulate contact 
between the central office and the regions. A 
Regions and Areas Working Group was established in 
1983, to recommend to Council ways in which central 
commi ttees and staff could promote reg ional 
campaigning and membership 1 and to fund reg ional 
initiatives. From 1986, this working group was 
elevated to the status of a full national commit 
tee. National CND also produces a regular newsheet 
("Campaign") which has the specific aim of keeping 
regions and local groups informed on activities and 
forward plans at all levels of the Campaign. The 
fact remains, however, that in terms of staffing 
resources CND remains a centralised organisation; 
in 1985, the ratio of staff based centrally to 
those based in the regions was 7.5 to 1. One of 
the more active local groups commented in 1985, 
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'the fact that national meetings are in London, and 
that workers spend most of their time in London, 
not only reflects a London chauvinism; but threat-
ens the democracy of the organisation. '(8) CND has 
responded by appointing two new staff to service 
the Regions and Areas Working Group (only one of 
whom is to be based outside London), but the issue 
of over-centralisation is one .that is likely to 
remain on the agenda for some time yet. 
Criticisms from within the Campaign of a 
perceived trend towards centralisation and bureau-
cratisation qave been fuelled by the way in which 
CND has spent its not inconsiderable income. Table 
5.1 has been compiled from CND's annual Accounts, 
which have been professionally audited since 
1983. (9) The presentation of these Accounts under 
such headings as 'Organisation' and 'Policy and 
Decision-Making does not give an accurate,guide to 
the distribution of resources between centre and 
periphery. For example, between a third and a half 
of the spending on 'Policy and Decision-making' 
goes towards the Annual Conference where, as we 
have seen, local groups predominate. Similarly, 
'Organisation' includes the costs of recruiting and 
servicing the national membership. However, the 
Accounts do indicate the general split between 
administrative and campaigning expenditure. Money 
spent on campaigning activities - demonstrations, 
press and public relations work, Parliamentary 
lobbying, and so on - has settled at around a third 
of total spending. Money spent on 
policy and decision-making has 
accounted for at least half of total 
organisation, 
consistently 
spending. As 
can be seen from the table, money spent specific-
ally on the Regions has always been a minor element 
in CND's overall expenditure pattern. 
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Not surprisingly, this distribution of 
resources has angered some activists within the 
Campaign, who have become increasingly frustrated 
with what they see as too much time and money being 
spent on meetings at the expense of 'real' cam-
paigning activities. The fear is expressed that 
TABLE 5.1 
CND: Expenditure and Income (in It and %) 
1982· 1983 ·1984 . ·1985 
Expenditure on: 
- Organisation 57,361 196,568 387,169 282,711 
(46% ) (45%) (52%) (40%) 
- Policy and 
Decision-
making 4,956 32,825 48,596 68,620 
(4%) (7%) (6% ) (10%) 
- Campaigning 49,213 135,130 217,759 222,850 
(39%) ( 31%) (29%) (32%) 
-Regions 8,411 40,609 23,535 34,786 
( 7%) (9%) (3%) (5%) 
- Spec ialist 
Sections 4,090 18,397 35,989 42,916 
(3%) (4%) (5%) (6%) 
- Youth CND 1,917 9,563 21,204 28,088 
(1%) (2%) (3%) ( 4 %) 
- Donations 7,338 14,882 22,664 
(2%) (2%) (3%) 
Total 126,307 440,430 749,134 702,635 
(100%) (100%) (100% ) (100%) 
Total Income 125,307 461,255 721,259 782,260 
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CND is becoming less of a campaign and more of a 
quasipol i tical party - centralised, bureaucratic, 
cautious and more inflexible. Such criticisms have 
brought a dual reaction from CND's leadership. On 
the one hand, it is accepted that administrative 
overheads should be kept to a minimum, but that 
much of the responsibility for rising costs lies 
wi th the national committees' - as the Treasurer 
observed in 1985 
The budget requests received by the Finance 
General Purposes Committee show a tendency 
towards incremental budgeting. There seems to 
be a lack of questioning of Committee activi-
ties ••• and an automatic assumption that it 
will be necessary for all Committees to spend 
more in 1985.(10) 
On the other hand, the argument is made repeatedly 
that a professional central administrative struc-
ture is an asset to the Campaign as a whole, and 
that expertise developed within the Central office 
is a resource to be utilised at all levels and 
areas of the movement. This argument, presented to 
National Council by CND's Treasurer, is typical: 
The Campaign must be careful to ensure that 
expertise and knowledge at the national level 
is retained an,d shared with local groups, 
areas and regions. Criticisms about the over 
concentration of resources on the national 
office are mistaken in their particular focus 
that highlight the need for attention to be 
paid to ensure the Campaign is able to respond 
effectively at all levels. The head needs a 
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fit and able body and a body needs a head that 
can give a common voice, direction and purpose 
to the activities of the body.(ll) 
There are few within the Campaign who would 
dispute the need for CND to have an effective head 
office; what concerns the critics is that this is 
diverting energy and resources away from campaign-
ing at the local level. The fear is expressed that 
the Campaign will become dominated by officers and 
staff who are more concerned with the smooth 
running of the central administrative machinery 
than they are with encouraging and becoming 
involved in grass-roots activity - although it must 
be said that there is little evidence of this, both 
officers and staff making a point of maintaining 
their participation in national and local events. 
Even if the evidence to substantiate this fear is 
not apparent, however~ these apprehensions among 
those primarily committed to direct action are 
present, and voiced at both Council and Conference. 
Of course, it is always open to activists in 
the regions and areas to use the Annual Conference 
as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the 
central administrative machinery. In practice, 
however, Conference is too blunt and unwieldy an 
instrument for such control. Conference may be 
utilised to establish broad policy guidelines, but 
it is too remote a body to oversee implementation 
of those policies. 
It is not unusual to find this kind of 
distinction between control over policy formulation 
and control over policy implementation in any large 
organisation. The frustrations expressed by 
cri tics within the Campaign are, in particular, 
very reminiscent of those which recur in the Labour 
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Party. Leading figures in the Campaign are only 
too well aware of this, and some of the most bitter 
criticism has come from them rather than grassroots 
activists. Bruce Kent, when he was General 
Secretary, commented in 1984 that: 
CND for all sorts of historical reasons seems 
to have lumbered itself with a decision-making 
machinery which reproduces some of the worst 
features of the processes created by political 
parties.(12) 
Meg Beresford, in a paper submitted,to the National 
Executive in 1984 (before she succeeded Msg. Kent), 
was more trenchant in her criticisms.(13) Describ-
ing the organisation at the time as bureaucratic 
and inflexible, she argued that the decision-making 
structure was not properly democratic, and that it 
tended to frustrate initiatives from the grass-
roots. Moreover, the stress laid on consensus 
decision-making was tending to modify and moderate 
those initiatives that were pursued. This analysis 
was supported by the National Executive, which 
commented that it had become evident that many 
bright ideas were being 'watered-down or san i-
tised'.(14) 
It is important to put these criticisms of 
CND's decision-making structure in their proper 
perspective. Most of the argument has taken place 
at the national 
concerned and 
level, among those 
involved with the 
most directly 
structure in 
question. In the Campaign as a whole, the issue 
has not provoked widespread discussion or disagree-
ment. Results from the 1985 Membership Survey 
indicate some unease but also considerable apathy. 
For example, when asked about the influence of 
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full-time staff within CND, only 3 per cent of 
respondents thought it was excessive. However, when 
asked about their own influence in the running of 
CND, over 40 per cent thought it was insufficient. 
The full response to the question of 'How much 
influence would you say the following have ~i~&i~ 
CND' is given in Table 5.2. As can be seen, many 
respondents did not offer an opinion. Of those that 
did, there is little evidence of serious dissatis-
faction. It is noticeable that almost none of the 
respondents thought the full-time staff to have too 
little influence. It might be thought that this 
was more a reflection of all the other groups 
having their supporters among the survey sample, 
and answering on a basis of self-interest. There 
is some truth in this, as each sub-group was likely 
Table 5.2 
Influence within CND (in %) 
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Ul ::SI-! Q)°M s::: III 0 ..c:o s:::o ::s 
O<ll 'dS::: Q) OM Z- +lZ Q)Z 0 
0 .all< <IlP g I-! U ::SU Q)U ::s:>< 
Z <Il I-! 0 ..c: 0 I-! 0 
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Too much 3 9 5 11 5 2 2 0 
About Right 39 37 20 48 38 31 22 30 
Too Little 2 20 30 12 12 22 25 41 
Don't Know 50 31 42 26 41 41 47 23 
No Response 6 3 3 3 4 4 4 6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(n = 620) 
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to consider their own tendency to have less 
influence than it should, but only young people and 
Green voters appear to be particularly dissatis 
fied. 
Analysis of those respondents who considered 
themselves to have too little influence in CND - 41 
per cent of respondents - shows that they tend to 
fall outside the general category of middle-aged 
and middle class, perhaps reflecting some dissatis-
faction with the predominance of this group within 
the Campaign. 54 per cent of the under-24 age-
group, and 50 per cent of those over 60 thought 
their influence insufficient, compared with only 35 
per cent of the 25-59 age group. 34 per cent of 
graduates were dissatisfied, compared with 50 per 
cent of nongraduates, and 38 per cent of those in 
middle-class occupations compared with 47 per cent 
of those in skilled manual or manual occupations. 
Other variables, such as sex, length of CND 
membership, voting choice and membership of a 
poli tical party, church or trade union, did not 
show any significant variation from the pattern of 
overall responses. 
In general terms, therefore, although there 
has been considerable debate among those actively 
involved in national decision-making about the 
appropriate structures and processes the Campaign 
should adopt, the membership as a whole has 
remained largely indifferent. Although there is a 
significant level of dissatisfaction about their 
personal influence in CND, few respondents seem to 
attach blame for this to any particular element in 
the Campa ign. In other words, the Campa ign seems 
to have convinced its own members at least that it 
is a broad-based movement, demonstrating mutual 
138 
tolerance and understanding between its various 
elements rather than sectarianism. 
CONCLUSIONS 
CND is clearly distinguished from 'pure' social 
movements, like the peace movement as a whole or 
the women's movement, by its formalised and 
institutional structure for participation by the 
membership and for decision-making. Although this 
structure is overt, it is difficult to categorise. 
It is a hybrid form of organisation - one which 
stresses the validity of individualism whilst 
simultaneously giving expression to a federal 
incorporation of sub-groups. Ambiguities abound, 
whether in the form of overlapping membership 
categories, division of power between decision-
making bodies or coordination between representa-
tive committees. These ambiguities are due to a 
number of factors. Hostil i ty towards centralised, 
bureaucratic decision-making, as practised by suc-
cessive British governments over nuclear weapons 
policy, may attract and maintain membership for the 
Campaign, but it militates against the delineation 
of clear lines of authority within CND's own 
organisation. Creating the facility for sub~groups 
to develop their own organisational form within the 
Campaign may well assist the dissemination of the 
unilateralist message into groups and parties 
outside the Campaign, but it also creates the 
opportunity for internal dissent and factional ism. 
Stressing the moral validity of the Campaign is not 
only a powerful tool for recrui tment, it is also 
vital for the Campaign's survival in the absence of 
any concrete progress towards its objectives; yet 
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it can also encourage independent attitudes among 
the membership rather than sol idari ty and compro-
mise. Employing both 'insider' tactics (lobbying, 
educational work) and 'outsider' tactics (varieties 
, 
of direct action) gives the Campaign considerable 
strategic flexibility and makes it attractive to a 
range of different recruits,but it leads to 
inevitable confusion over distribution of resources 
between the two. 
Having said that, the overall conclusion must 
be that CND has coped relatively well with the 
organisational stresses it has faced. Despite 
unprecedented growth, despite heavy reliance on 
volunteer staff and part-time officers (with a 
consequent high turnover rate in decision-making 
and administrative positions), despite l~ck of 
progress on its objectives and the disappointment 
of the 1983 and 1987 elections, despite its 
membership mix of veterans from the school of 
Labour and Union organisation politics, those 
committed to more direct forms of democracy and 
action, and those with no prior political experi-
ence but an overwhelming belief in the moral worth 
of their arguments, and despite incorporating all 
these into a structure which emphasises consulta-
tion and consensus-building rather than hierarchy, 
the Campaign has largely avoided sectarianism, 
internal dispute or serious disillusionment among 
the mass membership. 
It is a fragmented organisation, in that there 
is no single source of authoritative decisions 
which determines everything that happens in the 
Campaign. It's best known leaders - for example, 
Joan Ruddock and Bruce Kent during the first half 
of the eighties - have enjoyed considerable loyalty 
and support from all sections of the Campaign1 yet 
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their role has been largely one of the 'travelling 
evangelist'(15) rather than making decisions which 
are in any sense binding upon the Campaign's 
supporters. It is true that, at anyone time, 
members of CND will be pursuing many different 
activities, and that the national officials and 
administrators may often have only a vague idea of 
what all these activities are, but there is a 
strong argument to be made that this is beneficial 
rather than disadvantageous to the Campaign. 
Success in terms of changing public policy may 
have been conspicuous by its absence, but no-one 
could deny the vi tali ty of the Campaign in the 
early eighties. In the mid-eighties, CND has had 
to face the paradox of growth. In its desire to be 
seen as democratic, it has seen a system of 
committees and working groups proliferate yet 
this is perceived by some in the Campaign as a 
trend towards bureaucratisation and away from the 
cutting edge of campaigning. Even leading figures 
in CND share this fear, but as yet have been unable 
to devise a solution which does not emphasise 
hierarchy at the expense of democracy. 
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Chapter six 
THE AIMS OF THE CAMPAIGN 
Discussion of the aims of CND should be a simple 
exercise. It purports to be a single issue organi-
sation - that issue being the abandonment by all 
countries of any weapons of mass destruction. On 
the face of it, the targets of its efforts may not 
be visible, but they are easily delineated - un-
like, for example, the targets of anti-poverty or 
anti-discrimination organisations. The issue is of 
such fundamental importance in both domestic and 
international politics, however, that the apparen-
tly straightforward aims of the Campaign in fact 
incorporate many ambiguities and differences of 
opinion. It is these, and their impact on the 
Campaign, that we will attempt to analyse in this 
chapter. 
Unlike most other social movement organisa-
tions, CND has a formal constitution which includes 
a statement of the Campaign I "! aims. 
paragraph of this constitution states 
The opening 
The aim of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarma-
ment is the unilateral abandonment by Britain 
of Nuclear weapons, nuclear bases and nuclear 
alliances as a prerequisite for a British 
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foreign policy which has the worldwide aboli-
tion of nuclear, chemical and biological weap-
ons leading to general and complete 
disarmament as it prime objective. 
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is op-
posed to the manufacture, stockpiling, test-
ing, use or threatened use of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons by any coun-
try, and the policies of any country or group 
of countries which make nuclear war more like 
ly, or which hinder progress towards a world 
without weapons of mass destruction. 
It can be seen from this that nuclear weaponry is 
not the only concern of CND: any weapons of mass 
destruction, especially chemical or biological 
weapons, are viewed as equally reprehensible. In 
practice, however, virtually all of CND's campaign-
ing is directed against nuclear weaponry. This is 
partly because it is in this area that the most 
obvious and visible escalation has taken place in 
the post-war period. CND will react to any 
apparent escalation in the sphere of chemical and 
biological warfare with a forthright condemnation 
(as in, for example, the proposed up-dating of 
NATO's chemical weapon stock in 1986), but rarely 
takes any initiative to put these areas in the 
forefront of its campaigning. The 1985 survey 
evidence indicates substantial concern over this 
kind of weaponry 76 per cent of respondents 
agreeing that the Campaign should give a high 
priori ty to campaigning against chemical and 
biological weapons, with only 14 per cent saying it 
should have a low priority and 4 per cent no place 
in campaigning at all. Nevertheless, there is no 
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evidence in the form of conference resolutions or 
internal debates in National Council or Executive 
to suggest that there is any serious disagreement 
within the Campaign over the strategy of giving a 
clear priority to nuclear weapons, bases and 
alliances. 
Pacifism 
It is important to note that CND is not 
committed to opposing the possession or use of all 
weapons, just those of mass destruction. In other 
words, CND is not a pacifist organisation. Obvi-
ously, all those who subscribe to or support the 
Campaign might be dubbed 'nuclear pacifists', but 
'total pacifism' is not as widespread as popular 
conceptions of the Campaign might suggest. This was 
highlighted by the Campaign's reaction to the 
Falklands War in 1982. There was some debate within 
the movement as to whether the Falklands was "CND's 
issue~, given that nuclear weapons were apparently 
not involved. It was easy enough for the Campaign 
to decide to point out the potential nuclear 
implications - the presence of a Polaris submarine 
in the South Atlantic, the possibility that Task 
Force vessels were carrying nuclear weapons, and 
the possibility that if defeat seemed likely 
Britain might threaten the use of nuclear weapons -
and this the Campaign did during the whole Falk-
lands episode. A much more difficult decision, 
however, was whether national CND should take a, if 
not the leading role in protesting and campaigning 
against the war in all its aspects. Pacifist 
opinion within the movement argued that CND could 
not claim to be a 'peace movement' without taking 
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some stand against the war, a public position which 
went beyond a concern with just the nuclear 
dimension. There were others in the movement, 
however, who - whilst certainly not condoning the 
war - did not consider themselves to be pacifists. 
They argued that CND should not adopt an official 
policy of opposition to the war, given the apparent 
unpopularity of such a position with the general 
public, but should concentrate solely upon the 
nuclear issue. Faced with the dilemma of feeling 
some obligation to campaign upon an issue, but 
knowing in advance that public opinion was very 
likely to be unreceptive, if not hostile, national 
CND adopted much the same tactic as it has over the 
thorny question of NATO membership - it left it to 
local groups to decide for themsevles whether they 
wanted to campaign on the war, and many of them did 
in fact take the lead in anti-Falklands war 
campaigning in their area. National CND did not 
take a formal lead, however 1 underlining the point 
that 'total pacifism' is an influential strand 
wi thin the Campaign, but it is far from being a 
dominant force. 
As noted in Chapter 4, the 1985 survey 
suggested that about half of the membership could 
be classified as 'total' pacifists1 however, they 
tend to be somewhat less active in CND's own 
activities. Perhaps as a reflection of this, 
pacifists were also more unhappy about their 
influence within CND1 48 per cent indicated that 
they thought they personally had too little 
influence within the Campaign, whereas only 36 per 
cent of non-pacifists expressed similar dissatis-
faction. Be that as it may, pacifists are cer-
tainly not without influence in CND. They may be 
unable to persuade others within the Campaign to 
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JOln them in renouncing conventional as well as 
nuclear weapons (and, indeed, rarely try to do so)~ 
but they do constitute an important enough strand 
of opinion to stop the Campaign moving in certain 
directions. 
The best example of this is the recurring 
debate over whether the Campaign should not only 
oppose current defence strategy but also endorse a 
particular alternative defence policy for Britain. 
Some non-pacifists in the Campaign argue that if 
CND were to support a specific non-nuclear defence 
policy, this would enhance CND's appeal, particu-
larly to those in the middle of the electoral 
spectrum who might feel CND's current policy to be 
unrealistic. This argument has been conducted 
since 1980, but became more important after the 
1983 General Election, when it appeared that many 
voters equated nuclear disarmament with leaving 
Britain defenceless. Pacifists strongly resist· 
this argument, however, not wishing to lend their 
support to any specific policy which would entail 
the maintenance or escalation of present levels of 
conventional armaments. They have been successful 
in advancing this viewpoint in so far as whereas 
the Annual Conference in 1980 voted in favour of 
the movement 
policy, the' 
formulating an alternative defence 
1983 Conference called only for 
education of both membership and the general public 
about various forms of non-nuclear defence poli-
cies. They have been helped by the fact that 
leading figures in the Campaign, although they 
would not describe themselves as 'total paci-
fists', have not wished to take up the idea of 
endors ing a specific alternative defence policy, 
precisely because of the risk of alienating a 
substantial proportion of the membership. 
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This was an important factor in the short-
lived history of a proposed 'Defence Charter'; an 
idea which surfaced in 1985. Proposed largely on 
the initiative of James Hinton (then chairperson of 
the national Projects Committee), Meg Beresford, 
Dan Smith and others among the national leadership 
who take an internationalist perspective on CND's 
strategy, the idea behind the Defence Charter was 
to counter the 'defenceless' argument which proved 
so damaging in the 1983 Election. The strategy was 
to devise a package of recommendations which would 
shift the argument,on non-nuclear defence away from 
a concentration on abolishing nuclear weaponry and 
onto a cons ideration of how non-nuclear defence 
could be presented 
foreign policy. For 
as part of a credible 
such credibility to be 
new 
ob-
tained, it was considered essential by Hinton to 
secure the support of politicians, trade unionists, 
church leaders and others who were not members of 
or associated with CND - as he put it, 
The basic problem was to address defenceless-
ness in an authoritative way. To do that, it 
was necessary to get support from political 
and non-political figures who were not 
identified as CND supporters. (1) 
This meant that the Charter could not simply 
restate CND's own position in its entirety; given 
that the aim was to attract support from outside 
the unilateralist, anti-NATO school of thought 
(Dennis Healey, for example, was a key target 
figure), then the package had to stop short of 
making specific commitments on the immediate 
scrapping of Britain's existing deterrent and 
membership of NATO. Hence the only specific demand 
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in the Charter was for the cancellation of Trident 
and the removal of Cruise 1 otherwise the Charter 
was couched in generalities about the need for a 
foreign policy which would reduce tension between 
East and West and lead to a more equitable sharing 
of resources between North and South. Although the 
Charter argued that Britain should 'move towards' a 
non-nuclear defence policy, no timetable was 
envisaged, and there was no suggestion as to what 
form this new system of defence might take. Having 
formulated this package,' the intention was to 
secure its endorsement by leading national figures, 
and then conduct a mass petition throughout the 
country. 
The initiative failed, partly because there 
was not sufficient support from outside CND, but 
also because it was not received favourably by many 
within the campaign. The instigators of the Charter 
were well aware in advance that it would incur the 
displeasure of those in CND who put a high priority 
on British withdrawal from NATO (primarily Labour 
CND and their sympathisers). They attempted to 
circumvent this opposition by arguing that as this 
initiative was independent of CND, the Campaign did 
not need to decide on whether or not it formally 
supported i to They had some success with this 
tactic, in that, ~espi te vehement objections from 
Labour CND, the idea continued to be discussed in 
national CND throughout 1985. Any chance of the 
movement actually endorsing the idea, however, 
disappeared when it became clear that pacifist 
opinion was hostile. The 'total pacifists' in the 
Campaign could not bring themselves to support an 
initiative which did not make a specific commitment 
to decommission Polaris, let alone make clear what 
kind of conventional armaments would be employed as 
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part of a non-nuclear defence strategy. The 
national leadership was careful to keep the topic 
off the agenda at National Conference, precisely 
because it did not wish to expose a split between 
'total' and 'nuclear' pacifists. It is in this 
sense that pacifist opinion is influential in CND~ 
the 'total pacifists' are not sufficiently powerful 
to direct national policy in a positive way, but 
they do have a negative influence in the sense that 
they can set parameters beyond which the movement 
cannot go. More often than not, they do not have 
to argue their casel the national leadership is 
sufficiently sensitive to pacifist opinion that it 
will not commit itself to any course of action 
which it is anticipated will be unacceptable to the 
many pacifists within the movement •. 
Conventional weapons 
Consequently, while CND is happy to publicise 
various alternative strategies of non-nuclear 
defence, it refuses to endorse (even by implica-
tion) any particular strategy. The Campaign's 
literature outlines the main alternatives -'defen~ 
sive' conventional weaponry (Anti-tank missiles, 
fighter aircraft) rather than the 'aggressive' 
counterparts (tanks, bombers) 1 'in depth' defence 
which rests on mobilising reservists to exact a 
'high admission price' on any invading forcel 
sabotage 1 civilian-based non-violent resistancel 
and guerrilla resistance - but apart from noting 
reservations about guerrilla resistance (even if 
only as a fall-back strategy), CND is scrupulous 
not to indicate any preference. To justify this, 
the leadership argues that the nature of CND as a 
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protest movement is such that it does not need to 
endorse any particular strategy, merely to make 
the case against nuclear weapons and publicise all 
the possible alternatives. The choice of one 
particular alternative is left to political 
parties - the following argument from Dan Smith is 
typical of the line taken by CND's leadership since 
the early eighties:-
One question faced by all CND activists at one 
time or another is, 'What defence policy do 
you advocate to replace our reliance on 
nuclear weapons?' Arising from this widely 
shared experience, there is a growing interest 
in CND developing an alternative defence 
policy. I bel ieve it would be a fundamental 
strategic error for CND to take this course • 
• • The fact that CND is not a political party 
means it cannot aspire to hold governmental 
power. Political parties which aspire to form 
a government need to have defence policies, 
and CND's role is to do everything it can to 
form a climate of opinion in which the defence 
policies developed by parties are non-nuclear, 
and in which the electorate opts for a party 
or parties with non-nuclear defence policies. 
In other words, CND's basic role is to close 
the door against certain options in defence 
policy - nuclear options. Since it will never 
have to implement a defence policy it is 
needless and inappropriate for it to develop 
one. ( 2) 
Among the national membership as a whole, the 1985 
survey reveals a substantial minority who take a 
positive stand on the issue of conventional 
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weaponry. Asked whether Britain should have more 
conventional weapons if nuclear weapons were 
abandoned, 25 per cent agreed while 58 per cent 
rejected the idea. There were few significant 
differences between these groups, except that those 
opposed to increasing conventional weaponry tended 
to be slightly younger. The 1986 Annual Confer-
ence, however, did vote in favour of a resolution 
which called for all money at present spent on 
nuclear weapons to be diverted away from defence, 
and not into spending on conventional weapons. This 
remains a significant difference between the 
Campaign's programme and that of the Labour Party, 
Labour having made clear by the time of the 1987 
Election that it intended to devote money saved by 
nuclear disarmament to increased spending on 
conventional weapons. 
Rather than becoming involved in the specifics 
of non-nuclear defence CND prefers to concentrate 
upon more general arguments about just what does 
constitute effective 'defence'. The Campaign argues 
that nuclear weapons do not provide such a defence, 
but on the contrary make Britain more of a likely 
target. Moreover, use of nuclear weapons against 
another nuclear-armed state would only provoke 
retaliation, and thus destruction on both sides. 
Use or threatened use of nuclear weapons by Britain 
or any other nuclear power against a non-nuclear 
state is seen as politically unacceptable - oso, for 
example, 
Nuclear weapons are so dangerous that they are 
not very useful. Britain's nuclear weapons did 
not deter the Argentinian invasion of the 
Falklands. A non-nuclear state, Vietnam, 
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fought a long successful war against nuclear 
America. ( 3 ) 
Similarly, the prospect of a nuclear-armed state 
threatening to use nuclear weapons against a 
non-nuclear Britain the 'nuclear blackmail' 
scenario which has been persistently stressed by 
the Conservatives - is discounted as very unlikely 
on political grounds, and, even if it did occur, it 
would be better to come to terms with such a threat 
rather than indulge in mutual destruction - hence, 
It is very difficult to imag ine a nuclear 
power threatening to use nuclear weapons 
against a non-nuclear country unless they were 
already at war. Indeed the history of the last 
30 years shows that even in war this threat is 
unlikelYl it would be very difficult for any 
state to justify to its own people,let alone 
the rest of the world, a nuclear attack on a 
country which was not threatening it ••• If, 
however, this threat was made and was not a 
bluff, and we were actually faced with a 
choice between nuclear obliteration and giving 
way, then most people would probably prefer to 
keep on living. Our best course of action then 
would be a determined campaign of civil 
resistance.(4) 
In addition to these pragmatic arguments, CND also 
advances a powerful moral argument against nuclear 
weapons. Reduced to its essentials, this states 
that it is immoral to subscribe to a defence policy 
which is based on the threat of killing millions of 
people (mostly civilians) in other countries and, 
through inevitable retaliation, millions of British 
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people - 'in the final analysis, nuclear deterrence 
is the moral equivalent of holding a pistol to the 
heads of our own children, wives, husbands and 
friends.'(5) 
Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Increasingly in recent years, CND has not 
rested its case entirely upon the moral or practi-
cal shortcomings of nuclear weapons, but has 
placed its arguments for nuclear disarmament in 
the context of the need for a whole new defence 
and foreign policy perspective for Britain. The 
argument is that any defence policy is futile 
(though a nuclear defence policy is particularly 
so) unless it is devised in the context of a 
foreign policy which signals to the rest of the 
world that Britain is concerned to promote interna-
tional peace and understanding. As with non-
nuclear defence policy, CND does not see it as its 
proper function to devise a fully-fledged alterna-
tive foreign policy, but rather to highlight what 
is wrong with existing policy and to encourage 
discussion about possible alternatives. The 1985 
survey shows that ,there is considerable support 
among the national membership for radical change. 
63 per cent agreed that Britain should pursue a 
strictly non-aligned defence and foreign policy, 
with only 17 per cent indicating disagreement. 
Despite this being a policy stance which is 
considerably at variance with that advocated by 
Labour, support for the Labour Party and trade 
union membership was somewhat higher among those 
favouring non-alignment, whereas the group reject-
ing the idea tended to be younger, male rather than 
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female (this being one of the few issues which 
revealed a significant difference according to 
gender) and more disposed to support the SDP/Liber-
al Alliance. 
As might be expected, most of the discussion 
within the Campaign about foreign policy centres 
around the super-power confl ict, and particularly 
on the implications of this for Europe in the form 
of the NATO/Warsaw Pact divide. Before examining 
this, however, it is worth noting a' more general 
trend which has become apparent since 1983, which 
is a growing interest in the linkages to be made 
between disarmament and development. Since its 
re-birth, CND's literature has detailed specific 
instances of the undesirable effects of nuclear 
weapons on non-nuclear states. Examples of this are 
the impact of uranium mining on the people of 
Namibia and the Aboriginal population in Australia, 
and the after effects of nuclear weapons testing on 
the Navaho Indians in New Mexico and the population 
of the South Pacific Atolls. The recent trend, no 
doubt partly inspired by the massive publicity 
given to the problems of famine and under-develop-
ment in the Third World during 1984 and 1985, has 
been to place these particular instances in the 
more general context of the Arms Race and su-
per-power hostility being a direct cause of poverty 
and repression in the Third World. The argument is 
not without difficulties for CND: a move' towards 
conventional weaponry by nuclear states could mean 
that more resources would be required (as nuclear 
weapons are relatively cheap), leaving less 
available for overseas aid and even more interest 
in selling such conventional weaponry to Third 
World countries. CND confronts this problem by 
arguing that it is the possession of nuclear 
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weapons which in itself reinforces the spending 
pattern on conventional arms, because it maintains 
the atmosphere of international tension. In other 
words, the relevance of nuclear disarmament to the 
Third World is not just to bring to an end exploi-
tation of the raw materials necessary for the 
production of nuclear weapons, but also because it 
would mark the first stage of a process of 
lessening international tension and conflict 
generally. As the present chairperson argued 
shortly after his election, 
Bread not bombs is an important moral state-
ment about priorities which a lot of people 
readily understand, and we must keep on saying 
it because it connects the arms race with 
popular awareness of world 
musn't oversimplify things. 
poverty. But we 
The reasons why 
millions are starving today are complex, and 
the nuclear arms race is only one of them. 
Non-nuclear defence would cost money, though 
whether it costs more or less than nuclear 
deterrence depends on how you assess external 
threats and what kind of defence policy you 
opt for. All that's open to debate. But 
apart from asserting right priorities, one of 
the most important things we must say about 
disarmament and development is this: what we 
need is an independent foreign policy, not a 
so-called 'independent' nuclear deterrent. As 
long as we have a British government devoted 
to the nuclear deterrent, and which allows the 
military confrontation between the super-
powers to dominate its relations with the rest 
of the world, we have no independent foreign 
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policy which can give Third World countries 
the help they urgently need.(6) 
Su.ch an approach has been accepted by the 
Campaign nationally: the 1985 Conference approved a 
resolution which stated that 
The continuing massive escalation of the arms 
race diverts enormous resources from peaceful 
development throughout the world. It is a 
cause of poverty and deprivation and perpetu-
ates injustice and inequality between North 
and South. 
and went on to instruct National CND to campaign on 
this issue. Among the membership, however, there 
are signs of caution. Asked in the 1985 survey 
whether money saved by nuclear disarmament should 
go primarily on overseas aid, 39 percent agreed -
reflecting the real commitment among many in the 
Campaign to prioritise the issue. 42 per cent 
disagreed, however, many of whom indicated (without 
being asked to do so) that any such savings would 
be better spent on improving health and social 
services in Britain. In other words, the difference 
of opinion within the Campaign is over priorities 
not principles: there is widespread agreement that 
Britain's foreign policy should reflect greater 
concern for the Third World, but less unanimity 
over how important this should be. 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
Any such move towards a more equitable 
relationship with the Third World rests, however, 
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· upon disengagement from the super-powers. Again, 
there is widespread agreement on the principle of 
disengagement, but very real and much more serious 
disagreements over the priority to be given to this 
and the tactics to be employed. More than any 
other issue, it is the position CND should adopt 
vis-a-vis NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the super-
powers which has caused internal division and 
sometimes bitter argument. The different opinions 
on this within the Campaign are many and tend to 
overlap: at the risk of over-simplification, 
however, three broad schools of thought may be 
identified as influential. 
One coalesces around those in the leadership 
who are committed to an internationalist perspec-
tive. Most have past or present links with END, 
the campaign for European Nuclear Disarmament. This 
organisation, in which British campaigners play the 
leading role, does not have members as such, but 
rather supporters who subscribe to the END journal. 
END rejects a nationalist approach to disarmament 
(although it advocates unilateral steps by individ-
ual nations), and lays great stress upon peace 
campaigners from both Western and Eastern Europe 
working together. They argue .that although CND 
should continue withdrawal from NATO as long as it 
remains a nuclear alliance it should only do so in 
conjunction with campaigning as far as possible for 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact nuclear alliance 
as well. Their ideological perspective is one 
which sees a need for people in both Western and 
Eastern Europe to be liberated from super-power 
domination. Generally speaking, they are less 
ready than some others in the Campaign to see the 
USSR's role in the Arms Race as reacting to 
American escalation: whilst they accept that the 
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USA is more to blame for such escalation, and that 
the USSR has a more impressive record on disarma-
ment proposals, they argue that neither super-power 
has taken concrete unilateral action and thus it is 
important to maintain the pressure on both. 
Tactically, this means that they advocate a 
strategy of 'detente from below', which entails 
pursuing a dialogue not only with the govern-
ment-approved 'official' peace groups in the USSR 
and Eastern Europe, but also with 'unofficial' 
groups and individuals. It also means that they 
resist attempts to commit CND to a strategy of 
campaigning for British withdrawal from NATO 
immediately and as a first priority 1 they argue 
rather that the Campaign should 'educate' people 
about the implications of NATO membership, putting 
this firmly in the context of the need for the 
dissolution of all nuclear alliances. 
Another broad school of thought, which 
centres around Labour CND, but includes adherents 
from outside the Labour party is convinced of the 
necessity to prioritise withdrawal from NATO. They 
lay a greater stress on America's role in escala-
ting the Arms Race, and argue the need to question 
the assumption that the Soviet union is necessarily 
an enemy of Britain (They should not be confused 
wi th the numerically very small element of long-
serving members of the British Communist Party in 
CND, who attempt to advance the view that the 
Soviet Union is virtually blameless1 although 
active, especially at the local level, and vocal at 
Conference, their views rarely attract majority 
support within the Campaign.l Their ideological 
orientation is not so much pro-Soviet as anti-
American, and as such they are deeply suspicious of 
the internationalist argument about giving equal 
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priority to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The possibil-
i ty of Britain undertaking unilateral nuclear 
disarmament, yet remaining a member of NATO, is 
dismissed on the grounds that it could lead to 
American bases remaining in Britain which could be 
put on a nuclear footing in times of crisis. 
Moreover, membership of NATO has implications for 
other aspects of governmental pol icy as well as 
defence - for example 
Since NATO was set up in 1949, it has been an 
organ of the cold war. It is a military 
alliance dominated by America and created not 
in response to Soviet aggression but to 
guarantee US nuclear supremacy over the USSR 
and to establish America as the world I s most 
powerful state. It is not an alliance of 
equals - the interests of other member states 
are totally subordinate to US interests. 
Whilst Britain remains a member, we lack 
overall control of our economic, industrial 
and social policies and independence in our 
foreign and international policies • • • 
Membership of NATO means not only that our 
military budget squeezes other budgets and 
threatens a socialist programme of a Labour 
government, but it also means that we are in 
an alliance that threatens any other country 
trying to liberate itself from imperialism. 
• There is no distinction between US fore ign 
policy and the policy of NATO ••• (NATO) does 
not defend our freedom, our democracy, or our 
liberty. In reality, it threatens all of these 
things, and jeopardises peace throughout the 
world.(7) 
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These differences of opinion 
clearly at CND's Annual Conference. 
emerge most 
The question 
of prioritising campaigning on NATO withdrawal has 
been raised several times. In 1981, Conference 
reaffirmed CND's commitment to Britain's unilateral 
withdrawal from NATO. In 1982, Conference passed a 
resolution which noted with regret that the 
previous decision to carry out educational work had 
not been fully implemented, and reiterated the 
instruction to do so to National Council. In 1983, 
Conference again called for educational material to 
be prepared which would present the case for 
leaving NATO; significantly, however, a further 
resolution instructing National Council to include 
withdrawal from NATO as a fundamental element in 
all future 
Council as 
campaigns 
a delaying 
was referred to National 
tactic. The 
pol icy on NATO wi thdrawal was also an 
Campaign's 
influential 
factor in the election of a new Chairperson at the 
1985 Conference. Among the candidates, Dan Smith 
was identified with the internationalist school of 
thought, whilst Joy Hurcombe and vic AlIen were 
firm in their insistance on prioritising the NATO 
issue. Although empirical evidence is impossible 
to obtain, there was a clear impression among 
delegates that most of Hurcombe and AlIen's second 
preference votes went to Paul Johns rather than Dan 
Smith precisely because Johns was viewed as more 
likely to prioritise the issue. In the event, 
Johns has stuck to the line developed by the 
leadership during the early eighties - that is, to 
affirm CND's commitment to campaigning for British 
withdrawal, but to advocate an educational strategy 
rather than anything more radical - for example 
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It would be quite wrong to put 'Britain out of 
NATO' on its own up at the top of our agenda, 
and go round mindlessly shouting 'No, No, 
Nato'. But the time has come where we need to 
mount a well-constructed public information 
campaign about Nato, about how its political 
and military decisions are taken, and how, in 
consequence, democratic control over defence 
issues in this country is eroded. What 
priori ty we give to this and how we fit it 
into our other political campaigning we've got 
to think through together. (8) 
Despite some vocal oppositi.on, particularly from 
Labour CND, this position is broadly acceptable 
within the Campaign, although the 1986 Annual 
Conference did pass by a clear majority a motion 
emphasising CND's commitment to campaigning for 
British withdrawal from NATO. 
An important third element in the internal 
discussions over NATO were those who were leading 
figures during the first half of the eighties and 
who had strong ties with the Labour Party - for 
example, Joan Ruddock, Roger Spi11er and Mick 
E1liott. These were inevitably subject to cross 
pressures - their colleagues in Labour CND pressing 
them to priori tise NATO withdrawal, whilst Labour 
and most unions' policy was to remain in the 
Alliance. Their response was to make clear their 
commitment to the Campaign, by continuing to argue 
the case for withdrawal both within the Campaign 
and in Labour and union circles, but they appeared 
more mindful of the electoral unpopularity of 
withdrawal than their counterparts in Labour CND, 
and correspondingly more pragmatic and disposed to 
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see the issue remain as just one of a number of 
campaigning priorities. 
The Campaign's strategy towards the 
union has only received extensive debate 
Soviet 
at one 
Annual Conference, in 1984. Then, however, it was 
the occasion of prolonged and fierce debate. The 
resolution called on Conference to step up its 
campaigning against Soviet deployment of new 
nuclear weapons and to campaign against Soviet 
nuclear weapons and policies. This led to passion-
ate arguments that CND should not attack the Soviet 
system as a whole, countered by equally passionate 
arguments that CND had, if it was to keep any 
credibility, to be seen to be even-handed in its 
campaigning against all nuclear weapons powers. 
Since then, however, the issue has become less 
contentious, and guidelines on contacting both 
official and unofficial peace groups in Eastern 
Europe have been agreed, and opposition to both 
nuclear alliances reaffirmed. 
Among the national membership, the 1985 survey 
produced results which reflect the differences of 
opinion which exist where Britain's relationship 
wi th the super-powers is concerned. Asked whether 
Bri tain should leave NATO, less than half (43 per 
cent) agreed and 26 per cent disagreed (26 per cent 
don't know; 6 per cent no response) a surprising 
result, given the Campaign's clear policy commi t-
ment to withdrawal. Labour and Green supporters 
were predominant in the group favouring withdrawal; 
this group also tended to be more active than the 
sample as a whole, both within CND and in political 
parties, trade unions and other publ ic campaigns. 
Among the group opposing British withdrawal from 
NATO, there were more SDP/Liberal Alliance sup-
porters than in the sample as a whole, a higher 
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incidence of religious belief, and a tendency to be 
sympathisers rather than activists. Asked whether 
Britain should substantially reduce its present 
defence and foreign policy links with America, an 
overwhelming majority of respondents - 91 per cent 
- agreed. Asked who bore the main responsibility 
for the Arms Race in recent years, 53 per cent 
singled out America, 42 per cent laid equal blame 
on America and the soviet Union, while only one 
respondent laid responsibility on the soviet Union 
alone. Those who considered America to be primarily 
responsible did not differ from the sample as a 
whole in any significant way, except they tended to 
come from the older age bracket. Those who thought 
America and the soviet Union to be equally respon-
sible tended to be younger, more disposed to 
support the SDP/Liberal Alliance, and less involved 
in both CND'S activities and political parties. 
Asked whether they considered the Soviet union to 
pose a military threat to Britain, there was an 
unusual age profile, with no less than 43 per cent 
of those who thought it did being 25 or under~ they 
also tended to be less active in CND's activities 
and less likely to belong to a political party or 
trade union. 
Anti-Americanism 
In addition to these atti tudinal questions, 
respondents were also given a list of six possible 
campaigning areas, and asked to indicate which 
three they thought CND should pursue. The areas 
given were the nuclear civil defence program, 
Trident, British unilateral nuclear disarmament, 
British withdrawal from NATO, Cruise, and the 
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removal of all American bases from Britain. The 
last alternative - removal of U.S. bases was 
chosen by 73 per cent of respondents, -and there 
were no significant differences between this group 
and the whole sample. British withdrawal from NATO 
was prioritised by only 18 per cent of respondents: 
compared with the whole sample, they tended to be 
younger, and more involved in other public cam-
paigns. They were also more likely to lay sole 
blame on America for the Arms Race, to oppose 
replacing nuclear weapons by more conventional 
weaponry and to favour a non-aligned defence and 
foreign policy for Britain. 
There is clearly a substantial element within 
the national membership who are firmly opposed to 
American defence and foreign policy, at least in so 
far as it impinges on Britain's policies in this 
area. If one takes those respondents who indicated 
that CND should prioritise the removal of American 
bases as a campaigning issue, who favoured reducing 
Britain's defence and foreign policy links with 
America, and who identified America as primarily 
responsible for the Arms Race, then this group 
accounts for 39 per cent of all respondents. The 
survey evidence suggests, however, that they are 
not concentrated in anyone area or group among the 
membership as a whole. They tend to be slightly 
older (39 per cent over 40, compared with 30 per 
cent of all respondents), to support the Labour 
Party (73 per cent, compared wi th 67 per cent of 
all respondents), to be less likely to be practi-
sing members of a church, more 1 ikely to favour 
withdrawal from NATO (52 per cent, compared with 43 
per cent of all respondents), and to advocate a 
position of non-alignment for Britain (74 per cent, 
compared with. 63 per cent of all respondents). 
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Otherwise~ however, there are no significant 
differences between this group and all respondents 
and, as can be appreciated from the above, the 
differences that do exist are not great. In other 
words, al though there are clear divisions amongst 
the leadership over the most suitable strategy for 
CND to adopt vis-a-vis the super-powers, the survey 
does not suggest that these differences are 
reflected in any clear factional form among the 
national membership. 
Unilateralism 
The debate over the Campaign's pol icies 
towards the super-powers has also called into 
question CND's commitment to the principle of 
unilateralism, although this has never developed 
into a serious dispute. There was an attempt at 
the 1985 Conference to have the constitution 
amended so as to replace the call for unilateral 
Bri tish nuclear disarmament with a call for the 
adoption of a non-nuclear defence policy in other 
words, omitting the term 'unilateral'. This was 
supported by Bruce Kent, who for some years had 
been arguing that 'multilateralism' and 'unilatera-
lism' were by no means mutually exclusive, but in 
fact complementary. He claimed at the Conference 
that the present wording of the Constitution was 
'negative and unhelpful'. Despite this, Conference 
responded to the arguments of other delegates that 
it was essential to keep the explicit commitment to 
unilateralism if the Campaign was to retain the 
support of pacifists and keep its moral integrity 
intact, and the motion 
CND has consistently 
was clearly 
argued that 
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lost. However, 
unilateralism 
should go hand-in-hand with multi-Iateralism; the 
argument is that unilateralist measures 
subsequent multi-Iateralist measures. 
can inspire 
Thus, while 
CND acknowledges that it is unrealistic to expect 
either super-power to abolish all its nuclear 
weapons unilaterally, the Campaign argues that 
British unilateralism could help to break the 
deadlock in arms control negotiations. The 
contention is that an important first step in any 
multi-lateral disarmament is to confine possession 
of nuclear weapons to the super-powers, and whilst 
unilateral action by Britain would not have much 
effect on the global armoury of nuclear weapons, it 
would at least prompt the super-powers into a 
reassessment of their position. This is somewhat 
ironical in the light of Gorbachev's initiatives in 
1986/87, which have prompted the European powers 
into a hasty reassessment of their own positions. 
In an attempt to discover attitudes towards 
unilateralism among the national membership, the 
1985 survey asked respondents to indicate whether 
they supported unilateral nuclear disarmament a) as 
soon as they became seriously interested or 
involved in CND (' immediately'); b) intuitively, 
but having taken some time work out why (' intui-
tively'); c) after much consideration of pro and 
counter arguments ('eventually'); or d) whether 
they were still considering the issue ('undeci-
ded'). Among the whole sample, 37 per cent 
indicated 'immediately', 35 per cent 'intuitively', 
16 per cent 'eventually and 11 per cent 'undeci-
ded'. As might be expected, given that they 
consti tute 72 per cent of the whole sample, the 
'immediate' and 'intuitive' sub-groups taken 
together do not differ significantly in any other 
respect from the whole sample. There is a slight 
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tendency for respondents in these two sub-groups to 
be older; to favour Labour rather than the SDP/Lib-
eral Alliance, to be more active in CND's affairs, 
to favour withdrawal from NATO, to reject the 
notion of the Soviet threat and to favour non-
alignment when compared with the total sample, but 
in all cases the difference is only a few per cent. 
Comparing the 'eventual' sub-group with the total 
sample reveals men to be over-represented, more 
support for the Alliance, more recent members and 
less enthusiasm for withdrawal from NATO and 
non-alignment. 
Perhaps the most interesting results come from 
the 'undecided' sub-group. They tend to be younger 
(32 per cent under 25, compared with 24 per cent of 
the total sample), much more evenly divided between 
Alliance and Labour (32 per cent Alliance voters, 
43 per cent Labour voters, compared with 15 per 
cent and 67 per cent respectively among the total 
sample) and less active (2 per cent activists, 29 
per cent participants and 65 per cent sympathisers, 
compared with 11 per cent, 34 per cent and 48 per 
cent respectively among the total sample). They 
are also less active outs ide CND - 15 per cent 
belonging to a political party (32 per cent in the 
total sample), 25 per cent to a trade union and 50 
per cent supporting other campaigns (compared with 
37 per cent and 60 per cent respectively among the 
total sample). Only 38 per cent laid the main 
responsibili ty for the Arms Race on America alone 
(compared with 58 per cent of the 'immediate/intui-
tive' sub-group and 53 per cent of the total 
sample), whilst 52 per cent laid equal blame on 
America and the Soviet Union. Similarly, only 15 
per cent favoured British withdrawal from NATO 
(compared with 50 per cent of the 'immediate/intui-
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tive' sub-group and 43 per cent of the total 
sample); with almost half (47 per cent) definitely 
rejecting the idea. Whilst in the'immediate/intui-
tive' sub-group 72 per cent thought that the Soviet 
Union did not pose a serious military threat to 
Britain, and 15 per cent thought that it did, among 
the 'undecided' sub-group opinion was much more 
evenly divided - 37 per cent rejecting the notion 
of a soviet threat, and 35 per cent arguing that 
such a threat does exist. Similarly, only 35 per 
cent of the 'undecided' sub-group supported the 
idea of non-al ignment for Britain, compared with 
69 per cent of the 'immediate/intuitive' sub-group. 
Despite these marked differences, it must be 
remembered that the 'undecided' sub-group only 
accounts for some 11 per cent of the total sample, 
so in overall terms there is clearlY widespread 
support for unilateralism within the Campaign. 
Indeed, it might be argued that given CND's 
explicit commitment to unilateralism it is 
surprising to find any of the national membership 
in the undecided category. However, given that 
much of the publicity given to CND during the 
eighties has concerned its opposition to Cruise and 
Trident, rather than its more extensive commitment 
to unilateralism, it is surprising to find so few 
among the national membership who express no doubts 
about expanding their opposition to Cruise and 
Trident into unqualified support for unilateral 
nuclear disarmament. Among respondents as a whole, 
68 per cent of respondents thought that CND should 
prioritise British unilateral disarmament as one of 
its campaigning options. 
Respondents were also asked which arguments 
against unilateralism (if any) they found hardest 
to refute, either in their own minds or in discus-
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sion with others. Two-thirds of respondents gave 
an answer to this, and of these almost 20 per cent 
cited the charge of 'defencelessness' - presumably 
with memories of the 1983 election campaign in 
mind. A further 10 per cent found it difficult to 
dismiss the argument that unilateralism might upset 
the balance of deterrence in international rela-
tions, and just under 10 per cent noted that 
distrust of the Soviet union made it difficult to 
persuade people into supporting unilateralism. Just 
over 10 per cent of respondents indicated that they 
did not find any arguments against unilateralism 
hard to refute, perhaps surprisingly, however, this 
group were no more active within the Campaign than 
their less self-confident counterparts. 
The Question of Nuclear Energy 
A potentially more serious dispute has 
occurred over the stance CND should adopt on the 
question of nuclear energy. This has been the 
subject of numerous resolutions at Annual Confer-
ence throughout the seventies and eighties. At the 
1978 Conference, for example, a resolution was 
passed to the effect that 'so-called peaceful 
development of nuclear power be opposed (by CND) as 
a matter of policy'. The main 
been that the proliferation of 
would lead to a proliferation 
concern has always 
nuclear technology 
of nuclear-weapon 
states. CND has repeatedly drawn attention to the 
linkage between the production of plutonium by the 
nuclear power industry, and its use in the manufac-
ture of nuclear weapons. This argument was 
highlighted by the efforts of a CND working group 
which gave evidence to the Sizewell B Public 
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Enquiry that, despite government assurances to the 
contrary; plutonium from British nuclear power 
stations had been exported to America, and used for 
weapons production. Apart from making this 
connection, however, CND has been reluctant to add 
formal opposition to nuclear energy to its state-
ment of policy aims. 
This reluctance is partly due to the belief of 
many in the movement, from various shades of 
opinion, that CND is and should remain a sin-
gle-issue organisation, and that concern over 
nuclear energy, although shared by most in CND, is 
best expressed through environmental groups such as 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. A more 
important factor, however, has been the opposition 
of trade unions affiliated to CND. Until recently, 
trade unionists have been apprehensive about the 
effect on their members' jobs of a drive against 
nuclear power. Within the Campaign, this has 
brought them into conflict with the relatively 
small but active and voluble contingent of Green 
Party supporters, who have persistently argued 
that CND should formally commit itself to opposi-
tion to nuclear energy.This disagreement between 
Greens and trade unionists reached its height at 
the 1984 Annual Conference, when Green CND sought 
to amend the Constitution to incorporate oppos i-
tion to the total nuclear energy cycle. This was 
firmly opposed by trade unionists, particularly 
the Transport and General Workers delegates, and, 
on a card vote, the motion was narrowly defeated. 
By the 1985 Conference, however, the Transport and 
General (along with other unions) had already 
changed its own policy on nuclear energy and trade 
unionists and greens were able to agree on a 
resolution calling on Trade Union CND to pursue an 
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educational campaign on the problems associated 
wi th the nuclear power industry; and the need to 
develop alternative plans which would safeguard 
employment in the context of a non-nuclear energy 
policy. This was carried unanimously and, as this 
rapprochement occurred before the Chernobyl disas-
ter, there is every reason to believe that CND 
will adopt an even stronger opposi tion to nuclear 
energy in the future as shown by the decision to 
mount a national demonstration in 1987 in partner-
ship with Friends of the Earth. The 1985 survey 
revealed considerable potential for this to occur, 
55 per cent thought that CND should give a high 
priori ty to campaigning against nuclear energy, a 
further 29 per cent that it should form part of the 
Campaign's programme but wi th a low priori ty, and 
only 8 per cent indicating that the issue should 
not be given any priority at all. 
Employment and Conversion 
The employment consequences of a move away 
from nuclear power is not the only problem faced by 
trade unionists in CND, there is also the more 
pressing problem of their members who are directly 
employed in nuclear weapons production. A classic 
example of the problems facing CND in this context 
is the Vickers shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness, 
chosen to build the new Trident submarines and 
employing about half of the town's working popula-
tion. CND faced up to this dilemma by making 
Barrow the site of its annual demonstration in 
1984, and thus confronting the problem head-on. CND 
has a dual strategy. Firstly, to emphasise the 
capital-intensive nature of nuclear weapons 
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production7the argument is that a move to non-
nuclear defence would create more jobs. This is an 
argument that is heard more in the Trade Union CND 
than in the movement as a whole, as many pacifists 
would be very reluctant to endorse a policy which 
rested on increasing the output of conventional 
arms. The second strategy, referred to more often 
at Conference, is to advocate 'conversion' - that 
is, utilising the skills and resources at present 
employed in nuclear weapons production for new, 
socially useful production. Much inspiration is 
drawn from the experience of Lucas Aerospace, where 
shop stewards pursued such a course(9), though it 
is admitted that special circumstances (not least 
the support of Tony Benn~ then Minister of Indus-
try) were important in this case. CND's thinking 
on the problems of conversion has not advanced much 
beyond establishing the need for considerable 
public investment, at least in the short-term, but 
it is an issue which Trade Union CND pursues with 
some vigour7 the Transport and General Workers 
Union ~ in particular, is involved in studying the 
problem, and CND has sponsored a full-time worker 
attached to Barrow to develop ideas on the ground. 
A number of major trade unions have formed a 
Defence Conversion committee to explore alterna-
tives and publicise them within the trade union 
movement. (10) 
Legali ty 
If the search for viable conversion projects 
is still in a formative stage, so too is CND's 
attempt to explore the legality of nuclear weapons. 
To some extent as a response to the Conservative 
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government's stress on law and order, CND has 
sought to argue that it is governments rather than 
protestors who are guilty of a serious crime. 
Drawing on a number of international conventions 
and agreements(ll), CND argues that nuclear weapons 
defy these because they are indiscriminate weapons 
which, if used, must inevitably affect the civilian 
population and neutral countries. Any attempt to 
present a case on these lines has been rejected by 
British courts on the grounds that defence policy 
is a Crown prerogative, and therefore outside their 
competence. Nevertheless, CND continues to cam-
paign on this issue, and the 1984 Annual Confer-
ence endorsed a motion which committed the Cam-
paign to put a greater emphasis on the legality 
question in the future. Some individuals in CND 
(notably the Quakers) have attempted to withhold a 
proportion of their taxes, on the grounds that the 
money would be used to finance defence. To date, 
this has met with a singular lack of success in the 
British courts. 
Non-Violent Direct Action 
Legality is of course important for CND in 
another respect - the legitimacy or otherwise of 
non-violent direct action (NVDA), and the alleged 
civil liberties in curtailment of protestors' 
general. NVDA has been a core belief among CND 
inception, and the activists since the movement's 
ideological justification for it has remained 
largely unchanged. Briefly, 
and civil disobedience is 
CND argues 
justified 
that NVDA 
when the 
protest is motivated by a regard for higher or more 
fundamental laws1 thus, for example, international 
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law is cited as one ground, and Christian CND 
asserts that civil disobedience is entirely 
consistent with Christian beliefs. Frequent ref-
erences are made to the precedents set by the 
suffragist movement, the Chartists, Ghandi, the 
civil rights movement in America, and the long 
tradition in Britain of protest activity. It is 
freely acknowledged by all but the most ardent NVDA 
enthusiasts in the Campaign that such action rarely 
produces concrete results (although it is argued 
that the actions of the Greenham women have caused 
real disruption to the operations of that base). It 
is thought to be worthwhile, however, partly be-
cause of the media exposure it brings and partly 
because of the consciousness-raising effect it has 
on those who participate. (12) Successive Confer-
ence resolutions have endorsed the principle of 
NVDA, always stressing that it should be peaceful -
the 1983 Conference decided that local groups 
should have the right to withdraw membership from 
any person advocating violence against others in 
any form. In practice, there is a historic 
suspicion among activists that the leadership is in 
practice somewhat ambivalent on the question of 
direct action, partly because of the negative 
treatment it can (and usually does) receive in the 
media, and partly because it represents a tactic 
over which they can exercise little direct control. 
This suspicion is discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter, but it is certainly true that there 
are some in the movement who have doubts about the 
political efficacy, if not the moral principle, of 
NVDA. 
The 1985 survey sought to investigate those 
doubts. Some 30 per cent of all respondents 
indicated that they were not prepared to partici-
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pate in NVDA, although many respondents gave 
personal reasons (fear of arrest; family or work 
responsibilities) for their reluctance. Respondents 
were also asked to give their opinion on whether, 
in general terms, NVDA strengthened or weakened the 
Campaign. 56 per cent thought that it strengthened 
the Campaign; apart from a slight tendency to be 
more active in CND's affairs, this sub-group did 
not di ffer greatly from the whole sample. 22 per 
cent thought that NVDA weakened the Campaign; a 
quarter of these were SDP/Liberal Alliance support-
ers, and they tended to be less active both inside 
and outside the Campaign. 
civil Liberties 
Civil liberties is an area in which CND has 
developed policy in response to events. These can 
be divided into two types: judicial and police 
action in response to NVDA, and the harrassment of 
CND activists generally. Many of those involved in 
NVDA activities have been arrested, charged with 
obstruction or breach of the peace, and usually 
convicted. More disturbing, in CND's eyes, has been 
the use of conspiracy charges against those in 
peace camps (notably Alconbury). It is alleged 
(and certainly believed by the leadership) that 
even members of CND who limit their protest to 
demonstrating are subject to scrutiny and investi-
gation by the Special Branch and M.I.5, such 
activities including interference with mail and 
phone-tapping. CND's tactical response to this is 
discussed later: in this context, the point to note 
is that this apparent harrassment has revived a 
debate within the movement about the relationship 
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between the nuclear state and civil liberties. 
Nuclear weapons policy is a uniquely secretive 
area, even within the generally very secretive 
system of British government. CND highlights the 
almost complete lack of democratic and Parliamen-
tary input into the decision-making process about 
nuclear weapons, and argues that 'national secu-
rity' is used as an excuse to restrict information 
which might damage the government's case for the 
possession of nuclear weapons. In this sense, 
civil liberties are seen as an i~evitable casualty 
of the nuclear state. At both the 1984 and 1985 
Annual Conferences, resolutions were overwhelmingly 
approved· which criticised the curtailment of 
traditional rights of free speech, freedom of 
assembly and of peaceful protest, and which called 
on CND to work with the National Council for Civil 
Liberties in a campaign against the Public Order 
Act (which gives the police powers to impose 
wide-ranging conditions on demonstrations, meetings 
and marches of all kinds). Christian CND and Green 
CND are particularly keen advocates of prioritising 
the civil liberties issue. 
Conclusions 
At the start of its re-birth at the end of the 
seventies, CND was a small, single-issue group 
working within a two-party system in which many 
thought of Labour as the 'natural' party of 
government. Less than ten years later, the 
Campaign had grown at least twenty-fold, had lived 
through the rise and (given the 1987 election) 
apparent demise of three-party politics and, above 
all, had come through an era in which Thatcherism 
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and Conservative governments had been the norm. 
Gi ven a combination of freshly recruited support-
ers, changes in the party system and implacably 
hostile governments, it 
surprising if the Campaign 
or extent of its demands. 
remained largely true to 
would not have been 
had changed the nature 
In the event, it has 
its original visionl 
although its campaigning has not achieved any 
concrete changes in public policy, it has not 
sought to replace its principal goal with something 
which might be easier to achieve. It has entered 
into working alliances with the anti-nuclear energy 
lobby, but has not allowed itself to become 
submerged into the diffuse 'green counter-culture'. 
It has resisted the temptation to restrict its 
campaigning to apparently popular issues like 
Cruise and Trident, remaining committed to the much 
less popular stances of complete British nuclear 
disarmament and withdrawal from NATO. 
Part of the reason for this may lie in the 
relati vely steady turnover of 
the Campaign. No individual 
leading figures 
or small group 
in 
of 
individuals has been able - or indeed sought - to 
monopolise the leadership throughout the eighties. 
Of the leading figures in the Campaign, only Bruce 
Kent has remained in a prominent position from 1979 
to 1987, and even he has played less of a role in 
decision-making since· the mid-eighties. The 
Campaign has thus avoided the danger of an estab-
lished leadership seeking to maintain its own 
position by re-defining goals into more manageable 
proportions. 
Another reason lies in the nature of the 
membership, and the various sub-groups into which 
it may be divided. There are few clear boundaries 
between these sub-groups, and much over-lapping 
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membership, but some distinct elements may be 
identified - for example, pacifists; Labour party 
supporters, Greens, SDP/Liberal All iance support-
ers, trade unionists and internationalists. We 
have already noted in our discussion of the 1985 
survey results that membership of other groups does 
not appear to diminish loyal ty to the Campaign. 
What it does mean, however, is that each sub-group 
is loyal, but in its own way in that each group 
holds some of the principles embodied in the 
Campaign to be effectively non-negotiable. Thus, 
the pacifists will not countenance the Campaign 
adopting a policy which appears to endorse in-
creased spending on conventional weapons 1 the 
Greens insist upon ralslng the issue of nuclear 
energy and vociferously resist any trend towards 
the Campaign becoming more centralised and using 
only 'conventional' pressure group tacticsl trade 
unionists insist upon the employment consequences 
of nuclear disarmament being taken into account, 
and internationalists refuse to allow the Campaign 
to become purely anti-American in its outlook. 
This. is not to say that everything in the 
Campaign's programme is negotiable. At the time of 
writing, its stances on the specifics of the 
foreign policy and general defence policy that it 
feels Britain should follow are deliberately vagu~, 
to allow the Campaign some flexibility and to avert 
opposition from sub-groups within the movement. On 
other issues, however, the commitment is firm and 
non-negotiable 1 in particular, the commitment to 
unilateralism and to working for that using both 
conventional and unconventional (NVDA) tactics 
appear to be seen by the bulk of the membership as 
defining features of the Campaign, and thus 
immutable. 
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The only issue to cause a persistent problem 
has been the Campaign's policy on withdrawal from 
NATO. Apart from a residual suspicion among 
activists about the leadership's real commitment to 
NVDA~ it is the only issue on which the leadership 
has been repeatedly criticised. This is likely to 
remain something of a problem for those charged 
with guiding the Campaign. Successive opinion polls 
and general elections during the eighties have 
confirmed that the idea of withdrawal from NATO is 
unpopular with the electorate, and the 1985 survey 
suggests that these doubts are shared by many of 
the Campaign's own members. Any attempt to 
moderate the Campaign's policy on NATO withdrawal, 
however, would not only meet with stiff resistance 
from Labour CND and Green CND (numerically small 
elements in the Campaign, but active and vocal 
within it), but might well inspire complaints from 
those without partisan commitments that CND was 
becoming too closely identified with the Labour 
Party and its policies in this area. As with its 
atti tude towards NVDA~ the Campaign has a commi t-
ment to withdrawal from NATO which may well lessen 
its impact upon public opinion and established 
members of the polity, but which many of its 
supporters insist upon retaining. We shall now 
examine how this apparent tension between respecta-
bili ty and radicalism has affected the Campaign's 
choice of tactics during the_eighties. 
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Chapter Seven 
TACTICS: PROTEST AND PERSUASION 
It can be seen from our discussion of CND's 
membership and aims that the Campaign incorporates 
diverse elements. Politically they range from 
those on the organised left, for whom nuclear 
weapons are .just one of a number of undesirable 
features associated with capitalist liberal 
democracy, to those who are committed to more 
mainstream political parties and activities but who 
are impelled by what they see as the special 
importance of this issue to make a particular 
effort, and to those whose interest in conventional 
politics is minimal and whose motivation to support 
the Campaign is almost entirely on moral grounds. 
Socially, the predominance of the middle-aged and 
middle-class should not mask the fact that not all 
supporters fall into these categories. Moreover, 
there is the high incidence of cross-cutting 
membership of other groups and campaigns by CND 
supporters, all of which have their own tactical 
strategies and methods. All of this means that 
the Campaign brings together people with very 
different ideas on the most suitable way to 
communicate and present the case for unilateral 
nuclear disarmament. 
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An Inaccessible Policy Area? 
This variety of experience and attitude among 
its supporters is one of the reasons that ·CND 
chooses to employ a range of tactics, rather than 
seeking to impose just one strategy on the Cam-
paign. Another reason, of course, is that the 
opportunity for CND to act as other (more conven-
tional) pressure groups do is simply not available. 
As far as the Thatcher governments have been 
concerned, CND has nothing to offer~ its expertise 
is not sought after by British governments and, 
even if the government were to accede to at least 
some of CND's demands, its supporters are unlikely 
to transfer their allegiance to the Conservative 
cause. The nature of the issue is 
Bri):.ish pol i tics, in that no other 
also unique in 
policy area is 
so inaccessible. Defence policy, and particularly 
its nuclear dimension, is an area which has 
consistently been kept within the executive rather 
than parliamentary sphere since 1945. parliamentary 
debates on even the generalities of nuclear weapons 
policy are few and far between. The details of such 
policy are hardly ever discussed outside the closed 
doors of the Whitehall and defence establishment. 
(The decision to modernise the Polaris force during 
the seventies was kept secret even from most of the 
Cabinet, let alone Parliament and the public.) 
Hence, whilst environmental groups can utilise such 
avenues as Public Inquiries and Royal Commissions 
to advance their case, this option is not open to 
CND( 1). Compared to most other liberal democra-
cies; the British system is a closed and secretive 
system and never more so than when it comes to 
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nuclear policy. (Indicative of this is the way in 
which CND has despatched researchers to the United 
States where, taking advantage of the Freedom of 
Information provisions, they have been able to 
discover far more about British policy than they 
ever have by working within their own country.) It 
is within this context that one must assess CND's 
choice of strategies and tactics. Even if it were 
to be the unanimous wish of its members, there is 
little opportunity for CND to pursue a conventional 
"insider" strategy which rests upon the government 
accepting the Campaign as a legitimate and worth-
while participant in the policy-formulation pro-
cess. 
Protest and Persuasion 
Even if the political opportunity structure 
were such as to offer CND the possibility of using 
only conventional tactics, there is a substantial 
body of opinion among the membership who would view 
this as inadequate. Impelled by the belief that 
decision-making on nuclear weapons is conducted in 
an undemocratic manner, and that the moral case for 
unilateral nuclear disarmament is so strong, there 
are many involved in the Campaign who believe that 
protest 
part of 
activities are a necessary and desirable 
CND's tactics. There is also a, small 
minori ty who take this' argument a stage further, 
advocating that the Campaign should be organised as 
a movement of mass resistance (physical, but 
non-violent) against the more visible manifesta-
tions of the nuclear state, but there is little 
evidence of much enthusiasm for this strategy among 
the membership as a whole. Those who disagree with 
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such a strategy tend to register their disapproval 
by non-participation in events, rather than arguing 
the case against at Conference or Council. Never-
theless, there is still a widespread belief that 
protest and resistance tactics should continue to 
be employed by CND. Indicative of this are the 
responses in the 1985 survey to the question about 
the effect of NVDA on the Camp~ign, with over half 
of all respondents of the opinion that NVDA 
strengthened the Campaign as a whole. The ecstatic 
reception which is usually accorded to those who 
relate their experiences of direct action to 
Conference is a further indication that, among 
activists at least, protest and resistance are seen 
as an essential element in CND's campaigning. 
Such feelings cannot be ignored or discounted 
by the decision-makers in national CND, not least 
because frustration among activists could prompt a 
transfer of energy and commitment away from CND and 
into one of the related ,organisations in CND's 
'social movement industry'. CND's supporters are 
'conscience constituents', in the sense that they 
do not derive any direct material benefit in return 
for their commitment: they also have little in the 
way of concrete success to show for their effort 
since 1979. In such circumstances, varie ty . and 
spontaneity in campaigning activities can become 
important motivating forces. Constant repetition of 
a few simple arguments whilst eschewing any 
unconventional protest, might be seen by some in 
national CND as the most effective way of influenc-
ing the uncommitted among the electorate, but if it 
were the only strategy to be employed by the 
Campaign, it would require cons iderable patience 
among activists. In other words, were CND's 
leadership actively to discourage unconventional 
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protest, they would risk alienating many of their 
most energetic supporters. In any case, the 
structure of CND is such that, even if it were 
thought desirable, the national leadership could 
not impose a ban on unconventional 
is little national CND can do if 
protest. 
a local 
There 
group 
pursues its own tactics, and any unconventional 
acti vi ty against nuclear weapons is likely to be 
presented by the media as at least linked to CND, 
regardless of the national leadership's formal 
position. (The classic example in this instance is 
the NVDA undertaken by the Greenham Women's Peace 
Campr despite the fact that the Greenham Women have 
consistently maintained their autonomy from CND, 
their activities are usually treated by the media 
as being strongly associated, if not synonymous, 
wi th CND). 
It is not surpr ieng, therefore, that CND's 
leadership in the eighties has given guarded 
approval to the use of protest and resistance 
tactics. It has been their firm conviction, 
however, that it would be misguided for the 
Campaign to concentrate exclusively upon such. 
tactics, mainly because it would make it too easy 
for CND's opponents to brand the Campaign as 
anti-social, eccentric and above all unrealistic. 
Again, the nature of the issue at stake has 
tactical implications. CND is seeking to mobilise 
opinion around a fundamental issue that has 
ramifications for other important policy areas. 
Clearly, a decision by a British government to 
adopt the unilateralist option would involve at 
least a review of foreign policy generally (and 
most probably significant changes), which in turn 
might well have significant implications for 
economic policy one may only speculate what 
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effect unilateralism and possible withdrawal from 
NATO might have upon the very significant level of 
American investment in the British economy. The 
point to make in this context is that, as the 1983 
and 1987 elections demonstrated, it is relatively 
easy for those opposed to unilateralism to raise 
the spectres of destabilisation and irresponsibil-
ity, and reinforce the British electorate's 
apparent preference for incremental rather than 
radical change. A Campaign which became known only 
for its fence-cutting and paint-daubing would run 
the risk of having its arguments dismissed without 
consideration by those committed to more conven-
tional forms of political participation. 
This analysis of the dangers inherent in a 
Campaign devoted exclusively to protest and 
resistance is not found only among the leadership, 
but at all levels of the Campaign, as Table 7.1 
from the 1985 Survey shows. Respondents were given 
a list of six possible types of activity that CND 
could pursue, and asked to indicate which three 
they thought to be the most important. As can be 
seen, the more conventional activities - educa-
tional work, lobbying and developing international 
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TABLE 7.1 
Activities CND should undertake (in %) 
bUl 
Ul O-l-l Ul 
0) 0. 1:1 -I-l 
Ul UlO) Ul 
<0 0)'0 • .-1 
u ~ > 
• .-1 
.-1.-1 -I-l 
.-1.-1 U 
.. .:t: ... .:t:. ..:t: 
Educational Work 28 81 
Big Public Events 18 54 
Considered NVDA 9 26 
Small Public Events 10 28 
Lobbying politicians 20 58 
83 79 86 
44 57 54 
34 24 26 
53 30 22 
53 56 60 
Developing Inter-
national contacts 16 47 27 46 51 
(n = 620 620 70 209 295) 
contacts received a considerable degree of 
support from both activists and the less active. 
Given this, it would be mistaken to assume that the 
debate within CND on the choice between conven-
tional and unconventional tactics resolves itself 
into a dispute between leadership and followers ~ 
the belief that the Campaign should utilise both 
kinds of tactics is apparent at all levels of the 
membership. 
Another major factor which influences CND's 
choice of tactics is that much of their campaigning 
is inevitably reactive, in that they are operating 
in a changing environment as successive governments 
(both British and foreign) make decisions which 
cause CND to change its tactics. Thus, for example, 
the 1979 decision to accept Cruise and Trident 
prompted CND to adopt a strategy which concentrated 
on these particular weapons systems and was largely 
189 
based on protest tactics. In 1983, however~ the 
combined effect of the Election and the subsequent 
deployment of the first Cruise missiles was to 
prompt CND into rethinking its strategy, such that 
by 1985 the emphasis had moved from weapons systems 
to the broader fundamentals of unilateralism. After 
1983, much more emphasis was being placed upon more 
conventional methods of persuasion as well as 
protest tactics. This transi tion is discussed in 
more detail belowl the general point in this 
context is that CND's choice of tactics is inevita-
bly both varied and dynamic over time. The Campaign 
has attempted to pursue both conventional tactics 
of education and persuasion and unconventional 
tactics of protest and resistance. It has attempted 
to maintain the enthusiasm of its activists without 
aliena ting the uncommitted and unconvinced among 
the electorate. It has, in short, attempted to 
capitalise upon the variety of perspectives found 
among its membership, rather than seeking to impose 
uniformity. 
Campaigning to Educate 
In the realm of education and persuasion, CND 
devotes considerable effort to producing published 
material which sets out the Campaign's position on 
the main issues involved. This material takes the 
form of leaflets, pamphlets and books, as well as a 
vast range of badges and stickers. The Campaign 
also publishes a monthly magazine - 'Sanity' -which 
has a circulation of around 40,000. It is a glossy 
magazine~ produced to a high standard. Although it 
does cover internal debates and developments within 
the Campaign, most of its material concerns the 
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wider issues of nuclear disarmament~ and it is 
aimed as much at the uncommitted as it is at the 
active membership. CND also produces a newsletter 
- 'Campaign' - which is much more concerned with 
keeping the membership informed about campaigning 
initiatives, and is primarily aimed at local 
groups. Whilst Campaign is concerned with intra-
movement communication, sanity offers news coverage 
and factual articles about nuclear weaponry and 
strategy, together with CND's arguments, in a 
conscious effort to attract interest from outside 
the movement. Thus, for example, Trident is 
described in terms of its technical capabilities, 
it is compared with previous and contemporary 
weapon systems, its construction and those contrib-
uting to it are analysed - all at an impressive 
level of knowledge. Alongside this are presented 
CND's arguments, stressing the expense, that it 
represents an escalation in the arms race - which 
in turn leads into discussions of the concepts of 
escalation, deterrence and defence. Al though it 
would appear that efforts are made to present such 
information and discussion in an accessible style, 
much of the content is clearly written with an 
educated readership in mind. Hence discussions in 
sani ty about Cruise, for example, tend to concen-
trate on its role as a first-strike weapon and its 
technical capabilities (and deficiencies) rather 
than using Cruise to indulge in populist anti-
Americanism. America is certainly criticised for 
its defence policy, but usually in terms of 
reasoned argument~ the influence of international-
ists on Sanity's editorial board is sufficient to 
ensure that the Soviet union does not escape 
similar criticism. 
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In addition to these periodicals, CND Publica-
tions (which ~ for business reasons ~ is a separate 
enti ty from national CND) also publishes a number 
of books and pamphlets, most of which are concerned 
with describing and analysing nuclear strategy and 
its implications for Britain. Some are addressed 
specifically to activists, a good example being Dan 
Plesch's comprehensive guide to organlslng and 
running a local group(2), which offers advice on 
everything from conducting public meetings to using 
the media and influencing political parties and 
trade unions. 
National CND also has a Research section, 
which offers journalists and researchers informa-
tion on both nuclear weapons and CND's pol icies, 
together with access to a press cuttings service. 
As might be expected, the Research section keeps a 
full collection of the material issued by the 
organisations of scientists, doctors, teachers, 
lawyers and so on who ally themselves with the 
Campaign's cause. SANA is a particularly important 
source of information, as it produces material on 
the probable effects of nuclear warfare which is 
unobtainable from official governmental sources. 
The Medical Campaign against Nuclear Weapons 
(MCANW) is a similar source of authoritative 
information, and both groups are cited frequently 
in CND 1 i terature. Their material is also used 
extensively by Teachers for Peace, a relatively 
small organisation of teachers and lecturers which 
is affiliated to CND, and which seeks to promote 
the teaching of peace studies in schools and 
colleges. This is an area which has attracted more 
publicity than action; a survey in 1983 suggested 
that only 23 per cent of local authorities taught 
peace studies as a formal subject(3). Given the 
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high proportion of CND's membership who came from 
the educational sector (25 per cent of respondents 
in the 1985 survey), one might expect more activity 
in this area. However, advocacy of peace studies 
has led to such an outcry over possible bias in the 
classroom(4) that there seems to be little overt 
enthusiasm in national CND for prioritising this 
area, although CND remains committed to the idea in 
principle. 
The Work of Specialist Sections 
The specialist sections are expected and 
encouraged to pursue educational work within their 
own areas. Christian CND (CCND) is the most active 
of the specialist sections, with some 150 local 
CCND groups and about 6000 subscribers to its 
newsletter 'Ploughshares'. As we shall see, CCND 
and the other specialist sections are also involved 
in the realm of protest and resistance tactics -
CCND is particularly notable for the way in which 
it has resisted becoming a 'moderate' element in 
the movement - but much of their time and energy is 
devoted to persuasion. CCND has put a lot of 
effort into lobbying church organisations at a 
national level, the General Synod of the Church of 
England being its prime target. After some success 
in 1983, when the Synod rejected the 'first use' 
policy of NATO as immoral but refused to adopt the 
report of its working party on the implications of 
nuclear weapons (which argued for a progressive 
disengagement from nuclear weapons by the U.K., 
whilst still remaining in NATO)(5), CCND has become 
impatient at the lack of concrete proposals from 
such bodies, and now concentrates more upon 
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campaigning at a local level. As with the teach-
ers~ CCND is frequently criticised for attempting 
to import 
political 
'politics' into what should be a non-
area, but a recent attempt by some of 
those members of Synod opposed to CCND to introduce 
a resolution condemning civil disobedience never 
even reached the agenda, as CCND is skilled in 
pointing out the connections between acts of 
conscience over nuclear weapons and similar acts 
directed against such issues as apartheid. 
Trade Union CND (TUCND) has also given much 
attention to education and persuasion in the trade 
union movement. Emphasis is placed upon establish-
ing a CND presence in the workplace, and members 
are urged to propose resolutions against nuclear 
weapons at all levels of their union's democratic 
structure (TUCND providing model resolutions for 
guidance). TUCND has a particular interest in the 
idea of conversion (i.e. viable alternatives to 
jobs in the nuclear weapons industry), and has 
produced a video on the subject. They are also 
heavily involved in the Barrow project, where a 
full-time worker funded by CND is spearheading a 
local initiative to persuade the Trident workforce 
that there is an alternative to their current work. 
At a national level, TUCND works closely with the 
National Trade Union Defence Conversion Committee, 
and campaigns to link arms expenditure with cuts in 
the social and health services. Labour, Liberal 
and Green CND work in a similar fashion, although 
they have different priorities. Liberal CND places 
a lot of emphasis 
(especially with 
on regional and local 
Liberal Councillors); 
work 
at a 
national level, they are active at the annual Party 
Conference, but have had little success in attract-
ing support from their allies in the SDP. Green 
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CND does undertake educational work within the 
Green Movement, but is much more concerned with 
varieties of protest and resistance tactics. Labour 
CND is also active at a national and constituency 
level, but is often castigated by those in the 
Campaign who are uncommitted to a party for being 
more interested in proposing and passing resolu-
tions rather than becoming involved in actual 
campaigning. 
Parliamentary Lobbying and General Elections 
An area in which new initiatives have been 
mounted is that of Parliamentary lobbying and 
persuasion. Indeed, the importance of this area has. 
grown such that, from 1985, the work of the 
political specialist sections has been increasingly 
subject to direction and coordination by the 
Parliamentary and Elections Committee(6), and two 
full-time staff who have been appointed to service 
the Committee. This up-grading was largely 
inspired by the unhappy experience of· the 1983 
General Election. This was a salutary experience 
for national CND, not just in terms of the election 
resu1 t, but also because it exposed serious 
shortcomings in CND's organisation. 
CND's efforts in 1983 were organised by a 
specially constituted General Election Unit, 
established just days before the election was 
announced. This unit sought to coordinate the 
various activities which were thought appropriate 
and which did not contravene the Representation of 
the People Act (RPA). These included the produc-
tion of leaflets, posters and stickers I the 
preparation of briefings for CND's own speakers and 
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sympathetic Parliamentary candidates; advertising 
in the national press; and the organisation of 
meetings and rallies to be addressed by leading 
figures in the movement. Many problems were 
encountered, not least of which were concerned with 
the provisions of the RPA - thus, for example, 
CND's legal advisers pointed out that if CND were 
to call on people to vote for no Cruise and no 
Trident, this could be construed as either encour-
aging people to vote Labour or discouraging them 
from voting Conservative, and in both cases would 
have been contravening the RPA. This kind of 
problem had not been properly considered prior to 
the election, and led to some confusion and 
frustration both within national CND and in some 
local groups. Similarly, although almost four 
million leaflets and some 80,000 posters were 
produced, the intention to concentrate the distri-
bution of these on marginal constituencies was 
frustrated by the lack of an established system for 
regional distribution. In the event, distribution 
went smoothly where a strong regional organisation 
already existed, but was much more haphazard 
elsewhere. National newspaper advertising was 
another disappointment. It was originally intended 
to be the area in which CND would make its most 
forceful intervention. Again, however, lack of 
preparation meant that much of the intended copy 
was withdrawn at the last moment, mainly because it 
had been agreed that all such copy would be vetted 
by national officers who, in the run-up to the 
election, were too busy or unavailable to perform 
this function. Even fund-raising posed unexpected 
(though not unwelcome) problems. A special appeal 
for money was sent out once the election was 
announced, setting a target of ~50,OOO. The actual 
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budget for the election period was £30,000, but the 
appeal raised almost £75,000 - leaving CND unsure 
whether it would be morally correct to spend any 
surplus on activities unconnected with the election 
campaign. 
In short, the 1983 election caught national 
CND unprepared, and revealed serious shortcomings 
in organisation and internal decision-making pro-
cedures. Once the dust had settled after what was 
a disastrous result for unilateralists, discus-
sions began on how to improve matters before the 
next election, with considerable time and atten-
tion being devoted to the matter during 1985/86. 
One move was the upgrading of the authority of the 
Parliamentary and Elections Committee over the 
specialist sections. Another was to create a 
database of constituency profiles, holding records 
on incumbent MPs and Parliamentary Candidates and 
principally concerned with their position on the 
nuclear issue - first priority in compiling this 
information has been given to constituencies which 
contain nuclear bases or defence industry instal-
lations. Similarly, marginal constituencies were 
identified by 1986, and the intention was that 
public speaking engagements by the Campaign's 
better known personalities were to be concentrated 
in these areas. 
The real problem 
1983, however, was in 
without falling foul of 
the Campaign had found in 
propagating its message 
the Representation of the 
People Act. The solution that the Campaign's lead-
ership came up with was to try to undertake the 
bulk of campaigning before the next election was 
officially announced. Consequently, during Febru-
ary to April 1987, when speculation about a gen-
eral election was growing, CND organised a speak-
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ers' tour (in the 'CND Express') of some 44 
marginal constituencies. During the actual 1987 
election campaign in June, CND kept a relatively 
low profile. Some advertising was undertaken in the 
national press, but not much. If CND's leading 
figures had any comments to make during the 
campaign, they were not reported in the national 
media. The only advice CND offered to guide its 
supporters was to vote for whichever candidate had 
the best record and most appropriate views on 
unilateralism. To what extent, if any, this low 
profile was motivated by the desire to give the 
Labour Party a clear run on the issue is debate-
able. Certainly no-one holding office in national 
CND would be prepared to argue that this was the 
case, not least because many in the Campaign would 
not support Labour's policy on conventional defence 
spending. Whatever the real reason, CND played 
much less of a part in the 1987 election, although 
some E40,OOO, was devoted to electoral campaigning 
in the first half of 1987. There is no doubt that 
a high profile could well have resulted in CND 
being prosecuted under the Representation of the 
People Act, especially if the Conservatives had 
lost the election indeed; the feeling within 
national CND is that they only escaped prosecution 
in 1983 because the Conservatives were so success-
ful. It seems equally likely that there was an 
implicit agreement among the Campaign's leadership 
that it was best to allow Labour to concentrate on 
what it saw as its strengths during the 1987 
election (for example, health and education), and 
that strident campaigning by CND could well prove 
counter-productive to Labour's chances of success. 
Campaigning during national elections is only 
a part of the new approach to Parliamentary work, 
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as the main aim of the P.&E.Committee has been to 
develop new methods of persuasion which can be 
routinised and employed between as well as during 
the general elections. In this way, the P.&E. 
Committee hopes to preclude both the disorganisa-
tion which characterised the 1983 campaign, and the 
disappointment of the 1984 elections to the 
European Parliament - when the P.&E. staff wanted 
to mount a high-profile campaign (and were encour-
aged to do so by the Labour Party, who were worried 
about a low turn-out), but were instructed by the 
leadership to keep a low-profile in order to avoid 
a repetition of the 1983 experience. 
The new machinery which is being developed 
focuses both on Westminster and on the constituen-
cies. Inside parliament, the concern is almost 
exclusively with the Commons, as there is thought 
to be little scope for attracting new converts 
among the Lords. In the Commons, lobbying takes 
the form of providing briefings for MPs, holding 
meetings which are addressed by sympathetic experts 
(SANA and the MCANW being important in this 
context) and making information packs generally 
available. By 1985, for example, when the Defence 
Estimates were debated in the Commons, the P.&E. 
Committee had previously sent out both technical 
and general briefings, held meetings and press 
conferences at the House, and subsequently analysed 
contributions to the debate for further use 
-whereas, two years earlier, the Defence Estimates 
went through with virtually no input from CND. It 
is not just the overall level of effort which has 
improved, howeverl the P.&E. Committee's new ap-
proach is to be much more systematic in its 
lobbying, and a lot of work has been put into 
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identifying different target groups among MPs, and 
tailoring the information on offer accordingly. 
Ini tially, this differentiation is made in party 
terms. For Conservative MPS, the idea is to push 
information which might lead them to question their 
support for all existing defence policies - thus, 
for example, they are sent material highlighting 
the economic cost of Trident or arguing the need 
for a restoration of British control over its own 
defence strategy. Where Labour MPs are concerned, 
the aim is not so much to press them to expand 
their commi tment to non-nuclear defence (for 
example, by advocating withdrawal from NATO), as to 
encourage them to actually campaign on the commit-
ments that have been made. One might expect CND's 
efforts to be concentrated on Parliamentary Labour 
CND (PLCND), a group of some 130 Labour MPs in the 
1983/87 Parliament who supported unilateralism, 
but PLCND's meetings tend to be poorly attended and 
liaison with CND seems less than perfect. As the 
P.&E. Committee noted in 1986, in a general over-
view of the state of opinion in Parliament on the 
nuclear disarmament issue 
As yet there is no substantial campaigning on 
the issue in the Labour Party. Specifically, 
neither the front bench nor any PLCND member 
employs a single full-time researcher on 
defence. Other than the isolated efforts of a 
few very good MPs, there is no effective 
organisation on the issue by either PLCND, 
Tribune, Campaign, Back Bench defence commit-
tee, Whips Office or Front Bench team in the 
PLP, and outside the Commons neither the 
Labour Disarmament Liaison Commi tte.e, the NEC 
or more significantly any of the left organ i-
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sations have organised any effective campaign-
ing. Labour CND has produced a useful 
campaigning pack but still tends to be 
associated with a section within the party 
rather than with CND itself.(7) 
Given this, CND's strategy before the 1987 election 
was to encourage PLCND MPs to move away from 
discussion and into actual campaigning, and to 
persuade the 80 or so Labour MPs who still had some 
reservations on the issue to enter into a full 
commitment to nuclear disarmament. 
The minor parties may not have many MPs, but 
they are important to CND. The Scottish and Welsh 
nationalist parties both have anti-nuclear poli-
cies, as does the Green Party. The P.&E. Commit-
tee is careful to nurture its connections with 
these. minor parties, partly because of this, and 
partly because it is aware that in a hung Parlia-
ment they could exercise an influence out of all 
proportion to their numerical representation. 
Similar thinking applies to the SDP/Liberal 
Alliance. prior to the possibility of a merger 
between the SDP and the Liberals, the P.&E. Com-
mittee has been foremost among those in CND who 
argue that, whatever the frustrations of lobbying 
the SDP, whose leaders are highly unsympathetic to 
the unilateralist argument, the Alliance will be 
crucial in any Parliament other than one with a 
clear Conservative majority. The importance of 
Alliance MPs in a hung parliament is obvious. In 
the event of a Labour majority, it is argued that a 
significant commitment to nuclear disarmament by 
Alliance MPs would leave those on the right of the 
Labour Party with nowhere to go if they wanted to 
soft-pedal on their commitment to unilateralism. 
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Although virtually no progress has been made with 
the SDP (who removed from their list of candidates 
the only prominent CND member in the party), close 
contact was enjoyed with some five of the eighteen 
Liberal MPs in the 1983/87 Parliament. such 
sympathetic MPs outside of the Labour Party are 
particularly important in that they can help with 
organising meetings or putting Parliamentary 
questions, which goes some way to avoiding CND 
being exclusively identified with Labour Party. 
It is hard to assess the impact of such 
lobbying of MPs, as the Commons does not have many 
opportuni ties to express an opinion on matters of 
nuclear policy. As the central issue is only 
infrequently debated, CND briefs MPs when related 
issues arise for example, civil liberties or 
~nuclear power. The P.&E. Committee has had some 
success in suggesting Parliamentary Questions to 
sympathetic MPs, particularly the twenty or so who 
(according to the P.&E. workers) make nuclear 
disarmament the issue they prioritise above all 
others, and Early Day Motions are another device 
which CND encourages MPs to use. As yet, the P.& 
E. staff have not been able to utilise Select 
Committee hearings as an arena in which to demon-
strate CND's expert knowledge, although they intend 
to develop this kind of work. 
National Canvassing 
It is outside Westminster that the most 
significant innovation has been made. Drawing on 
American experience, the P.&E. staff have set out 
to establish a network of Parliamentary Moni tors. 
The idea is to have a Monitor in each constituency: 
by mid-1986, there were just under 520 in place, 
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wi th about 65 per cent of these considered to be 
active. The Monitors are asked to scrutinise their 
local press for any statements by MPs or candidates 
which might be relevant. National CND scrutinises 
Hansard, and sends Monitors information on what 
their MP has been saying or doing on the nuclear 
issue. Monitors also receive copies of the 
information briefings which are normally sent to 
MPs. The intention is to develop a network of 
informed monitors who can not only exercise direct 
pressure on their MP, but also ensure that the MPs 
stance on nuclear disarmament is made known 
throughout the local CND groups and the constitu-
ency as a whole. It is a tactic which has concerned 
some MPs, who feel that they are being kept under 
surveillance, but national CND argues that it is 
doing no more than exercising legitimate rights of 
democratic accountabili ty. Whilst it is an uncon-
ventional tactic in the British context - as one 
P.&E. staff member put it, 'it's much more conven-
tional in Britain to lie down in the road'(8) - it 
is one which has attracted interest from other 
pressure groups,(9) and is considered to be a 
success by CND's leadership. A related development 
which has yet to get under way is the attempt to 
establish Contact Persons in each Labour and 
Liberal constituency party. If such contacts can 
be recruited, the ir function will be to organise 
meetings and invite speakers, to lobby their MPs 
and candidates, and to ensure that the issue of 
nuclear disarmament is raised whenever possible in 
meetings and discussions within the constituency 
organisation. 
This kind of work in parliament and the 
constituencies does not require much input 
bulk of the national membership; apart 
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from the 
from the 
less than one per cent of the membership who 
volunteer for constituency work~ most of the 
lobbying is undertaken by staff and committee 
members at national CND, and runs smoothly. 
Attempts to involve the rest of the Campaign's 
membership in the task of public persuasion have 
not always been so successful. Thus~ for example, 
two national ballots of public opinion have been 
undertaken in the eighties, and neither has lived 
up to expectations. A 'Peace Canvass' was under-
taken in 1983, with the aim of communicating the 
Campaign's message on a door-by-door basis across 
the nation. In the event~ not all local groups 
took up the idea~ and its originator admitted 
somewhat ruefully that it was not easy to motivate 
on the doorstep, rather 
that did not involve 
members to talk to people 
than campaigning in ways 
face-to-face contact(lO). The main impact of the 
Peace Canvass seems to have been on CND itself 1 
although it confirmed that many people agreed with 
CND on the specific issues of Cruise and Trident it 
also revealed that unilateral nuclear disarmament 
was equally unpopular, and served as a reminder to 
CND that there was a long way to go on the road to 
unilateralism. A similar exercise was mounted in 
1985, when local groups were encouraged to spend a 
week carrying out a ballot of opinion on Trident in 
town centres throughout Britain. Although the 
ballot produced gratifying results for CND (84 per 
cent against Trident, 12 per cent in favour, only 4 
per cent don't knows), this was on the basis of a 
mere 100,000 returns - that is to say, even less 
than the total number of members of national CND at 
the time. This was because many local groups simply 
decided not to participate in the exercise, 
preferring to take up other campaigning initiatives 
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which were emanating from other parts of national 
CND at the same time, with little effective 
coordination. Many of these did not necessitate 
face-to-face contact 1 for example, Operation 
Christmas Card (first mounted in 1984) centred 
around members sending messages calling for peace 
and more open dialogue to official bodies, public 
organisations and private citizens in the Soviet 
Union, Czechoslovakia and the G. D. R., and proved 
very popular with the membership. 
The Move to the 'Basic Case' 
Such innovative 
the disappointments 
ideas, however, could not mask 
and set-backs of 1983. Not 
only had the General Election exposed the apparent 
unpopularity of unilateralism, but the first 
deployment of cruise missiles at Greenham in late 
1983 dealt a severe blow to the morale of acti-
vists. During the 1979-83 period, when most of 
CND's campaigning was directed against the specific 
weapons systems of Cruise and Trident rather than 
the more general arguments about unilateral 
disarmament, Cruise had always preoccupied the 
English membership of CND, while Tride'nt was seen 
as the most important issue by activists in 
Scotland. (11) The deployment of Cruise meant that 
the Campaign, at least in England, had to develop a 
new perspective, not least because it became clear 
to national CND during 1984 that deployment had 
contributed to an, atmosphere of fatigue among the 
local groups. Faced with up to five years of 
campaigning before there was even a chance of 
reversing the British commitment to both Cruise and 
Trident, and the alternative attractions of the 
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Labour Party under a new leader and the higher 
profile enjoyed by Greenpeace and the famine relief 
campaigns, there was some concern in national CND 
that the membership's commitment would begin to 
flag or be transferred elsewhere. 
CND's response 
decision to maintain 
emerged in 1985, with the 
most of its existing campaign-
ing arguments, but to make a conscious effort to 
integrate them in a much more consistent manner 
than had ever been tried before. Dubbed the 'Basic 
Case' strategy, the intention was not so much to 
move away from campaigning against specific weapons 
systems as to present these and other arguments in 
a framework which sought to convince public opinion 
on the fundamentals of nuclear disarmament. Before 
1985, committees and staff at national CND (and 
some of the more active local groups) were initiat-
ing campaigns on such issues as Trident, Cruise and 
NATO, Civil Defence, and so on seemingly as the 
mood took them. There was little systematic 
effort made to coordinate these campaigns (a 
situation not helped by rapid expansion and staff 
turnover at national CND) ~ with the result that 
there was an uneven take-up of these initiatives 
by local groups, who were sometimes faced with a 
bewildering mUltiplicity of campaigning sugges-
tions. The new strategy envisaged amalgamating 
these different campaigning arguments in such a 
way that they would meld together. As Joan 
Ruddock, then Chairperson, argued early in 1985 
We have to be much more considered about the 
mass mobilisation we attempt to coordinate. We 
ought not to be rushing into actions or print 
or whatever on a continuous basis because 
that's what we've always done. We are very 
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action-orientated and this year we are going 
to be again, but a lot of people believe that 
we ought to be thinking what is the fundamen-
tal position to which we are trying to win 
people and do you best achieve that by a whole 
series of actions. So I would want some 
priorities which are about getting across the 
basic issues to people at a local level. 
Helping local groups to communicate on the 
doorstep about the immorality and uselessness 
of nuclear weapons and the case for. unilatera-
lism. (12) 
The tactic to be employed was the Extended 
Public Information Campaign (EPIC), whereby 
campaigns would be mounted - each lasting up to six 
months - concentrating on different aspects of the 
fundamental case for nuclear disarmament. Thus, 
for example, the first EPIC in 1986 centred on the 
perceived positive results of British nuclear 
disarmament, rather than criticising particular 
weapons systems, EPIC 1 was to present broad 
arguments about how unilateralism could enhance 
Britain's security and international standing. 
Despi te cons iderab1e planning during 1985, it is 
generally agreed in CND that EPIC 1 did not run as 
smoothly as expected. This was mainly because the 
Basic Case strategy does not just involve an 
unprecedented attempt at coordinated campaigning -
which caused predictable teething problems - but 
also because new methods of communication were 
adopted. In particular, it was the first time that 
CND had made a systematic effort to use national 
advertising. Previously, such advertising had been 
limited to recruitment advertisements, but central 
to the EPIC strategy was the use of press, cinema 
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and billboard outlets to put oV,er 'message adver-
tising' • Administrative mishaps and an unfamili-
ari ty with the world of professional advertising 
meant that many of the plans for EPIC 1 never 
materialised(13): EPIC 2, however, mounted in late 
1986 and centred around the theme that Britain 
could neither afford nuclear weapons or ever use 
them~ did benefit from professional advertising 
expertise, and is held by national CND to have had 
a particular interest on the party conferences that 
year - especially the Liberal Assembly. 
In theory, future EPICs will not be directed 
at the public in general, but at selected groups. 
In particular, little effort will be made to 
convert those who most strongly disagree with CND's 
aims. The intention, rather, is to aim the message 
at the 'middle ground' of opinion on the nuclear 
issue for example, those who are opposed to 
Cruise and Trident but still accept a policy of 
nuclear deterrence, or those who oppose American 
weapons in Britain but support 'British' weapons. 
The hope is that clear and repetitive 'message 
advertising' will imbue nascent supporters with a 
feeling of effectiveness - as the group responsible 
for planning the Basic Case strategy argued~ 
Public awareness of the dangers of nuclear war 
is high: our problem is the feelings of 
hopelessness and helplessness that go along 
with this - the inability to see any way out 
of the mess, the belief that Bri tish nuclear 
disarmament would make no difference, that the 
actions of an individual make no difference •• 
• We think that the crucial issue to get 
across is that something can' be" done and that 
CND knows'whilt.(l4) 
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Although such an argument might appear innocuous, 
there was the potential for internal disagreement 
over the new Basic Case strategy. Its emphasis on 
targeting the 'middle ground' and using profes-
sional communicators raised the suspicion on the 
part of some that the more controversial aspects of 
CND's ideology and tactics (eg. NATO withdrawal: 
NVDA) would not be included in the forthcoming 
EPICs. When the strategy was debated at the 1985 
Conference, one of the (hard left) contenders for 
the post of Chairperson argued against it on these 
grounds -
The Basic Case is part of the process of 
transforming CND into an educational pressure 
group and away from being a protest move-
ment.(lS) 
Moreover, the emphasis on integration of new and 
existing campaigns meant that each element in 
national CND (the national committees, working 
groups and specialist sections) had to agree to 
devote at least a part of their resources to the 
EPIC campaigns and~ where possible, to modify their 
campaigning material so that it tied in with the 
current EPIC theme. This caused some unease within 
both national CND and the local groups that the new 
strategy would entail a much higher degree of 
centralisation in CND's decision-making, at a time 
when many were pressing for greater decentralisa-
tion. 
The national leadership was able to mollify 
potential discontents such that the strategy 
received an overwhelming endorsement by the 
national Conference. They argued that there was no 
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reason for any particular policy or tactic to be 
excluded from the new approach, that it didn't mark 
a move away from protest to persuasion but merely a 
better way of doing what was already being done. 
The only casualty of the new strategy appears to 
have been the Trident campaign, on the somewhat 
ingenuous grounds that 
The Trident Campaign will be the Basic Case 
campaign, since it has become clear that 
Trident must be defeated on the basis that it 
is 'Britain's Bomb' and not because of the 
particular characteristics of the Trident 
weapon.(16) 
It is hard to see how the same argument could not 
be applied to Polaris, civil Defence, etc., but any 
suggestion from within CND that the Basic Case 
concept was so vague as to make it meaningless was 
firmly countered with a strong pragmatic argument -
that in the aftermath of the election and Cruise 
deployment, something had to' be done to motivate 
the membership or they might drift away. The point 
was made quite explicitly in National Council 
debates; as the planning group argued, the objec-
tive of Basic Case was not only to undermine public 
support for the idea of nuclear deterrence,but also 
to re-energise our members, our local groups 
and those who are wi th us bu t currently not 
active. There is some weariness in the local 
groups and, we 
appraisal of 
needed.(17) 
think, some consensus that 
our strategy and methods 
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re-
is 
The point was reiterated in the Conference debate 
on the new strategy, and seems to have been a 
sufficiently powerful argument to quell any serious 
dissent. It remains to be seen whether the 
proposed integration of campaigning initiatives 
takes place, or whether bureaucratic inertia at the 
national level will ensure the continuation of 
segmented and compartmentalised campaigning 
supplemented by new forms of advertising. Cer-
tainly, there are some at the highest level in 
national CND who see the only point of the new 
strategy being to give an impetus to the membership 
between General Elections, although such views are 
not expressed openly. Whatever the outcome, the 
adoption of the Basic Case approach does mark a 
formal commitment by CND to dissociate itself from 
its public image as a campaign primarily concerned 
with protest, and to propagate a new image of a 
movement that is just as interested in dialogue and 
persuasion as it is in unconventional protest. 
The Commitment to Protest 
This is not to say that protest will cease to 
be a tactic employed by national CND. Whilst there 
is a small minority in national CND who do express 
fears that the Campaign will abandon its commitment 
to protest action, the leadership has consistently 
denied this. Thus ~ for example, Paul Johns has 
argued that although the campaign should become 
more concerned to enter into a dialogue with the 
uncommi tted, non-violent resistance to the state 
should remain an important element; (18) the General 
Secretary has confirmed that there is no possibil-
ity of CND renouncing protest activities(19). As 
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we have argued earlier, protest is important to 
the Campaign on both an ideological and tactical 
level. Ideologically, protest is justified by 
reference to the 'undemocratic' way in which 
governments take decisions on nuclear policy and to 
the moral obligation to resist what are seen as 
fundamentally immoral policies. Tactically, some 
protest activity is important because it provides 
supporters with the opportunity to participate in 
actions which do not involve face-to-face contact 
on an individual or small group basis. Relatively 
anonymous participation in mass actions has all the 
. attendant benefits of experiencing group solidar-
ity. The classic example of this is the annual 
demonstration, which has taken place every year 
between 1980 and 1985. The turnout for these 
demonstrations is hard to determine, as CND's 
estimates and those of the police invariably 
differ, the police figure being considerably lower. 
The following figures represent CND's estimates1 
if; as the police suggest, actual turnout was 
somewhat lower, it does not invalidate the general 
point that these were genuine mass demonstrations. 
The 1980 demonstration was held in Trafalgar 
Square, and attracted some 80,000 participants. The 
demonstrations in 1981, 1982 and 1983 were all held 
in the more spacious surroundings of Hyde Park, and 
attracted 250,000, 400,000 and 300,000 participants 
respectively, In 1984, the annual demonstration 
was held outside London, at Barrow (where the 
Trident submarines are to be built)1 turnout 
dropped to some 25,000. There was another demon-
stration in London in 1984, to mark President 
Reagan's visit, which attracted some 80,000. In 
1985, a demonstration early in the year at the 
Molesworth site attracted just over 30,0001 a later 
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demonstration in Hyde Park produced a turnout of 
around 100,000. The crucial factor in determining 
turnout would certainly seem to be location. Any 
mass demonstration held outside London is, on past 
experience, unlikely to attract more than 30,000 
peoplel against this, however, there has been 
considerable ag i tation by activists (particularly 
in the North and Scotland) to mount more events 
outside of London and the South-East. As the 
ex~Chairperson of the Projects Committee remarked, 
decisions on where to hold 
usually highly emotive and 
demonstrations are 
controversial.(20) 
Wherever the demonstrations have been held in the 
early eighties, however, they have on the whole run 
smoothly. National CND claims to have a good 
working relationship with the Metropol i tan Pol ice 
over London demonstrations partly because there 
have been few problems in the past and partly 
because the organisation of these events has become 
routinised by CND staff. Even outside London, 
apprehensions about the impact of mass demonstra-
tions have been largely unfounded. For example, the 
farming communi ty around the Molesworth base were 
sufficiently fearful about damage to their property 
prior to the mass demonstration in 1985 that they 
commissioned aerial photographs of the area before 
the event 1 after the demonstration, the National 
Farmers' Union acknowledged that actual damage had 
been minimal and that the whole event had been very 
wellorganised(2l). 
The primary purpose of such mass demonstra-
tions is to achieve some impact on public opinion, 
and in this CND are aided by the media coverage 
that the demonstrations receive. Perhaps inevita-
bly, the demonstrations are reported as news 
events, with comment being made on the size of the 
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turnout and any disruption rather than on the 
issues underlying the demonstration. This is one 
of the reasons why CND decided against organising a 
mass demonstration in 1986. The alternative 
adopted was to mount an 'action' at the warhead 
storage site at Coulport instead - the difference 
between a demonstration and an action being that 
whilst the former requires only attendance, the 
latter (at least in theory) rests on participants 
being willing to participate in or support some 
form of NVDA, and thus be at much greater risk of 
arrest. The official reasoning behind the Coulport 
action decision was that this was in response to 
calls from local groups in the north of England and 
Scotland for activity in their area and that a 
national demonstration might prove too expensive. 
Unofficially, however, there was concern within 
national CND that a mass demonstration in 1986 
(particularly if it were to be held outside London) 
could see a continuation of the downward trend in 
turnout, and that it would be this rather than the 
Campaign's message which would be publicised by the 
media. 
There was similar apprehension in 1987, but 
this was resolved by mounting a joint demonstration 
with Friends of the Earth on a general anti-nuclear 
theme; which attracted some 100,000 participants. 
CND has no plans to repeat such an exercise, and it 
seems likely that, in the same way that before 1980 
the Campaign undertook marches rather than demon-
strations, in the latter half of the eighties 
smaller-scale actions at specific bases will become 
the norm, unless there is a significant upsurge in 
enthusiasm. That, in turn, will be determined by 
events outside of CND's control; the American 
action against Libya and the Chernobyl disaster in 
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the Soviet Union (both in early 1986) produced a 
dramatic upswing in membership enquiries; but the 
impact seemed relatively short-lived.' 
'Actions' as distinct from demonstrations, are 
unlikely to attract a turnout which bears any 
comparison with the numbers prepared to attend a 
demonstration. A nationally coordinated action at 
Mo1esworth in early 1986 produced a turnout of some 
7,000, compared with the 30,000 who attended the 
Molesworth demonstration in 1985. Given the real 
possibility of arrest - and it must be remembered 
that literally thousands of activists have been 
arrested in connection with NVDA actions since 1979 
- and the disruption this can cause in peoples' 
lives, it is hardly surprising that turnout is 
numbered in thousands rather than tens or hundreds 
of thousands. Despite the personal costs involved, 
there are a substantial number of activists within 
the campaign who are not only prepared to partici-
pate in such actions but persistently pressurise 
CND's leadership to mount and endorse more of them. 
The 1985 survey sought to investigate the spread of 
opinion within the national membership over the 
tactical choices the Campaign should adopt. 
Respondents were given six possible 
the Campaign should adopt, and 
indicate which three they thought 
important. As can be seen from 
activities that 
were asked to 
to be the mos t 
Table 7.1. a 
quarter of respondents prioritised NVDA as one of 
their choices; as one might expect, enthusiasm for 
NVDA was somewhat higher among the more active 
members, although even among this group only a 
third listed NVDA among their choices. Apart from a 
slight over-representation of Green votes, and 
under-representation of Alliance voters, there is 
little in demographic or attitudina1 terms to 
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distinguish this sub-group from the whole sample; 
support for NVDA is to be found in all the compo-
nent areas of the campaign. 
There are those within the Campaign who argue 
that it should employ tactics of NVDA and resis-
tance to the state with a much greater frequency 
and enthusiasm. Unlike their predecessors in the 
sixties, however, who coalesced around the Direct 
Action Commi ttee and the Commi ttee of 100, they 
have not organised into a distinct group within the 
movement. There is considerable support for NVDA in 
both Christian and Green CND, but there are also 
many advocates of NVDA who have no connection with 
either of these groups. Although the viewpoint has 
not been institutionalised, it has nevertheless 
always been present in the movement since its 
rebirth in 1979. It has been expressed not only in 
terms of calls for mass resistance actions, but 
also in demands for less centralisation in Campaign 
decision-making, and more autonomy for local 
groups. Advocates of NVDA have never enjoyed a 
trouble-free relationship wi th the Campaign's 
leadership, even though the people involved in both 
groups have changed over the years. Advocates of 
NVDA are suspicious of the leadership's commitment 
to resistance actions; there is a belief that the 
leadership is prone to being guided by public 
opinion rather than seeking to change it, and that 
this motivates the leadership to moderate both the 
demands and the tactics of the Campaign. The 
solution, according to advocates of NVDA, is to 
decentralise in the long-term, and to organise 
local groups to pressurise the leadership into more 
support for resistance tactics in the short-term. 
The leadership rarely if ever counters such 
arguments head-on, answering charges of undue 
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centralisation by pointing to the Campaign's 
democratic structure. Their argument is that if 
there was widespread enthusiasm for a particular 
tactic, then this would inevitably take place 
within local groups and the leadership would have 
no option but to follow. This does not address the 
point which the NVDA advocates are making, which is 
that the leadership should give a lead on coordi-
nated mass resistance rather than waiting to see if 
it occurs spontaneously. The leadership, whilst 
reaffirming its commitment to the principle of NVDA 
and resistance, is sceptical about both the 
practicali ty of organising a mass campaign based 
mainly on resistance, and the possible impact of 
such a tactic on many in the movement, let alone 
on public opinion. 
Protest and Internal Divisions 
These differences of opinion have threatened 
to become divisive only 
rebirth, during 1984/85. 
once since the Campaign's 
Perhaps ironically, the 
cause of the potential split was not a disagreement 
between advocates of NVDA and the Campaign's 
leadership, but one between NVDA enthusiasts within 
the Campaign and the best-known practitioners of 
resistance tactics in the Peace Movement as a 
whole, the Greenham Women. The Greenham Peace Camp 
was established in 1981, when some forty women, men 
and children marched from Cardiff to Greenham to 
publicise the planned deployment of Cruise missiles 
at the' base. Disappointed at the lack of media 
coverage given to their march, they decided to set 
up a camp outside the base. The small number of men 
involved in the action were excluded by a unanimous 
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vote among the women, who then started to develop 
the women-only camp along strictly non-hierarchical 
lines - in their terms, 'making a new kind of 
politics', one which emphasised individualism and 
rejected structure{ 22). For the next three years, 
the Camp flourished as more women (from both the 
U.K. and abroad) participated. During 1982 and 
1983, the numbers fluctuated between hundreds and 
thousands in attendance, many of the women living 
in the Camp under extremely difficult circum-
stances. As neither the original march or the Peace 
Camp were CND initiatives, this is not the context 
in which to give an account of the Greenham Camp. 
It is worth remembering, however, that - although 
the Camp had shrunk in size dramatically by 1987 -
during the 1982-84 period it was highly successful 
in attracting public attention. A combination of 
mass actions (30,000 women 'embracing the base' in 
1982; 40,000 in 1983) and smaller-scale initiatives 
(the numerous invasions of the base) drew at least 
as much media coverage as anything CND was doing at 
the' time. It was one of these mass actions which, 
indirectly, gave rise to a threatened split in the 
Campaign during 1984. 
The problem arose over the deployment of the 
first Cruise missiles in the U.K., at Greenham in 
1983. For many advocates of NVDA, the physical 
arrival of Cruise was an event of unique impor-
tance, one which demanded a show of resistance. 
They argued within the Campaign the necessity of 
mounting NVDA at Greenham as and when the missiles 
arrived. CND's National Council had already heard 
arguments for and against the separatist stand 
taken by the Greenham Women, and had decided in 
April of 1983 that the Campaign would support the 
women's action at Greenham whilst providing an 
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opportunity for men and women to join together in 
backing the demonstration there. The hollowness of 
this resolution was revealed later in 1983; in 
response to calls from within the Campaign for some 
action, CND proposed to the Greenham Women that a 
joint action be mounted in December 1983 the 
women to mount their own action around the perime-
ter fence, while a mixed demonstration of support 
would be held near the base. This proposal was 
rejected by the women, who vehemently opposed the 
idea of any mixed action either at or near the 
base. After heated discussion, national CND gave 
way. In a letter to all local groups, the national 
officers said 
We believe that confrontation within the peace 
movement is to the disadvantage of all and 
therefore accept reluctantly the women's veto 
on our proposals. We understand that the 
Campaign has given us no mandate to endorse 
separatist action, but equally we are aware 
that most people in CND hold the women's 
actions at Greenham in very high regard. (23) 
It was certainly true that there was little or no 
overt expression of misogynism in the debate within 
CND, and equally true that there existed (and still 
does exist) considerable support for the commitment 
shown by the women. Among the decision-makers on 
the National Council and its Committees, however, 
there were still some who felt a very real frustra-
tion at not being able to use tactics of mass 
resistance at Greenham. This frustration was 
contained in the short-term by the mounting of a 
demonstration at Burghfield nuclear weapons factory 
to coincide with the Greenham action, but feelings 
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of resentment at the Greenham Women's veto and 
suspicions that the leadership were not wholly 
enthusiastic about mass resistance actions contin-
ued unabated. 
The first deployment of Cruise missiles did 
not, therefore, cause a split in the movement, and 
CND's leadership had succeeded in their prime 
objective of holding the Campaign together through 
the twin disappointments of the general election 
result and deployment. The respite was short-
lived, however, as advocates of mass resistance in 
local groups based in Essex and East Anglia almost 
immediately announced the formation of Action '84. 
Although strenuously denying that Action '84 was 
any kind of break-away group, its instigators left 
little doubt that their intention was to encourage 
and mobilise support for mass resistance among 
local groups, and to use this to force national CND 
into adopting such a tactic. Their arguments were 
given a focus by CND Council's decision in January 
1984 not to mount an action to mark President 
Reagan's visit to London in June 1984 to attend the 
Economic Summit - which was Action '84's preferred 
strategy - but instead to participate in Euro-
pean-wide demonstrations against Cruise, which were 
being organised to coincide with the June elections 
to the European Parliament. Having failed to 
convince the Council to support a London action 
against Reagan, Action '84 decided to take their 
case direct to the membership. In a mailing sent 
to all local groups in England and Wales,(24) 
Action '84 argued that mass actions would not only 
complement and revitalise existing localised NVDA, 
but would also have a much greater impact on the 
political authorities. They also argued that, 
whatever CND National Council decided, it was 
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inevitable that at least some in CND would feel 
impelled to express their opposition to Reagan: and 
that, unless this protest was coordinated, this 
would result in the sort of 'ragged, small-scale 
actions' which (in Action.' 84' s opinion) had marked 
the deployment protest. Action '84 made it plain 
that if there was support among local groups for 
the principle of nationally organised mass NVDA, 
then they would assume the responsibility of 
organising such action if national CND would not. 
The National Executive's reaction to this was 
to consider the idea of a mass action in London 
against Reagan, but to remain unconvinced. Presuma-
bly the National Executive was waiting to assess 
the response by local groups to Action '84's 
mailing. Action '84 held a meeting for interested 
groups in February 1984, and there was a sufficient 
turnout for national CND to realise that evidently 
there was a significant level of support for Action 
'84's ideas. As a result of this meeting, Action 
'84 proposed both a mass action (encirclement of 
the Summit meeting at Lancaster House) and a mass 
demonstration (to be organised by London Region 
CND, and not involving NVDA). The National Execu-
tive reacted quickly, seeking to incorporate this 
emerging 'wing' of the movement before a formal 
rift could develop. Jimmy Johns, Action '84's 
leading spokesperson and well-known in the Campaign 
for his commitment to NVDA tactics, was coopted 
onto Projects Committee: the National Executive and 
Projects issued a statement to the whole campaign 
which offered Action '84 the compromise solution of 
national endorsement of the proposal for a 'conven-
tional' demonstration in London, and consultations 
over the question of accompanying NVDA. 
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Four months of negotiations ensued,as the 
National Executive remained sceptical of the 
advisability of mounting mass NVDA in the centre of 
London, at a time when the leaders of the Western 
world were gathered together. Action '84 contin-
ued to argue the case for mass NVDA directed 
against the actual Summit meeting, but the National 
Executive and Projects were concerned that this 
NVDA and the proposed 'conventional' demonstration 
could not be kept separate, and that demonstrators 
who had not intended to participate in NVDA could 
become involved - as projects Committee argued, 
such people will have given little previous 
thought to NVDA, have had no training, be 
members of no affinity group. If the police 
decide to make arrests, the presence of such 
raw recruits will increase the possibility of 
things getting out of hand.(25) 
When it became clear that Action '84's supporters 
(now amounting to some 150 local groups) were 
insistent on some kind of mass action being 
mounted, Projects devised another compromise. 
Rather than mass NVDA directed at the Summit on the 
same day as the demonstration, they suggested an 
action to be held the day before and for it to be 
targeted at the American Embassy instead of the 
Summi t . meeting at Lancaster House. The issue was 
not resolved until the National Council meeting in 
April 1984, when a third compromise was agreed upon 
- mass NVDA (in the form of a blockade) to be 
mounted on the same day as the conventional 
demonstration, but directed towards the American 
Embassy rather than the Summit meeting. This was 
accepted by Action '84, and once again a potential 
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split had been averted. The demonstration and 
action which took place on June 9th was adjudged a 
success: some 80,000 participated in the conven-
tional demonstration, and around 2,000 people 
blockaded the American Embassy. A protest was 
still mounted at Lancaster House, but this involved 
a London-based group of peace activists who were 
not associated with CND. 
In the aftermath of these six months. of 
negotiations, the eventual compromise was hailed by 
both national CND and Action '84 as a demonstration 
of the movement's ability to accommodate and 
cooperate. Nevertheless, the prolonged reluctance 
of the National Executive to endorse mass NVDA was 
not forgotten by some 
later in 1984 to revive 
activists, who attempted 
the spirit of Action '84 
but in a wider context. Dubbing themselves 
Direction '85, this grouping (which included many 
who had been associated with Action '84) called for 
not only more mass actions, but also decentralisa-
tion of decision-making in CND, and stronger 
campaigning on basic issues like withdrawal from 
NATO and unilateralism - whether they were popular 
with the electorate or not. Despite vigorous 
lobbying at the 1984 Annual Conference, this 
grouping never attracted a significant level of 
support from among local groups. One may speculate 
that one of the reasons for this was that Direction 
'85 did not have a specific issue around which to 
organise their campaign. Not only was there no 
equivalent to Reagan's visit forthcoming, but CND 
during 1985 was also showing signs of a greater 
readiness to organise nationally-coordinated NVDA -
not least because of the incorporation of Action 
'84 members into the decision-making process. 
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The target for this NVDA was to be the second 
Cruise missile site at Molesworth. This was seen 
as a unique opportunity by NVDA activists. It was 
still a 'green field' site. Whilst Greenham had 
been an established (and thus relatively secure) 
base prior to the Cruise 
facilities comprised only 
decision, Molesworth's 
a few minor buildings 
with no personnel stationed there. This meant that 
there would have to be a lengthy period of building 
and construction work which could offer considera-
ble scope for disruption and passive resistance. 
There were two peace camps established at Moles-
worth) the People's Peace Camp - a small group of 
Christians, who set up their camp in 1982 - and the 
Rainbow Village - a collection of about a hundred 
travellers and Green activists who had stayed on 
after a Green gathering at the base in mid-1984. 
Few people were involved, however, and there was no 
question of a Greenham-type exclusion of men being 
applied. 
The strategy devised by NVDA activists, and 
subsequently endorsed by National Counc il without 
prevarication, was the Molesworth Pledge/Rota 
scheme. The idea was to organise a continuous 
protest at the site by firstly calling on individu-
als in the movement to pledge their willingness to 
participate in either NVDA or in a support role 
when construction work started, and secondly to 
organise these volunteers via a regional rota 
(regions being allotted specific days of the week 
when their members should attend) in order to 
spread the load. In this way, it was hoped that 
construction work could be severely impeded, if not 
halted completely) and that this would be a symbol 
of continuing resistance to Cruise - an important 
point, given that only 16 of the planned 160 
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missiles were actually deployed in the U.K. at that 
time. The scheme got underway towards the end of 
1984, and by early 1985 enough volunteers. had come 
forward to enable CND to announce that the Rota 
would be launched on February 11. On 6 February, 
however, several thousand men from the Army and the 
Police were drafted in to erect a seven-mile 
security fence around the base, and to evict the 
Rainbow Village campers. Mr. Hesel tine's appear-
ance on the scene dressed in an Army flak-jacket 
led the media to dub the exercise an 'invasion'. 
Overnight, the Pledge/Rota strategy was crippled 1 
rather than giving volunteers the chance to disrupt 
construction work, the Pledge now involved vigils 
outside a base which remained undeveloped for a 
further six months. CND persisted with the Pledge 
until mid-1985, but most local groups outside of 
those closest to Molesworth (primarily East Anglia 
and the East Midlands) either d~d not take up the 
ini tiative or could not generate much enthusiasm 
among their members. There was some confusion 
within national CND as to what to do about the 
Pledge, apart from claiming that it had forced the 
Ministry of Defence into its 'pre-emptive strike'. 
Although small numbers of demonstrators were 
fulfilling their Pledge obligations, the action was 
clearly falling far short of its target1 yet if it 
was continued, it might stifle other campaigning 
initiatives at Molesworth. Looking back, the then 
chairperson of Projects commented 
Nobody in national CND could come up with a 
clear explanation of what the Pledge was about 
once the fence had gone up - it didn't have a 
clear rationale.(26) 
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Any attempt to discontinue the Pledge immediately 
after February 6, however~ would have risked 
another potential split between NVDA advocates and 
the leadership. The instigators of the Pledge were 
already unhappy about the apparent reluctance of 
leading figures in the Campaign (particularly Joan 
Ruddock and Bruce Kent) enthusiastically to endorse 
the Pledge in public, although the Campaign 
remained committed to it officially. In the event, 
those who thought the Pledge to be misjudged or 
rendered ineffective by the erection of the fence 
did not argue for its abandonment until mid-1985, 
and even then offered an alternative in the form of 
a nationally-organised mass NVDA action at the camp 
in 1986, to mark the anniversary of the 'invasion'. 
This alternative was accepted by the instigators of 
the Pledge who, although still convinced that it 
was a worthwhile initiative, were attracted by the 
idea of a national mass action- the very tactic 
they had been arguing for via Action '84. 
This is not to suggest that there was complete 
satisfaction with CND's actions on Cruise. In an 
exercise reminiscent of Action '84, a group of 
activists called a national conference in March of 
1985 in Manchester: the aim of the conference was 
to organise opposition to Cruise which would be 
independent of CND. Some 450 delegates from the 
U.K. and abroad attended, and were critical of 
CND's campaigning on Cruise, particularly the 
apparent reluctance to endorse NVDA on the issue 
with any great enthusiasm. One issue of contention 
was CND's backing of Cruisewatch a group of 
activists based in the south which includes members 
of CND, but also people from other peace campaigns. 
Their 
convoys 
objective 
when they 
is to monitor 
are deployed 
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Cruise missile 
on exercise, in 
order to demonstrate that their movement cannot be 
kept secret thus refuting Michael Hesel tine's 
claim that Cruise can 'melt into the countryside'. 
Cruisewatch is autonomous from CND, but receives 
funding via the Projects Committee, and delegates 
at the Manchester Conference were 
the priority this was receiving. 
dissatisfied with 
This dissatisfac-
tion also surfaced at CND's Annual Conference in 
1985, when a resolution was passed which instructed 
the National Council to give a much higher level of 
direct tactical support for autonomous anti-Cruise 
activi ties such as Cruisewatch and the Greenham 
camp. Projects Committee (and particularly its 
Chairperson) usually had to endure the brunt of 
these criticisms,but pursued a strategy of contain-
ing the dissent and making concessions where 
necessary rather than allowing the disagreements to 
lead to any kind of split between the NVDA acti-
vists and CND. This strategy was shown to be 
successful by the mass action at Molesworth in 
1986; in which the NVDA activists worked within 
CND's guidelines without dissent. In the view of 
Projects Chairperson, their 'loyalty' over this 
action was proof that the spectre of a split in the 
movement over NVDA had been averted(27). 
Deployment of Cruise at Greenham and the 
securi ty fence at Molesworth may have diminished 
the opportunities for effective NVDA, but sections 
of the Campaign remain committed to the idea. Green 
CND has consistently argued the necessity for NVDA, 
seeing it as an important element in the Green 
philosophy - 'direct action is a fundamental part 
of reclaiming personal responsibility for our 
communities and environment' (28). Although Green 
CND has always taken a particular interest in 
Molesworth, however, it has become increasingly 
227 
preoccupied with the policing of travellers and 
their festivals since the demise of the Pledge 
campaign. Christian CND is another section which 
has always emphasised protest as well as persua-
sion. It has developed its own Affinity Group 
network - small groups which train and mobilise for 
NVDA - and its national organiser has pointed out 
that members are often put in prominent positions 
during demonstrations and actions because of their 
experience and good reputation for maintaining 
non-violence in difficult situations(29). It also 
mounts its own actions, usually coinciding with 
significant dates in the religious calender, which 
have resulted in many CCND members being arrested. 
Alone among CND's activists, they are often able to 
persuade Magistrates' Courts to at least listen to 
a defence which is couched in terms of civil 
disobedience being justified by reference to a 
'higher' moral authority. The courts have also 
been the arena in which CCND has achieved the most 
media attention. For some two years, CCND fought 
against a proposal by the Church of England to sell 
some land that it owned at the Molesworth site to 
the Ministry of Defence. CCND's offers to buy the 
land were refused, but taking the matter through to 
the High Court finally resulted in an in-court 
settlement to the effect that the land could not be 
sold to the Ministry of Defence without the Church 
of England taking into account other offers and 
its own policy on nuclear weapons - a judgement 
hailed by CCND as 'giving us in effect what we had 
been asking for,(30). 
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Protest and the Missing Working Class 
CCND's organiser has argued that many who 
become involved in the section's work have no prior 
political experience, and that this means they 
bring a fresh and enthusiastic approach to their 
campaigning(3l). Whilst there may be similar 
enthusiasm, there is unlikely to be a lack of 
political experience among Trade Union CND members. 
TUCND is more concerned to influence its constitu-
ency through education and persuasion than through 
participation in NVDA. 
the past (though not 
Attempts have been made in 
by TUCND) to mobilise the 
Campaign's sympathisers in trade unions into direct 
action. The Annual Conference passed a resolution 
in 19BO calling on CND members in trade unions to 
organise industrial action as a way of campaigning 
against nuclear weapons policy. The 19B2 Confer-
'ence (which attracted an unusually high number of 
delegates from 'hard left' political groups) passed 
a similar resolution, calling on CND members 
to educate, agitate and organise in trade 
unions and workplaces for a campaign of 
action, including industrial action such as 
the boycott of the nuclear arms industry~ the 
non-handling of or refusal to transport 
weapons and components, and industrial 
disruption around old and new nuclear weapons 
bases.(3l) 
Both resolutions failed to find any significant 
support among trade unionists within the Campaign, 
and even less among trade unionists in the country 
as a whole. The fact that they were passed at all 
is more indicative of the efforts made by Trotsky-
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ist activists to influence the Campaign's direc-
tion in the early eighties~ than it is of any real 
possibility of the Campaign inspiring industrial 
action. Given the economic climate in the eight-
ies, it is not surprising that NVDA which could 
result in arrests and job losses does not appeal 
to many trade unionists. It is one thing for a 
union to adopt anti-nuclear resolutions at a 
national level, but quite another to translate 
this into action at a branch level. As the Trans-
port and General Workers Union has found when 
attempting to persuade its members to boycott 
delivery and construction work at Molesworth, 
getting workers to prioritise the issue when it 
might risk their livelihood is problematic, to say 
the least. 
Nuclear-Free Zones 
One area in which trade unionists have been 
active is that of Nuclear-Free Zones (NFZ's). Many 
local authorities have adopted this concept, 
originally devised in Australia in the seventies, 
which entails declaring a community to be nu-
clear-free - that is, opposed to nuclear weapons, 
nuclear waste dumping and transportation of nuclear 
materials through the area. The idea was first 
taken up by Manchester City Council in 1980, when 
it passed a resolution calling on the Government to 
refrain from the manufacture or positioning of any 
nuclear weapons within the boundary of the ci ty. 
six months later, over sixty other local authori-
ties had passed similar resolutions. By the end of 
1981, this number had grown to some 120 authori-
ties, and a National Steering Committee was 
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established to coordinate future activities. At the 
time of writing, there are some 170 local authori-
ties participating in the NFZ campaign. 
CND did not become fully involved with the NFZ 
campaign until 1982. The issue which prompted 
closer liaison between the two campaigns was civil 
Defencel the NFZ campaign was concerned with other 
issues which also engaged CND (e.g. peace educa-
tion), but it was on civil Defence that the two 
campaigns found a commonality of interest. CND had 
always opposed the concept of Civil Defence on the 
grounds that it.was impractical and ineffective in 
the face of a nuclear onslaught,and that to persist 
with civil Defence planning would only propagate 
the idea that nuclear war could be survived which 
could make people complacent about the dangers of 
the arms race. It also argued that the· Govern-
ment's civil Defence plans entailed unacceptable 
curtailments on civil liberties, highlighting the 
emergency powers that would be granted to the 
military and the police in the event of a nuclear 
attack. Many local authorities shared this view 
(predominantly, of course, Labour controlled 
authorities), but were obliged by central govern-
ment to participate in civil Defence planning. 
Under regulations issued by the Home Office in 
1974, local authori ties had a duty to make plans 
for civil Defence in their area. These plans were 
incorporated into a number of national exercises 
held every two or three years since the mid-
seventies. The planned exercise for 1982, however -
termed 'Hard Rock' by the government - had to be 
cancelled when it became clear that twenty NFZ 
county councils were refusing to participate in the 
exercise. (County Councils are much more important 
than District Councils in this context, as the main 
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planning powers and responsibilities reside wi th 
them). CND decided to capitalise on this set-back 
for the government by mounting its own exercise 
('Hard Luck')~ which drew on the expertise of SANA 
to offer NFZ councils an estimation of the effects 
of a 'limited' nuclear attack on their area. SANA 
argued that official estimates from the Home Office 
seriously underestimated the extent of casualties 
and damage, an argument which was reiterated by the 
British Medical Association in 1983.(32) 
This dispute over the validity of official 
of the information was to become the lynch-pin 
ensuing conflict between central government and the 
NFZ's. Following its cancellation of the Hard Rock 
exercise. The Home office introduced a new set of 
Civil Defence regulations in 1983. These imposed on 
all councils the duty to participate in Civil 
Defence exercises1 they also required councils to 
provide emergency control centres, to train staff 
in civil Defence duties and to recruit and train 
volunteers for Civil Defence - the latter despite 
fears expressed by trade unionists that a volunteer 
force could be employed for strike-breaking 
purposes. Al though the NFZ' s dubbed the new 
regulations as 'ill-drafted, contradictory, imprac-
tical to implement and designed del iberately to 
further mislead the public about the effects of 
nuclear war' (33), they could not question their 
legali ty. Failure to comply could result in 
commissioners being drafted in by central govern-
ment to implement regulations, 
charged to the Council and 
with the cost being 
the possibility of 
individual councillors being surcharged. Conse-
quently, the NFZ response has not been an outright 
refusal to implement the regulations. They have 
argued, however, that they cannot draw up proper 
232 
plans unless and until the Home Office provides 
them with full information about the likely nature 
and the scale of any attack - what are termed the 
government's 'planning assumptions'. Specifically, 
the NFZ's have demanded, as a prerequisite of 
drawing up Civil Defence plans, that the Home 
Office should tell them what are the likely targets 
in their area, what would be the effect of an 
attack on them, and what problems could be caused 
outside the authority's area. The Home Office is 
extremely reluctant to provide such detailed 
information on its planning assumptions, as it is 
well aware that the information would be seized 
upon by the NFZ's and CND and used to conduct local 
campaigns which would highlight the vulnerability 
of communities under nuclear attack. The Home 
Office claims that it is impossible to predict with 
any accuracy the targets or magnitude of a nuclear 
attack, and hence that civil Defence planning 
should be flexible enough to cover a range of 
possibil i ties. The NFZ's intend to go ahead and 
mount their own planning assumption studies1 if 
they cannot obtain the information they need from 
the Home Office~ they will use groups such as SANA. 
Only one such study has been completed, by the GLC 
in 1986(34); this concluded that much smaller 
nuclear attacks than were previously assumed would 
effectively destroy London, and condemned the Home 
Office policy of flexible planning for all types of 
attack as unworkable. Other studies are underway in 
a few NFZ's, but there have been some difficulties 
in persuading officials in local authorities to 
rely on information which does not emanate from the 
government. 
CND, liaising with the NFZs through the 
national steering committee, has been active in 
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encouraging the NFZs to continue with this policy 
of delay and resistance. CND has argued that the 
NFZs future strategy should be to comply with the 
new regulations, but to do so 'creatively' - that 
is to say, to pUblicise the effects of nuclear war 
and the enormity of seeking to draw up realistic 
Civil Defence plans in the face of these. The NFZs 
have yet to endorse this strategy (arguing that the 
do not need to choose a strategy until local 
Planning Assumptions Studies have been conducted), 
but they are maintaining a close relationship with 
CND. To date, the government has done little to 
bring the NFZs in~o line. Deadlines have been set 
for all councils to complete their Civil Defence 
plans, but when the NFZ councils have either failed 
to submit plans or submitted out-dated plans, the 
deadlines have generally been extended rather than 
enforced. A few authorities have been financially 
penalised, but others in the NFZ campaign adopting 
the same tactics have not attracted action. civil 
Defence exercises have been held since the new 
regulations came into force, but they have been of 
a much smaller scale than envisaged in 'Hard Rock'. 
When the 'Brave Defender' military manoeuvres were 
held in 1985 (the biggest such exercise since 
1945), nuclear attack did not form part of the 
scenario(35). In the wider political context; the 
government's abolition of the GLC and metropolitan 
counties dealt a blow to the NFZ campaign, but the 
inten~ion is to increase recruiting efforts at the 
borough level. 
CND will certainly participate in this, as it 
has identified the twin issues of NFZs and Civil 
Defence as very worthwhile campaigning areas. A 
motion to the 1984 Annual Conference stipulating 
that resources be allocated to continue the 
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high-powered campaign on these issues was over-
whelmingly carried. For CND~ the issues lend 
themselves to a campaigning style which emphasises 
the relevance of the nuclear threat to the individ-
ual in his or her own community, and NFZ councils 
are encouraged to develop initiatives which 
publicise this. The NFZ campaign has the addi-
tional benefit that CND are seen to be working in 
cooperation with democratically elected public 
bodies, and to be providing those bodies with 
specialised information that is sufficiently 
credible to cast doubt on the government's own 
circulars - both factors which are held to enhance 
the public legitimacy of the Campaign. Not least, 
NFZ authorities can and do provide practical 
support and facilities for peace campaigning in 
general in their area. 
Conclusions 
We have already noted that CND is a relatively 
homogeneous group. Its membership and support is 
predominantly drawn from a specific class location, 
the educated middle-class, who are more likely than 
not to be employed in the public sector. Its 
members display a high level of consensus over the 
aims and goals of the Campaign. We have to 
remember, however, that CND is far from being a 
completely homogeneous o~ganisation. It does, 
after all, bring together young anarchists and 
senior citizens, the unemployed and those with 
positions of responsibility in society~ there are 
not many groups in Britain which have working 
together people who look as if they have just 
stepped out of the House of Commons and others who 
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have the appearance of having arrived from the 
Glastonbury festival (and~ indeed~ have done just 
that in both cases). These people, with their 
variety of backgrounds and peer groups, may well be 
in accord over the aims of CND, but they are likely 
to want to express their commitment and take action 
in rather different ways. 
For those directing the Campaign, the problem 
lies in maintaining the enthusiasm of its support-
ers, and their willingness to take various forms of 
public action, whilst simultaneously convincing 
politicians. and the public to consider the idea of 
unilateralism and treat it as a serious alternative 
to existing thinking on national defence, rather 
than just dismissing it as unrealistic or solely 
the preserve of an unworldly minority. During the 
eighties, the quest for respectability has pushed 
the Campaign more and more into the realm of 
persuasion and reasoned argument as distinct from 
protest and resistance. The focus of the Campaign 
has widened from a preoccupation with Cruise and 
Trident (issues which lent themselves to targeted 
protest actions) to the basic issue of unilateral 
disarmament. The perceived necessity to enter 
into dialogue over this seeking to persuade 
others of the positive virtues of this policy 
rather than just rejecting the existing system -
has grown, and is reflected in the new initiatives 
on lobbying and the Basic Case, and new appoint-
ments to the national staff. 
Persuasion, however, has not replaced protest; 
protest actions have been rather muted since 1984 
in comparison with the early eighties, but this is 
more a reflection of a general (and probably 
temporary) downturn in activity than any switch to 
tactics of persuasion. Protest remains an integral 
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part of the Campaign, and is likely to continue to 
do so~ because of two factors. These are the ways 
in which British governments exclude the Campaign 
from any dialogue and reinforce its 'outsider' 
status, and the commitment on an ideological level 
of at least some of the Campaign's supporters to 
the practice as well as the principle of peaceful 
resistance and NVDA. There are those within the 
Campaign who would like to see it concentrate 
exclusively upon protest and resistance, just as 
there are those who consider this self-defeating 
and would prefer to see the Campaign become a 
purely educational and conventional lobbying group. 
The leadership of the Campaign, however, with the 
support of the majority of the membership, have 
sought to keep both dimensions of activity as part 
of the Campaign's tactical armoury. This has led 
to stresses and disagreements, and it has meant an 
uneven take-up of national initiatives by local 
groups. It has not split the Campaign, however, 
which must be seen as a substantial achievement. 
Whether or not this unity in the face of tactical 
diversity has enhanced the impact of the Campaign 
on British society is the question to which we now 
turn. 
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Chapter ,Eight 
THE IMPACT OF THE CAMPAIGN 
Whatever the tactics employed by the Campaign, its 
ultimate aim remains the same - to influence the 
government, whether directly or indirectly, to 
adopt and implement a policy of unilateral nuclear 
disarmament. This, of course, it has singly failed 
. to do since 1979, the Thatcher administrations 
remaining totally committed to a policy of main-
taining an 'effective' nuclear deterrent which will 
only be dispensed with as a result of multilateral 
negotiation. This is not to say that the Thatcher 
governments have ignored CND. The peace movement 
may not have changed the government's policies, but 
it has persuaded them of the need to pUblicise and 
defend those policies - which is in marked contrast 
to the situation in the fifties and sixties, when 
the government did not feel it necessary to 
publicly refute the Campaign's arguments. As we 
shall see, during the 1982-83 period, the govern-
ment went to some lengths to diminish the growing 
popu1ari ty of CND and its message among the 
electorate. Since 1983 (and the twin 'victories' 
for the government of the general election and 
Cruise deployment), the government has been less 
concerned to wage a propaganda war against CND, but 
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has stepped up its use of coercive powers against 
peace movement activists, which itself represents 
some kind of impact by the movement. 
The Conservative Governments 
Neither the efforts of CND nor the unforeseen 
demands and costs of the Falklands conflict in 1982 
have caused the Conservatives to alter their stance 
on Britain's possession of nuclear weaponry. 
Government statements since 1979 have become more 
detailed, but the essence remains the same. Defence 
is conceptualised as consisting of four basic 
commitments: direct defence of the U.K., the 
maintenance of a strateg ic nuclear deterrent, the 
stationing of major land and air forces as part of 
the NATO dispositions in West Germany, and a 
similar naval contribution to NATO forces in the 
North Atlantic(l). Whilst it is accepted that 
defence of the U.K. itself has to remain primarily 
the responsibility of a British government, and 
that this entails independent control of the 
nuclear deterrent in the final analysis, Britain's 
defence policy is formulated almost entirely in 
terms of membership of NATO, and the main potential 
threat is conceptualised as coming from the USSR 
and Warsaw Pact. The Conservatives' commitment to 
NATO has never come under question since 1979; 
this is particularly important in terms of nuclear 
weapons, as it not only gives rise to the deploy-
ment of American Cruise missiles in the U.K., but 
it is also advanced as a powerful reason for 
maintaining a modern British deterrent. The 
argument advanced by the gove'rnment is that the 
deterrence capability of NATO is strongly enhanced 
by the presence of two independent nuclear powers 
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within it, and that moreover only Britain is in a 
position to be that 
is that hav ing two 
rated in the NATO 
prepared to commit 
second power. Their reasoning 
nuclear powers fully incorpo-
framework (France not being 
its nuclear forces to NATO) 
represents an extra insurance. Whilst the British 
government is fully convinced of America's commit-
ment to defend Western Europe by any means, it 
argues that the Soviet Union might doubt this 
commitment, but would be deterred from seeking to 
capitalise upon any perceived American uncertain-
ties by the knowledge that Britain could trigger 
off a nuclear exchange. As Francis pym argued in 
1980, when discussing the possibility of the 
Soviet Union being tempted to gamble on American 
hesitation, 
The nuclear decision, whether as. a matter of 
retaliatory response or in any other circum-
stance, would, of course, be no less agonising 
for the United Kingdom than for the Uni ted 
States. But it would be a decision of a 
separate and independent Power, and a Power 
whose survival in Freedom might be more 
directly and closely threatened by aggression 
in Europe than that of the United States. This 
is where the fact of having to face two 
decision-makers instead of one is of such 
significance. Soviet leaders would have to 
assess that there was a greater chance of one 
of them using its nuclear capability than if 
there were a single decision-maker across the 
·Atlantic. The risk to the Soviet Union would 
be inescapably higher and less calculable. 
That is just another way of saying that the 
deterrence of the Alliance as a whole would be 
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the stronger, the more credible and therefore 
the more effective. (2) 
As France is not willing to assume the status of 
the 'second centre of decision' within NATO, and as 
West Germany is bound by treaty (and international 
pressure) not to assume nuclear status, the 
government 
this role 
argues 
and 
that only Britain can fulfill 
it is proudly presented as a 
'distinctive, central and unique component of our 
contribution to the Alliance'(3). 
These basic principles of Britain's defence 
policy countering a perceived Soviet threat 
through a contribution to NATO which includes a 
strategic nuclear deterrent then underpin the 
government's case for Trident. The starting point 
is, of course, the Soviet threat. Its existence 
tends to be assumed rather than proven in govern-
ment statements, but it is the Soviet threat which 
leads the government to argue that Britain must 
deploy a 'super-power' weapon if it is to have any 
credibili ty. As John Nott retorted to the sugges-
tion that Trident was a somewhat grandiose weapon 
system for a country that was no longer a world 
super power, 
the threat that we face comes from a super 
power, our submarines must be capable of 
surviving against super power technology, and 
the defences that we have to penetrate are 
those of a super power(4). 
and this theme of Trident being essential because 
of improvements in Soviet defence systems was 
reiterated in the 1987 Conservative election 
manifesto. In the government's view, only Trident 
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is an adequate and cost-effective solution to the 
problem of the encroaching obsolescence of the 
present deterrent (Polaris is assumed to become too 
costly and difficult to maintain after the early 
1990s). The possibility of a deterrent force based 
on British-owned Cruise missiles is firmly dis-
missed. Cruise missiles may in themselves be 
cheaper than ballistic missiles, but many more of 
them are needed to constitute an effective deter-
rent. Moreover, of the various launch platforms 
available (i.e. surface ships, submarines, airborne 
and land-based), the government cons iders subma-' 
rines to be the most invulnerable - but a deterrent 
based on submarine-launched Cruise missiles would 
require more extremely expensive submarines to be 
built. Cost is not the only drawback to Cruisel the 
government argues that the long-term development of 
Soviet defences against Cruise missiles is very 
hard to predict(5). Trident, however, is presented 
as a formidable and proven system, which enables 
Britain to maintain cooperation with the United 
States established by the Polaris decision(6). 
The government accepts that Trident will cost 
a lot of money in absolute termsl the Commons 
Defence Committee has noted that the original cost 
estimate for Trident in 1980 was some 5.2 thousand 
million, and had risen to 9.3 thousand million by 
1985(7). However, the government points out that in 
the context of the total defence budget, such an 
expenditure (which they estimate will be spread out 
over a fifteen-year period, peaking in the late 
eighties) is relatively small - absorbing about 3 
per cent of the defence budget on average between 
1980 and 1995, and about 5 per cent in the peak 
years(9). However, as critics of the Trident 
programme (even within the Conservative Party) have 
245 
argued; only a part of the defence budget is 
available for the procurement of new equipment, and 
acquiring Trident will mean that there is consid-
erably less money available for other (conven-
tional) equipment1 
back-benchers have 
several prominent 
voiced very real 
Conservative 
apprehension 
about the impact of Trident on the Royal Navy in 
this respect. The government, however, argues that 
its impact on the acquisition of other equipment 
will be minimal and is, in any case, unavoidable -
as the Defence Minister argued in 1982, 
Our planned expenditure on the strategic 
nuclear deterrent, if it were instead to be 
spread over many conventional capabilities, 
would not represent more than a marginal 
increment in those conventional forces which 
will, anyhow obtain, 97 per cent of defence 
expenditure over that period (up to 1975) •• 
Of course, I and all my defence advisers 
would like more frigates. As Secretary of 
State for Defence, I should like more tanks 
and aircraft. However, all of us, including 
the Chiefs of Staff, are unanimous in the view 
that a strategic nuclear capability takes 
precedence over an increase in such forces. 
Even a massive conventional force has no 
ultimate value in a nuclear environment unless 
the possessor of those conventional forces can 
resist strategic nuclear blackmail by the 
other side. (9) 
Neither escalating costs of Trident nor the 
additional costs entailed by the Falklands campaign 
and subsequent defence have caused the government 
to change its mind on this. In its review of 
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defence spending in 1985, the Government was still 
insistent that the acquisition of Trident would 
have a minimal effect on the defence budget as a 
whole(lO); in the 1987 election manifesto, alterna-
tives to Trident were dismissed out of hand on the 
grounds that none could provide an equivalent level 
of security. 
Another criticism of Trident, advanced by both 
the peace movement and others more sympathetic to 
the government, is that Trident represents an 
escalation in the arms race because it is a 
'first-strike' weapon that is, one which can 
incapaci tate an enemy's offensive weapons before 
they can be used. This criticism has been voiced 
particularly since the government's decision in 
1982 to acquire the up-dated (D5) version of 
Trident rather than the original (C4) system(ll). 
The government has dismissed this criticism as a 
fallacy - partly on the grounds that the Soviet 
Union has too many targets for even the full 
British 
destroy, 
force of 
and partly 
four Trident submarines to 
because neither the British 
government nor NATO have any interest in developing 
a first-strike capability(12). Repeated accusations 
that the United States does have a strategy of 
achieving a first-strike capabil i ty have been met 
with blank denials that such a capability could 
ever be used; for example, in 1983 -
NATO is a defensive alliance and had made it 
clear that none of its weapons, nuclear or 
conventional, will be used except in response 
to attack •• Moreover, both the United 
Kingdom and the united States have undertaken 
not to use nuclear weapons save in the case of 
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an attack by another nuclear power or a state 
allied to a nuclear power.(l3) 
However, as is apparent from the concluding part of 
this statement, the government is firm in its 
resistance to any idea of NATO entering into a 
commitment to make no first use of nuclear weapons. 
The soviet Union has declared that it will never be 
the first to use nuclear weapons: but the govern-
ment argues that, given the Warsaw Pact's superior-
ity in conventional weaponry (at least in numerical 
terms), NATO could not be confident of resisting a 
conventional attack by conventional forces alone 
-and, moreover, that NATO's commitment to use none 
of its weapons except in response to an attack is a 
far more fundamental and comprehensive commitment 
than that offered by the soviet Union on nuclear 
weapons (14) • In other words, the government draws 
a firm distinction between capabili ty and intent' 
NATO needs the weapon systems which would enable it 
to pursue a strategy of 'flexible response', but 
does not necessarily intend to use them -
It strengthens deterrence that the Warsaw Pact 
is not allowed to believe that a limited 
conventional war could be fought in Europe 
without involving a risk of nuclear conflict. 
This does not, of course, meant that the 
Alliance is .committing itself in advance to 
the use of nuclear weapons in response to 
attack: it is simply keeping its options open, 
to increase the uncertainty in the mind of the 
potential aggressor and hence increase 
deterrence.(l5) 
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It is precisely that uncertainty that CND and the 
peace movement claim fuels the arms race, but the 
government is convinced that a combination of a 
second centre of decision in NATO, and an insis-
tence on retaining a nuclear option, combine to 
maximise the deterrent effect on the Soviet Union. 
Given this perception of the potential Soviet 
threat, it is not surpris ing that the government 
rejects any idea of a unilateral move towards a 
non-nuclear defence strategy. Reliance on conven-
tional weaponry alone is ruled out because of the 
costs involved and, more importantly, because it 
would open the way to nuclear blackmail. The 
government quote with approval the argument 
advanced by Lord Carrington (now Secretary General 
of NATO) -
I 
No amount of conventional improvement would 
protect the West from nuclear blackmail. The 
advocates of non-nuclear defence have to 
explain why a Soviet Union with a nuclear 
monopoly would launch a conventional attack 
against a conventionally well-defended 
position, when it could threaten a devastating 
nuclear strike without fear of effective 
retaliation. And they must explain also what 
answer they would give if such a threat were 
made. To say of the Soviet leaders 'Oh, but 
they wouldn't' is not an answer. 
wishful thinking.(16) 
It is 
The government also argues that any such move would 
result in Britain effectively sheltering under the 
American nuclear umbrella. Not only would this be 
an abrogation of the government's responsibility 
for national defence, it would also be morally 
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unacceptable and politically unwise (as it would 
leave France as the only European nuclear pow-
er) (17). 
The case for a move towards more 'defensive' 
weapons systems is dismissed in similarly robust 
terms. The government asserts that, in practice, 
there is no clear distinction to be drawn between 
'offensive' and 'defensive' systems, "although it 
does not substantiate this with detailed argument. 
It also makes the broader argument that 'defensive' 
systems do not constitute an effective deterrent -
there is little or no historical evidence to 
show that non-offensive defence alone has ever 
deterred aggression. Such a strategy would 
reduce the risk for a potential aggressor by 
making his territory, in effect, a sanctuary. 
The enemy may well be" willing" to take the 
risk, and pay the potential cost, of losing 
his military forces in the field if he knows 
that his own homeland could not be attacked in 
return. But if he is faced with a threat of 
retaliation he is likely to be far more 
reluctant to embark on aggression.(18) 
This view of deterrence - resting on the capability 
to penetrate Soviet and Warsaw Pact defences - also 
underpins the government's support for the deploy-
ment of Cruise in Britain (and Cruise and Pershing 
within NATO). The government argues that the Soviet 
Union's combination of improving defence systems 
and deploying new missile systems (especially the 
SS20) has made it inevitable that NATO should 
respond by modernising its own systems; if NATO had 
clone nothing, it would have seriously damaged the 
Alliance's abil i ty to deter the Soviet Union from 
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thinking that it could fight and win a nuclear war 
conf ined to Europe (19). However, the government 
also supports the United states' efforts to 
negotiate with the Soviet union over the deployment 
of the SS20, Cruise and pershing. This does not 
extend to the government supporting any notion of a 
nuclear 'freeze', however. Such a policy would only 
result in perpetuating and legitimising existing 
Sov iet superiority, because the Soviet union has 
modernised or replaced many of its nuclear weapons 
while NATO has adopted a policy of self-imposed 
restraint; verification would also be diffi-
cult ( 20) • 
Another idea emanating from the peace movement 
which receives short shrift from the government is 
that of Nuclear-Free Zones, particularly across 
Europe. This is seen as an idea which, if imple-
mented, would not only imperil the linkage with 
American nuclear weapons that provides 'the 
of NATO security'(21), but would ultimate guarantee 
also create a false impression of enhanced secu-
is because the concept is simply rity. This 
impractical, on three main grounds: 
First, the territory of the zone would remain 
under threat from long-range weapons located 
outside it Secondly, the mobility of 
modern missile systems means that they could 
be rapidly redeployed in a period of tension; 
this could be easier for the Soviet union than 
for the West. Thirdly, the Soviet Union could 
bring its conventional superiority to bear in 
such zones with less risk of provoking an 
escalation in the conflict: deterrence against 
the outbreak of hostilities would be weakened. 
Geographical redistributions of nuclear 
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weapons are no substitute for their overall 
reduction and ultimate elimination through 
balanced arms control agreements - an aim to 
which NATO remains fully committed.(22) 
More fundamental proposals for reform in defence 
policy, such as passive resistance and civil 
disobedience, are dismissed as lacking credibility 
in deterrence terms. Although it is something of a 
tribute to CND and the peace movement that the 
government has come to' even address these possi-
bilities, they are seen by the Conservatives as 
highly unrealistic. A defence policy based on some 
variation of 'social defence' or guerilla warfare 
is condemned on a number of grounds: 
It could only take effect after occupation by 
the aggressor. It is, therefore, essentially 
a national policy that would allow the West 
European nations to be picked off, individu-
ally. It would provide no defence against, 
for example, a blockade of the UK designed to 
starve the country into submission. Moreover, 
resistance of this nature depends on the 
occupying powers being inhibited by the 
attitudes of its own people and other nations 
from adopting oppressive measures: there are 
no grounds for believing that such restraint 
would be felt by the soviet Union. Perhaps 
more important, it is wholly unrealistic to 
suppose that the counter measures envisaged in 
social defence would be viewed by the Soviet 
union as any demonstration of the UK' s or 
NATO's will or capability to resist attack, 
and it would be irresponsible of the Govern-
ment to rely on such measures.(23) 
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When Neil Kinnock, during the 1987 election 
campaign, appeared to offer a qualified endorsement 
of some variety of civil resistance, he was 
immediately vilified by the Conservatives for 
advocating defeatism and surrender. 
In short, the Conservative government's 
defence policy has remained largely unchanged since 
1979; as has its view of the potential Soviet 
threat and what constitutes a 'realistic' deterrent 
against that threat. As is clear from the above, 
the government rejects CND's analysis and prescrip-
tion on every count, save that both subscribe to 
the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. The 
government has remained insistent that unilateral 
acts are too risky to be worthwhile ~ there is no 
confidence that the Soviet Union would respond in 
kind to what the government terms 'one-sided' 
measures -
history shows that by one-sidedly reducing our 
defence capabil i ties we increase the risk of 
war. Disarmament must be equitable and multi-
lateral if it is to enhance rather than 
decrease our security. (24) 
Moreover, although the government maintains a clear 
official commitment to the process of multilateral 
negotiation on nuclear disarmament (from a position 
of strength), it is also prepared to defend the 
record of Britain and NATO's nuclear weapons policy 
since the war. In 1981, it argued that whilst it 
could not be proven that deterrence based on 
nuclear weapons had played a key part in persevQring 
the East-West peace for 35 years, commonsense 
suggested that it must have done(25). In 1983, it 
claimed that NATO's twin policies of deterrence 'and 
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multilateral disarmament 'have preserved the peace 
in Europe for over 30 years and will continue to do 
so provided the West remains resolute in its 
approach'(26), and the 1987 election manifesto 
argued that the nuclear deterrent had prevented 
both nuclear and conventional warfare in Europe 
since 1945. In terms of current defence policy, 
therefore, CND's impact has been non-existent. The 
only shift in official statements since 1979 is 
that they have paid the peace movement the compli-
ment of seeking to refute its arguments rather 
than, as in the sixties and seventies, simply 
ignoring them. Apart from some doubts about the 
cost of Trident and its implications for the rest 
of the defence budget, the government has been able 
to rely on the Conservative party inside and 
outside Parliament to fully endorse and support its 
defence policy. 
Although CND has failed to have an impact on 
Conservative policies, it has not been ignored by 
the Thatcher governments. Considerable resources, 
in terms of money and manpower, have been devoted 
to the policing of demonstrations and direct 
action, particularly at Greenham and Molesworth. 
Legal powers have been employed, including the 
creation of new bye-laws to limit protest activity 
around major bases. Although inspired more by mass 
picketing and industrial disputes than CND activi-
ties, the government has also introduced new Public 
Order provisions which give the police greater 
powers to restrict or ban demonstrations and 
marches. Arguably, the use of such coercive power 
by the state has led to a victory over the peace 
movement,in that no major base in the U.K. has a 
flourishing peace camp or similar activity estab-
lished around it any longer (although there is a 
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small hard core of protestors at Greenham who have 
resisted all the authorities' efforts to date). 
Although the protestors may no longer be physically 
present in large numbers, however, their success in 
publicising the issue cannot be denied, and at one 
stage provoked the government into adopting a 
high-profile propaganda campaign against the peace 
movement, and particularly against CND. 
As we shall see, the government's counter-
campaign to CND has attracted considerable media 
attention. This has not centred on the content of 
the government's arguments so much as on the 
methods employed, particularly the alleged use of 
the security services to 'infiltrate' the Campaign. 
Before discussing this, it is worth noting that 
these allegations relate only to a relatively short 
period around the 1983 election. Both before and 
after 1983, the government has tended to adopt the 
same strategy as its predecessors towards the peace 
movement; to ignore it where possible, and, if 
pressed, to dismiss its arguments as unrealistic 
(without seeking to counter any of CND's specific 
arguments) and to concentrate on presenting the 
case for replacing Polaris with Trident. As the 
movement grew in strength, however - and particu-
larly as it started to convince the Labour Party 
and major trade unions to subscribe to the unila-
teralist cause - the Conservatives decided that a 
more overt strategy was necessary. During 1981 and 
1982, the then Minister of Defence (John Nott) 
attempted to 'freeze out' the Campaign by refusing 
to enter into any public debate(27). Simultaneous-
ly, it was made clear to television and radio 
producers that any programmes which covered the 
nuclear issue, and included a contribution from CND 
without a corresponding contribution from the 
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government, would be considered one-sided and 
'unbalanced'. Given the concern felt by most 
decision-makers in the British electronic media to 
maintain political 'balance' in their output, this 
tactic was relatively successful in keeping the 
Campaign's spokespersons out of discussion pro-
grammes, especially on television. It did not, 
however, prevent rapidly increasing coverage of the 
Campaign's activities as news events, culminating 
with extensive publicity being given to the Labour 
party's decision at its 1982 Conference to adopt a 
unilateralist policy by a two-thirds majority. 
The growing size and influence of the Cam-
paign, the forthcoming deployment of Cruise 
missiles and, of course, the apparent popularity of 
the Falklands 'victory' and an imminent general 
election, all combined to convince the government 
at the beginning of 1983 that it was no longer 
sufficient to simply ignore CND. On the one hand, 
the Campaign was growing stronger ~ membership was 
increasing, more people were prepared to partici-
pate in demonstrations and actions, and major 
parties, unions and some churches were giving their 
support to the Campaign. On the other hand, the 
Falklands campaign boosted popular support for 
'strong' government, and Labour adopting unilater-
alism as one of its official policies laid the way 
open for the government to argue that this proved 
CND to be merely a 'stalking horse' for the left in 
British politics, and to label both the Campaign 
and the Labour Party as left-wing extremists who 
would strip the country of its defences and leave 
it unable to perform such feats as the Falklands 
campaign. Although it has not been officially 
acknowledged, it seems clear that a decision was 
taken in late 1982 to go onto the offensive against 
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CND~ and 
of the 
January 
it seems very probable that this was one 
reasons underlying the replacement in 
1983 of John Nott at the Ministry of 
Defence with one of the government's best communi-
cators, Michael Heseltine. 
Heseltine's first initiative in the campaign 
,against CND was to take up the idea of mounting a 
national advertising campaign, to be prepared by 
professional advertising agencies rather than the 
Defence Ministry's own public relations staff. 
Estimating an expenditure of several million pounds 
of public money on such a campaign, Heseltine 
argued that it was legitimate for the government to 
incur such a cost as it had a duty to communicate 
to the electorate its policy on nuclear weapons and 
deterrence(28). Predictably, however, the idea was 
strongly criticised as an instance of a government 
using public funding to mount a party political 
campaign (a charge the Conservative government did 
not wish to face, given its own strong criticisms 
of advertising campaigns mounted by Labour-con-
trolled local authorities at the time). In the 
light of this, Heseltine dropped the' idea, but 
replaced it with another. This was the appointment 
of a' small team within the Ministry of Defence, 
known as D.8.l9 and consisting of career civil 
servants, whose job it was to assist Heseltine in 
his campaign against the unilateralists. The 
s ix-member team (compared with the hundred or so 
public relations staff employed within the Ministry 
of Defence) were charged with assisting in the 
preparation of speeches for Heseltine, the prepara-
tion of films and pamphlets explaining the govern-
ment's policies (none of which seem to have 
materialised) and dealing with enquiries from the 
media about the nuclear weapons issue. Although 
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little is known about how D.S.19 actually operated, 
it appears to have spent its time advising Minis-
ters rather than dealing directly with the media or 
public. It reputedly held weekly meetings during 
the first six months of 1983, attended by Hesel-
tine, Ministers from the Foreign and Home Offices, 
senior officials and Mrs Thatcher's press secre-
tary(29): the team was disbanded after the general 
election. 
Although the input from D.S.19 remains 
unclear, it is certainly true that shortly after 
its inception Heseltine moved onto the offensive 
against CND. He made a number of speeches in which 
CND was presented as indistinguishable from the 
Labour Party, and both were castigated as left-wing 
extremists who were prepared to gamble with the 
nation's security. In a more controversial move in 
the two months before the 1983 election, Heseltine 
issued two letters which claimed to show that CND 
had been taken over by left-wing activists. In 
April, Heseltine wrote to all Conservative MPs and 
all Conservative candidates in marginal seats. In 
this letter, he argued that- of the 26 individuals 
directly elected to CND's National Council by 
Conference, 14 were 'of the 
5 of these were said to 
Community Party (although 
left or extreme left': 
have links with the 
the letter omitted to 
mention that 3 of them left the Communist Party 
some twenty five years earlier). Of the remaining 
9, one was said to be linked with the International 
Socialists (the person concerned had in fact been a 
member of the Labour Party since he was 16, and 
denied having ever belonged to I.S.), and the rest 
were members of and active in the Labour Party. CND 
. ridiculed this letter as an unfounded smear, but 
this did not dissuade Heseltine from issuing 
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another letter (in May 1983). In this~ circulated 
to all Conservative candidates, Heseltine turned 
his attention to the National Executive Committee 
of CND, claiming that 
Executive, which is the 
run CND, is also of 
'a clear majority of the 
body which meets monthly to 
the left (whether Labour, 
socialist or Communist)' and that CND was instruct-
ing its activists to attack the Conservative Party, 
and especially the Prime Minister, during the 
general election campaign(30). 
Although these letters, and CND's vehement 
denials, attracted some interest in the media, they 
were not seen as particularly exceptional in the 
rough and tumble of British politics during an 
election campaign. Some time after the election, 
however, allegations were made that put these 
attacks from the government in a new and altogether 
more serious perspective. The allegations con-
cerned the government's use of the police and 
security services to gain information on CND which 
was then used for party political campaigning. The 
first serious allegations occurred in 1984, CND had 
for some time been receiving complaints from a 
sizeable number of its activists that mail to and 
from CND was being delayed and arriving having been 
opened and resealed, and that telephone conversa-
tions were being mysteriously interrupted. CND 
built up a dossier of these allegations which 
prompted Labour's Shadow Home Affairs spokesman 
(Gerald Kaufman) to question the Home Secretary 
about them. On the allegation of interference with 
mail, the Home Secretary agreed that clearly 
something was wrong (the Post Off ice had already 
agreed to pay compensation) but inferred that this 
might be due to normal wear and tear. He followed 
normal governmental practice in refusing to confirm 
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or deny whether any specific phone-tapping had been 
authorised, but gave the general assurance that any 
such authorisation was only given when on tightly 
defined criteria 'subversion' was suspected, and 
that CND itself was not considered a subversive 
organisation as such 
I welcome the opportunity to make it perfectly 
clear that peaceful political campaigning to 
change the mind of the government and the 
people generally about nuclear disarmament is 
a legitimate activity and does not fall within 
the strict criteria.(3l) 
The important qualification to be noted here is the 
use of the term 'peaceful'; the Home Secretary did 
not expand on this point, but it seems possible 
that the government has drawn a distinction between 
activists who attend marches and demonstrations, 
and those who participate in more direct actions, 
especially around the two Cruise bases. The latter~ 
by seeking to monitor and disrupt Cruise deploy-
ment, could be considered a direct threat to 
national security, and thus not covered by the 
above assurance. It was certainly the case that 
many of the complaints received by CND were from 
members based in the areas around Greenham Common 
and Molesworth. 
CND continued to press for a full inquiry into 
their allegations (a demand rejected by the Home 
Secretary), but the issue became subsumed during 
1984 and 1985 by new developments. Clive Ponting, 
a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, 
was accused of breaching the Official Secrets Act 
by leaking information on the conduct of the 
Falklands campaign to a Labour MP; he was subse-
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quently acquitted at his trial, but his case gave 
rise to concern that the Ministry of Defence was 
being over-secretive; In a previous trial in 1984, 
another civil servant, Ms. Sarah Tisdall, was 
convicted on a charge of contravening the catch-all 
section two of the Official Secrets Act by leaking 
information to the 
government's public relations 
arrival of Cruise missiles in 
concerning 
over 
the 
the strategy 
the UK. Neither of 
these cases had any direct bearing on CND's 
relationship with the government, but they did 
create a climate in which the revelations of yet 
another civil servant - Ms. Cathy Massiter, who 
worked for M.I.5 (Britain's internal security 
agency) - received massive publicity in early 1985, 
and centred on the government's alleged surveil-
lance of CND activists. 
Ms. 11assiter, who resigned from M.I.5 in 1985, 
had joined the agency in 1970. According to her own 
account, in 1981 she was chosen to take over 
responsibility for M.I.5's investigation of 
left-wing subversive influence within CND. She 
felt this to be a legitimate exercise, but became 
concerned during 1982 and 1983 that she was under 
political pressure to study all activists, not just 
known Communists in CND, and that this led to the 
Security Service breaking its own ru1es(32). She 
made four specific allegations relating to the 
investigation of CND. Firstly, that M.I.5 in 
conjunction with the Special Branch 'stretched' the 
concept of subversive to include anyone. who had 
contact with known Communists, and used this to 
justify the preparation of lengthy files on 
hundreds of CND activists including the leader-
ship(33). Secondly, that the telephone of John Cox 
(then a Vice-President of CND) was tapped in 1983, 
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officially because he was a known member of the 
Communist Party, but in spite of the fact that 
(according to Ms. Massiter) 'we knew from our 
coverage of the Communist Party that he was not 
getting up to anything in CND'; in other words, 
Cox was chosen as a means of monitoring conversa-
tions among CND's leadership rather than from any 
genuine suspicion of subversive activities on his 
part. Thirdly, that during 1982 and 1983, M.I.5 
introduced an agent into CND's headquarters who 
reported back on what was going on in the CND 
office - one Harry Newton, a 
left-wing politics whom Ms. 
been recruited by M. I. 5 
long-time activist in 
Massiter claimed had 
during the fifties. 
Fourthly, that unclassified information on the 
political affiliations and inclinations of leading 
members of CND, which had been in part gathered by 
the above techniques, was passed from M.l.5 to the 
D.S. 19 team in the Ministry of Defence, and 
subsequent!y used ~n Heseltine's campaigning during 
the run-up to the 1983 election. 
These allegations, and the initial banning of 
a television programme based on them, received 
extensive discussion in the media and Parliament, 
such that the government felt obliged to react to 
them. The allegation concerning the infiltration 
of Harry Newton did not receive much attention, 
partly because Newton died in 1983 and partly 
because many of those who had known him during and 
prior to his involvement with CND publicly voiced 
their disbelief that he was such an agent. The 
allegation that information had been passed to 
D.S.19 was taken up by the Opposition, but largely 
ignored by the government. Massiter's first two 
allegations were addressed by the Home Secretary, 
however, whose initial move was to establ ish an 
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inquiry (headed by Lord Bridge, Chairman of the 
Security Commission) to determine whether govern-
ment ministers since 1970 had operated under 
established guidelines whenever they authorised 
telephone tapping. Less than a week later, Lord 
Bridge reported back to the Home Secretary that no 
warrant for interception had been issued in 
contravention of the appropriate criteria. This 
inquiry was dismissed by both Labour. and Alliance 
leaders as seriously inadequate, however, because 
its terms of reference precluded any investigation 
into any unauthorised interceptions which may have 
been made by the security services or any improper 
use of information. The Home Secretary attempted 
to counter this criticism in a subsequent debate in 
the Commons, when he claimed that he had conducted 
his own enquiries in this area: he concluded that 
the security service has carried out no 
operation, investigation, surveillance or 
action against any individual otherwise than 
for the purposes laid down in its directive 
and with the propriety which successive 
Governments have rightly demanded of it, and 
which this Government will continue to 
demand.(34) 
He went on to offer a qualified assurance that CND 
membership did not, in itself, constitute grounds 
for regarding an individual as subversive: 
No member of CND, no members of a trade union 
- nor for that matter any individual- need 
fear that he is the object of surveillance by 
the security authorities unless his own 
actions and intentions bring him within the 
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strict criteria set out in the definition of 
subversion • • • It is not sufficient for the 
safety or well being of the state to be 
threatened. In addition, there must be an 
intention to undermine or overthrow parliamen-
tary democracy. That definition governs the 
work of both the security service and the 
special branches 
sion.(35) 
these 
in relation to subver-
assurances counter Neither of 
allegation that information obtained by 
the 
the 
securi ty services and special branches was subse-
quently used for party political campaigning. Nor 
do they have anything to say on the allegation of a 
phone-tap on John Cox, as the Home Secretary 
followed precedent by refusing to confirm or deny 
allegations relating to specific individuals. These 
points were pursued by CND, who took a case to the 
High Court in 1986 on the grounds that Cox's phone 
had been tapped and that the motive for the 
interception was party political rather than any 
danger to national security. The government asked 
the court not to review the case at all, on the 
grounds that governments never confirmed or denied 
tapping in the interests of national security, and 
the courts should not become involved for the same 
reason. The Higher Court rejected this application, 
however, arguing that it would be unacceptable for 
Ministers to evade ·complaints against them simply 
by citing national security. The Court also 
accepted evidence from Ms. Massiter that Cox's 
telephone had been intercepted. The Court pointed 
to two serious flaws in CND's case, however. 
Firstly, although Ms. Massiter claimed that Cox was 
being monitored because he was a committed member 
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of CND rather than working in the Campaign to 
further the interests of the Communist party, the 
Court argued that other evidence unknown to Ms. 
Massiter could have motivated the interception1 
given the government's refusal to disclose any 
information, Ms. Massiter's evidence was inadequate 
rather than unacceptable. Therefore, the Court 
declared the interception to have been lawful. 
Secondly, Massiter claimed that the possibility of 
tapping Cox's phone had first been discussed early 
in 1983 (between February and April), but the Home 
Secretary had not approved the interception until 
August - that is, after the general election. In 
the Court's opinion, this delay was crucial because 
it cast serious doubt on the allegation that the 
interception was politically motivated1 Mr. Justice 
Taylor argued that 
'if the issue of this warrant was for party 
political purposes, it is hard to credit that 
four months would be allowed to pass between 
application and warrant, thereby losing any 
advantage the tap might have afforded at the 
general election.(36) 
CND drew some comfort from the Court's insistence 
on its right to review such cases, but could do 
little about the problem of obtaining adequate 
evidence in the face of the government's determina-
tion to offer no guidance one way or the other. 
The Bridge enquiry and the High Court case 
both centred upon alleged interceptions at the 
national level of CND, but the Campaign is also 
concerned about surveillance of activists at a 
local level, presumably by special branch officers. 
CND has compiled a dossier of complaints from 
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members about mail and phoneintercepts~ particu-
larly those involved in the Cruisewatch network, 
and intends to present a case based on these to the 
European Court on Human Rights. The whole question 
of special branch operations was examined in 1985 
by the Commons' Home Affairs Committee. As the 
government refused to disclose much information, 
however, (on the grounds that it might compromise 
national security), the Committee had to conduct 
their investigation within narrow limits. Indeed, 
the Labour members of the committee argued that the 
government's attitude defeated the whole purpose of 
the enquiry, and they submitted a minority report 
rather than (as is normal) agreeing a unanimous 
report with their Conservative colleagues. Conser-
vative members professed themselves broadly 
satisfied that special branch operations were being 
conducted in line with established g'uidelines, but 
the Labour minority report argued that the govern-
ment's working definition of 'subversion' gave too 
much discretion to the special branch, and called 
for an independent inquiry to be conducted(37). 
Clearly, as both the courts and Parliament 
have discovered, it is impossible to obtain enough 
reliable information to assess whether all these 
various allegations concerning surveillance are 
correct in every detail and, if so, what exactly 
motivated such actions. There does seem to be 
enough circumstantial evidence to make ita rea-
sonable assumption that the Conservative govern-
ment was sufficiently concerned about CND's impact 
on parties, institutions and electoral opinion to 
take steps to inform themselves of the general 
direction the Campaign was taking, and of the 
leading personalities involved. This was particu-
larly so during the 1982/83 period, and it seems 
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probable that this continues to be the case where 
activity around major bases is concerned. 
Tactically, the Conservatives have persisted 
with a strategy of encouraging the electorate to 
identify CND as a left-wing organisation. Although 
Conservatives acknowledge that many involved in the 
Campaign are motivated by reasons other than 
principles of revolutionary socialism or communism, 
the Campaign is still labelled as being directed by 
left-wingers who allow ideological convictions to 
lead them into advocating 'irresponsible' policies. 
As far as the government's own defence policies are 
concerned, they continue to reflect a rejection of 
CND's arguments, albeit a reasoned rejection rather 
than the cursory outright dismissal which unila-
teralist arguments received from governments in the 
seventies. Overall, the Conservative governments' 
attitudes have not changed, but no effort has been 
spared to combat the Campaign and its unilateralist 
message. Although the government appears less 
concerned in the mid-eighties than it was in the 
year preceding the 1983 election and Cruise 
deployment, it is still the case that the govern-
ment identifies the Campaign as an organisation 
capable of effecting a significant influence of 
public opinion. In the mid-eighties, the govern-
ment appears to have reverted to its earlier 
strategy of seeking to ignore the Campaign's 
existence where possible, but the overt attacks 
made on CND in recent years are a testimony to its 
perceived ability to attract public attention and 
support. 
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The Labour Party 
Among the established members and institutions 
of Britain's political system, it' is the labour 
movement which has most evidently responded to the 
Campaign's persuasion. The trade unions and the 
Labour Party have shifted their position over the 
last decade from majority support (or, at least, 
acquiescence) for an orthodox, At1anticist defence 
policy to an unequivocal commitment to unilatera-
lism and non-nuclear defence. It should be noted 
that many decision-makers in CND do not see the 
convers ion . of the Labour party as the Campa ign' s 
greatest success. Mindful of past Labour govern-
ments' records on the nuclear deterrent, they argue 
that unilateral nuclear disarmament will only be 
implemented if, as well as a sympathetic govern-
ment, there is a substantial body of informed and 
public opinion pressing for it. Nevertheless, even 
those who are most cynical about Labour's determi-
nation to implement unilateralist policies when in 
office acknowledge that, even if Labour's support 
is not in itself sufficient, it is certainly 
necessary if nuclear disarmament is to become the 
effect ive policy of a British government in the 
foreseeable future. 
Labour governments in the sixties and seven-
ties adhered to orthodox defence policies. Although 
the 1964-70 Labour governments rejected the notion 
that Polaris constituted a deterrent that was 
effectively independent from the United States, 
they were insistent on obtaining Polaris neverthe-
less - because it gave NATO a 'second centre' of 
decision-making, and thus represented an insurance 
of the U.K.'s security. The 1974-79 government was 
even more clear-cut in its support for a nuclear-
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armed Britain within NATO. Despite a manifesto 
commitment to remove American Polaris bases from 
the U.K., the bases remained and the government 
approved a #1,000 million improvement programme for 
the Polaris system. Termed the Chevaline pro-
gramme, this up-dating of the Polaris warhead 
system was first considered by the 1970-74 Heath 
government, but subsequently implemented by Labour 
even though parliament, the Labour Party and indeed 
most of the Labour Cabinet were not informed of 
this. It has also been claimed that the Labour 
government had developed plans to replace Polaris 
(Prime Minister Callaghan favouring Trident as the 
best option), but that these were interrupted by 
the general election of 1979(38). To the extent 
that they were kept informed about the government's 
policy, there was little serious opposition from 
either the P.L.P. or the Labour movement as a 
whole. Although both the 1972 and 1973 Party 
Conferences had approved resolutions 
reliance on nuclear we~pons, neither the 
opposing 
1974 nor 
the 1979 manifesto contained any commitment to 
unilateralism. Similarly, the Labour government's 
commitment to NATO did not come under serious 
attack until the late seventies. Labour was able to 
agree in 1977 to the proposal for all NATO members 
to increase their defence expenditure from 1979 
onwards, but from 1978 there were indications that 
the party's acquiescence in the Labour government's 
Atlanticist perspective was coming to an end. 
There was, of course, some sympathy for the 
unilateralist cause within the Labour movement 
during the seventies, but it did not start to at-
tract significant support until the end of the 
decade. A National Executive Committee study group 
established in 1974 to look at defence policy was 
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dominated by unilateralists: their report dis-
counted the notion of a real Soviet threat, and 
called for both the scrapping of Polaris and a 
reduction in spending on conventional forces, but 
was firmly rejected by the Labour government. 
However, as Pimlott has noted, throughout the 
seventies a new generation of trade union leaders 
and officials was emergingl for many of them, their 
earliest experience of national politics had been 
during the Campaign's first phase (in the late 
fifties and early sixties), and they had remained 
loyal to the principle of unilateralism and 
provided the basis for the revival of unilateralism 
in the Labour Party during the eighties(39). The 
first concrete sign of this revival came in 1978, 
when Conference approved a resolution against the 
basing of American Cruise missiles in the UK, 
despite the Labour government's endorsement of 
NATO's modernisation programme. Such disagreements 
were overshadowed in 1979 by the Labour govern-
ment's industrial problems, and defence was not a 
major issue in the general election. This was 
short-lived, however, particularly after the Trans-
port and General Workers Union decided in 1979 to 
try to obtain a commitment from the party to 
unilateralism (the T.&G. being one of the few 
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unions, and the only major union, to remain 
committed to unilateralism throughout the sixties 
and seventies). A combination of this, Labour's 
defeat in 1979, the decision by NATO to adopt the 
Cruise and pershing option, and resentment within 
the Party over the 1974-79 government's reluctance 
to implement much of Labour's official policy, was 
such that during the early eighties defence policy 
became one of the most significant factors in 
Labour's bitter dispute over its constitutional 
arrangements which resulted in the breakaway of the 
SDP(40). 
The 1980 Conference signalled a major shift in 
Labour's defence policy. The Party's commitment to 
NATO was overwhelmingly supported, a motion calling 
for the substitution of non-alignment for NATO 
membership being defeated by 6.3 mill ion votes to 
0.8 million. A resolution ~calling for the next 
election manifesto to contain a commitment to 
unilateralism was carried, however, as were 
resolutions calling for no British participation in 
a defence policy based on the threat to use nuclear 
weapons (i.e. NATO policy), the removal of all 
nuclear bases 
negotiations 
calling off 
from Britain, and for multi-lateral 
to be conducted with the aim of 
the deployment of Cruise and the 
creation of a nuclear-weapons free zone in Europe. 
Taken together, these resolutions were somewhat 
ambiguous and contradictory (especially over NATO), 
but the move towards a fully fledged u~nilateral 
policy was now underway. The split with the SDP in 
1981 meant that leading Atlanticists in the party 
(for example, Bill Rodgers, Labour's defence 
spokesman until the split) had not only left but 
were tainted with charges of treachery. The 1981 
Conference reaffirmed Labour's commitment to NATO 
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(by 5.2 million votes to 1.6 million); 
Transport and General resolution calling 
but a 
on the 
National Executive to ensure that the next mani-
festo included an unambiguous 
unilateralism was accepted by 4.6 
2.3 million. In the same year, 
commitment to 
million votes to 
the Trade Union 
Congress approved a resolution advocating unilat-
eral nuclear disarmament, largely at the instiga-
tion of the T.G.W.U. It was not until 1982, 
however, that unilateralism received the two-thirds 
majority support at a Labour party Conference which 
ensured that unilateralism was once again an 
official element in Labour's policy programme. By 
1982, of course, the party was led by Michael Foot, 
a long-standing advocate of unilateralism, but the 
significant factor in the construction of the 
two-thirds majority was the gradual recruitment of 
major trade unions to the unilateralist cause. By 
1982, only two major unions (the A.U.E.W. and the 
General and Municipal) were opposed to unilatera-
lism. 1982 saw the unions steering Labour towards 
a more moderate stance in most policy areas, but 
both the 'soft' and 'hard' left retained a loyalty 
to the cause of unilateralism. The net effect was 
that the 1982 Conference approved a resolution 
which called for unilateralism to feature in the 
next election manifesto, the cancellation of both 
Cruise and Trident, and the removal of all nuclear 
bases from the U.K., by a majority of 4.9 million 
to 1.9 million. A more radical resolution, 
covering not just these matters but also calling 
for the removal of all American bases (whether 
nuclear, conventional or indeterminate) from the 
U.K. and the nationalisation of the arms industry 
was just passed - by 3.43 million to 3.40 million -
but a motion on withdrawal from NATO was once again 
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lost by 5.7 million votes to 1.2 million. Despite 
the fact that the Shadow Cabinet contained a number 
of known mul tilateralists (not least the deputy 
leader, Dennis Healey), the Conference had clearly 
committed the Party to adopting some variation on 
the unilateralist theme in the next election. 
Although there is a long history in the Labour 
Party of the Parliamentary leadership refusing to 
prioritise everything the Conference calls for, the 
combination of a sympathetic leader and the 
two-thirds majority at the 1982 Conference meant 
that, at the very least, Labour's manifesto for the 
next election would be 
the seventies. Even 
very different from those in 
the Falklands war, and the 
Labour leadership's support for the government once 
hostil i ties had commenced, did not sway the 
determination of unilateralists to see their policy 
both adopted and prioritised by the Party. 
Consequently, Labour went into the 1983 
election with a series of commitments on defence in 
its manifesto. These included the cancellation of 
Trident, opposition to the deployment of Cruise 
(and Pershing elsewhere in Europe) and a freeze on 
the development and deployment of all new nuclear 
weapons. More generally, the manifesto called for 
a move towards conventional defence although it 
also argued that Britain should reduce its spending 
on defence overall. Most controversially, however, 
the manifesto called for the removal of all nuclear 
bases (i.e. British and American) within five 
years, although it did not explain how 'nuclear' 
bases could be isolated from other bases, and an 
apparent commitment to scrap Polaris: 'apparent' 
because the manifesto said that Polaris should be 
included in global disarmament negotiations whilst 
simul taneously saying that Britain would have a 
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non-nuclear defence pol icy within five years 
anyway. This ambiguity was clearly an attempt to 
do to the multilateralists in the party what they 
had been doing to the unilateralists for the last 
twenty years - namely, offering just enough in the 
manifesto to retain their loyalty. The multilat-
eralists responded by criticising the manifesto 
during the election Campaign, arguing that Polaris 
should only be scrapped in return for (unspecified) 
Soviet concessions. The Conservative and Alliance 
leaders were able to present Labour as a party 
which could not agree on a fundamental issue. For 
a party which had only recently seen the 'defec-
tion' of ardent multilateralists to the SDP, the 
doubts voiced by Callaghan and Healey about the 
wisdom of unilateralism served only to increase 
the suspicions of grass-roots activists about the 
commitment of the Parliamentary party to implement-
ing Conference decisions. Michael Foot's efforts 
to explain Labour's policy in terms which did not 
contradict his own well-known commitment to 
un i-lateral nuclear disarmament, or provoke a 
public argument with some of his senior multilater-
alist colleagues, lacked conviction. The way was 
open for the Conservatives' to present Labour as, 
at best, disunited and, at worst, intent on leaving 
Britain 'defenceless'. Even if Labour had been 
truly united on the principle of unilateralism, its 
commitment to NATO membership would have left it 
open to charges of ambiguity; as it was, the public 
disagreements over Polaris were 
the impression that Labour had 
policy through on defence. 
sufficient to give 
yet to think its 
Clarification of Labour's policy did not come 
until 1984. Under its new leader Neil Kinnock, 
another long-time supporter of the unilateralist 
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cause, Labour undertook an adjustment of its 
defence policy which was approved by the 1984 
conference by 5.3 million vote to 1.3 million. The 
new policy reaffirmed much of what had been adopted 
over the preceding two years: the cancellation of 
Trident, the removal of Cruise missiles and of all 
nuclear bases remained as priori ties (41) • Equally 
firm was the intention to remain within NATO, 
though it was argued that a Labour government would 
use NATO membership to press for a change in NATO's 
nuclear strategy and a greater say for Western 
Europe in NATO's decision-making generally. A 
Labour government would attempt to persuade NATO to 
move towards 'defensive deterrence' and a policy of 
'no first use' of nuclear weapons: in the long 
term, Labour would like to see the 'mutual and 
concurrent' phasing-out of NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact. In the short to medium term, however, 
Labour's new pol icy was expl ic it on the need to 
maintain strong conventional forces. Partly as a 
response to the charges of 'defencelessness' 
levelled at Labour in 1983, and partly to ensure 
the loyalty of its right-wing, Labour emphasised 
that no-one should expect substantial savings· on 
defence expenditure, at least in the short-term. 
The policy document made it clear that money saved 
by the cancellation and abandonment of nuclear 
weapons would almost certainly have to be realloca-
ted to meet escalating conventional equipment 
costs. In subsequent comments, senior Labour 
politicians intimated that, given Labour's commit-
ment to strong conventional forces, defence 
spen-d ing might actually go up from its present 
levels(42). In other words, the shift to 'defen-
sive' defence remained a long-term priority for 
Labour, to be achieved through multilateral 
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agreement with our NATO allies. In the short-term, 
Labour was committed to maintaining such 'offen-
sive' conventional weaponry as the Tornado aircraft 
and existing aircraft carriers: as one peace 
movement journal commented, 
Labour's alternative defence policy has been 
reduced to the present force structure and to 
current, military equipment, with little 
planning for the transformation to nonprovo-
cative, defensive-oriented defence.(43) 
Similar ambiguities remained over the question of 
what constituted a 'nuclear' base (to be removed), 
and what constituted a 'conventional base (Labour 
making an explicit commitment to retain American 
bases which had a role to play in conventional 
defence. 
Whatever 
tion of its 
the ambiguities, 
policy met the 
Labour's redefini-
leadership's prime 
party unity. When objective, which was to restore 
the new policy was presented to the 1984 Confer-
ence, both Ca11aghan and Healey gave it a qualified 
endorsement, although both voiced doubts that the 
removal of U.S. bases could simply lead to them 
being re-established on the European mainland. The 
new policy was approved by a four to one majority, 
and thus became Labour's policy for the next 
election, with one proviso. This was the so-called 
Hattersley clause, a section in the policy document 
which pointed out that this policy - like any other 
policy could change before the next general 
election. The overwhelming endorsement of non-
nuclear defence by the Labour Conference made it 
unlikely that there would be any substantial 
changes, however. In short, in the space of five 
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years, Labour had moved from a position in which it 
was a firm supporter of NATO, a British nuclear 
deterrent and strong conventional forces to one in 
which the commitment to NATO and conventional 
defence remained just as strong, but there was now 
an explicit commitment to introducing a system of 
non-nuclear defence. Not surprisingly, the policy 
was hailed by the peace movement as a significant 
advance, even if Labour's thinking on NATO, bases 
and 'offensive' conventional weaponry was still out 
of line with that of CND. Rather than highlighting 
these remaining differences, CND concentrated its 
efforts on trying to persuade Labour to actually 
campaign on its new policy. The Labour leader-
ship's apparent reluctance to give the new policy a 
high profile prompted the 1985 Conference to pass a 
resolution calling for a coordinated campaign in 
support of the defence policy. Kinnock's response 
was to re-launch Labour's. defence pol icy in the 
latter half of 1986, with a much greater stress on 
the desirability of boosting spending on conven-
tional defence. This did little to allay the fears 
of the Reagan administration, which argued that 
Labour's policy was unrealistic in that NATO 
members could not pick and choose which obligations 
they would observe and which they would reject. 
Indeed, there was evidence of bi-partisan opposi-
tion to Labour's policy in America, with leading 
Democrats such as Senator Nunn (Chairman of the 
Senate Armed .Services Committee) and Congressman 
Steven Solarz (Chairman of the House of Representa-
tives Foreign Relations sub-committee) publicly en-
dorsing this kind of criticism. 
Domestic electoral considerations may well 
have weighed heavier with Labour's leadership than 
pressure from a combination of isolationists and 
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budget-cutters in American politics, but Labour 
still faced agitation for a higher profile campaign 
on non-nuclear defence from constituency party and 
Labour CND activists. Labour went into the 1987 
election with a manifesto which stressed the 
party's commitment to NATO, but laid equal emphasis 
upon the commitments to cancel Trident, de-commis-
sion Polaris, 
Bri tain, and 
actions to 
remove American nuclear weapons from 
to use the money saved by these 
pay for improvements in Britain's 
conventional forces. Labour's campaigning on the 
issue during the 1987 election remained muted, 
however J most commentators were agreed that, at 
least to some extent, this was a deliberate tactic 
by the party's campaign managers. 
The Trade Union Movement 
Dissatisfaction over the way in which Labour 
played down its defence policy has been largely 
confined to the left in the party, particularly 
among the constituency organisations. The major 
trade unions appear more inclined to acquiesce in 
the leadership's strategy, and have in any case 
tended to opt for a somewhat softer pol icy stance 
on nuclear weapons in recent years. The T. U. C. 
passed a unilateralist resolution in 1981, and 
followed that in 1982 and 1983 with resolutions 
calling explicitly for the removal of all nuclear 
bases from the U.K. In 1984 and 1985, however, the 
T.U.C. merely reiterated its 
Trident and star Wars (and 
opposition to Cruise, 
its support for arms 
conversion programmes) with no mention being made 
of the removal of bases or the general principle of 
unilateralism. The importance of the unions in 
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Labour's conversion to non-nuclear defence (and, 
indeed, Labour's commitment to NATO) should not be 
underestimated, 
Trade Union CND, 
however. CND, and particularly 
may not have enjoyed much success 
in generating interest and activity for their cause 
at the shop-floor level in the trade union move-
ment, but they have been successful in persuading 
unions to adopt non-nuclear policy stances at the 
national level. Trade Union CND claimed that a 
majority of British trade unionists were affiliated 
to CND at a national level in 1985, with some 
twenty eight national trade unions formally 
associating themselves with CND( 44) • This commi t-
ment at the national policy-making level is 
signif icant, as it is this which has led union 
delegations to Labour Party Conferences to support 
and re-affirm Labour's non-nuclear stance. It may 
be stating the obvious to point out that Labour's 
new approach could not have happened without the 
support of major unions, given their dominant 
voting power at Labour's Conference. The point 
should be made , however, that without the efforts 
of major unions, particularly the Transport and 
General, CND's impact on the Labour Party's 
policies would have been substantially less. 
The Alliance 
If CND has cause to be pleased with the 
progress it has made with the Labour Movement, the 
same cannot be said of its efforts towards the 'new 
force I in British politics in the eighties, the 
Social Democratic/Liberal Alliance. As we have 
noted, the growing influence of the left in the 
Labour Party towards the end of the seventies 
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prompted the breakaway of the SDP~ and Labour's 
leftward drift in defence was one of the policy 
issues which the nascent SDP leadership found 
particularly unacceptable. It should come as no 
surprise, therefore, that the SDP has consistently 
rejected any endorsement of a unilateral leap to 
non-nuclear defence. Indeed, since the accession 
. 
of David Owen to the position of leader - and his 
subsequent strength up until the 1987 election as 
undoubted final arbiter of SDP policy - CND has 
effectively given up any real hope of persuading 
either Owen or his party to modify their position. 
Apart from continuing routine lobbying, and the 
efforts of a few individuals in the SDP, virtually 
all CND's efforts have been directed at the Liberal 
wing of the Alliance - especially since 1983. 
In a discussion document produced for its 
first ever Conference, the SDP set out its policy 
on defence in terms which have remained largely 
unchanged since then(45). Stressing the need for 
an internationalist approach to defence and foreign 
affairs, the party offered strong support for NATO 
and for multi-lateral disarmament. The need. for 
Britain to possess a nuclear deterrent for so long 
as the Soviet Union had a nuclear capability was 
emphasised, making it necessary for Polaris to be 
maintained. 
on grounds 
argued that 
tion of the 
Trident was condemned, however, partly 
of cost and partly because the SDP 
it represented an unnecessary escala-
arms race. The idea of a battlefield 
nuclear weapons-free zone in Europe was endorsed. 
By 1982, Owen was arguing that there was no need to 
decide yet on the question of what, if anything, 
should succeed the Polaris system when it became 
out-dated in the nineties. 'NATO's modernisation 
programme and the deployment of Cruise was sup-
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ported until or unless the Soviet Union was 
prepared to negotiate mutual reductions in interme-
diate nuclear forces. In short, with the exception 
of opposition to Trident, the SDP proposed a policy 
that was firmly committed to a nuclear NATO. It 
was At1anticist, in that it endorsed the continua-
tion of the Ang10-American defence relationship, 
but this was tempered with the argument that 
Britain and other European members should exercise 
more influence in NATO's decision-making. 
Liberal policy was not quite so clear cut, as 
there had consistently been a minority of Liberal 
Party grass-roots activists who if not fully 
persuaded of unilateralist argument were cer-
tainly sceptical about the merits of a new genera-
tion of nuclear weapons. The Liberal leadership, 
not bound by party rules to follow the wishes of 
the Party's mass membership in any case, was 
successful up until 1981 in keeping such doubts 
confined to a minority. Party policy in the 
seventies and into the eighties rested on an 
acceptance of NATO and a belief in mu1ti1atera1ism, 
although the Party has been opposed to any inde-
pendent British deterrent since 1957. Concern over 
NATO's modernisation programme, however, and 
perhaps some unease at the firm line that the SDP 
was developing on the nuclear issue, resulted in a 
notable set-back for the leadership at the 1981 
Liberal Assembly, which voted to oppose the 
deployment of Cruise. The Liberal leader,. David 
Steel, rejected this vote, arguing that he alone 
must have a final veto over party policy, and there 
was little support for the Assembly motion among 
Liberal MPs. 
The 
with a 
two parties went into 
joint manifesto(46). 
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the 1983 election 
Condemning the 
Conservatives for pursuing policies which would 
escalate the arms race, and Labour for advocating 
'one-sided' disarmament, the Alliance offered a 
middle course (even if they did describe it as a 
'radically different' alternative). Both parties 
could agree on the cancellation of Trident, and it 
was proposed that although Polaris should be 
maintained, it should also be included in su-
per-power disarmament negotiations. The Alliance's 
position on Cruise was undecided, the argument 
being that any decision on whether or not to oppose 
Cruise deployment would depend upon what progress 
had been made in disarmament talks and the attitude 
of other NATO members; in other words Liberal 
activists' desire. to see 
against Cruise deployment 
a manifesto commitment 
was frustrated. The 
Alliance did, however, call for some system of dual 
AnglO-American control over Cruise a system 
rejected by the Government as unnecessary and 
costly. Should disarmament talks fail, then the 
Alliance was prepared to consider the idea of a 
multilateral freeze on the production and deploy-
ment of all nuclear weapons - a rather different 
stance from those Liberal activists who favoured 
the unequivocal introduction of an immediate 
freeze. NATO participation was strongly endorsed, 
as was a strengthening of NATO's conventional 
forces. NATO strategy caused some disagreement, 
Liberals favouring a policy of 'no first use' of 
nuclear weapons and the SDP a policy of 'no early 
use'; a compromise was reached by proposing in the 
manifesto that NATO should 'move towards' a no 
first use policy. The idea of a battlefield 
nuclear weapons-free zone in Europe was again 
proposed, as were proposals to ban chemical weapons 
and to work for a comprehensive test ban. 
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Apart from the insistence on cancelling 
Trident, the Alliance approach was set firmly in 
the mul tilateralist camp. Partly, of course, this 
stemmed from sincere doubts about the wisdom of 
unilateral acts, but it also served to allow the 
Alliance to blur differences between its two 
parties. Diff icul t decisions on both Cruise 
deployment and a Polaris replacement were deferred 
pending negotiations between and with other states. 
Whilst this may be a perfectly defensible policy 
stance in itself, there is little doubt that, under 
scrutiny, it could have proved a fragile foundation 
for Alliance unity on defence. One may only 
speculate, but if the media had not been preoccu-
pied with Labour's divisions over defence, then the 
suspicions of Liberal activists that the SDP 
leadership was determined to retain a modern 
nuclear capability at almost any cost might have 
received more exposure and discussion. As it was, 
apart from some interest in the concept of a 
dual-key control system for Cruise, the Alliance 
kept a generally low-profile on its defence policy 
during the election campaign. 
David Steel's problems with his extra-Parlia-
mentary party continued after the election. The 
Liberal Assembly in 1984 voted once again against 
Cruise, but this time in unequivocal terms, calling 
for the removal forthwith of those missiles already 
deployed in the U. K. This was despite a plea by 
David Steel, unprecedented in the party's history 
because it was delivered from the rostrum of the 
Conference rather than the platform, for the 
Assembly to settle instead for a freeze on further 
deployment and thus (implicitly) leaving those 
already deployed in place - a policy with which the 
SDP could agree. Although Anti-Cruise activists in 
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the Liberal rank and file were delighted with this 
vote, it was a narrow victory (611 votes to 556) 
and was secured only at the price of a compromise 
over Polaris. In an effort to secure support for 
their anti-Cruise motion, Liberal activists 
(including Liberal CND) gave their support to a 
motion which reversed the policy on Polaris. Rather 
than pronouncing against the very idea of an 
independent British deterrent, as the Liberal 
Assembly had in 1980, the 1984 Assembly voted to 
maintain Polaris but to include it in arms control 
negotiations. This was clearly designed to give 
David Steel some room for manoeuvre in his negotia-
tions with the SDP, who were much keener than the 
Liberals on replacing Polaris with some (cheaper) 
alternative to Trident. The Assembly reaffirmed the 
Liberals' commitment to a 'no first use' policy for 
NATO, however, and called for NATO to develop an 
'effecti ve non-nuclear, non-provocative system of 
defence'. 
Some in the peace movement hailed the Assembly 
decisions as representing a Liberal commitment to 
an essentially non-nuclear defence policy, but 
there was a general realisation that much of this 
policy would have to be modified if agreement on a 
common stance was to be concluded with the SDP. The 
two parties established a joint commission to 
examine defence policy, albeit 'in the context of 
Britain's membership of NATO and the European 
Community",' although there was little danger of 
either party subscribing to the idea of withdrawal 
from NATO. During 1985, while the joint commission 
was still considering the issue, the Liberals moved 
away from their 1984 stance and closer to the SDP. 
At the 1985 SDP Conference, Paddy Ashdown - the 
Liberal MP who had spearheaded the anti-Cruise 
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campaign a year 
horror and fury of 
earlier backtracked~ to the 
the anti-Cruise activists in the 
Liberal Party who had so admired his stance in 
1984. In 1985, however, Ashdown argued for the 
compromise his leader had attempted to get the 
party to accept the previous year - a freeze on 
further deployment, but no removal of those mis-
siles already in place. The issue was not debated 
at the Liberal Assembly that year (which restrict-
ed itself to a rejection of the Star Wars pro-
gramme), but it was hoped by the Liberals that 
this compromise by their party would be matched by 
a similar concession from the SDP. In the event, 
the 1985 SDP conference did move closer to the 
Liberals over the idea of a freeze on the develop-
ment and deployment of nuclear weapons. However, 
whereas Steel favoured an immediate freeze, the 
SOP's commitment to a freeze was dependent upon 
progress in arms control negotiations the SDP 
favouring a freeze only if the arms talks failed. 
To the extent that the two parties differed on 
defence and they agreed on much, including 
opposition to Trident and support for NATO - any 
significant movement towards compromise came from 
the Liberals rather than their partners. David 
Owen made no secret of his own attitude when he 
suggested in 1985 that it would be desirable to 
limit the number of Alliance candidates in the 
next general election who supported CND( 47) • He 
also began to discuss more frequently and publicly 
the possibility of a 'Euro-deterrent' - coopera-
tion between Britain and France to produce a 
successor or alternative to Polaris. Meanwhile, 
Nevi11e pres1ey, one of the SDP's founder members 
and also a member of CND, was elected to CND's 
National Council and subsequently removed from the 
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SOP's list of approved parliamentary candidates. 
The joint commission on defence reported its 
conclusions in 1986(48). The report contained few 
surprises, although it confirmed the fears of 
Liberal unilateralists by reiterating the argument 
that Polaris should be maintained and a decision on 
whether or not to replace it be deferred. As 
expected, the cancellation of Trident was endorsed. 
On Cruise, the commission favoured multi-lateral 
negotiation to remove all intermediate missiles 
from Europe, but was prepared to advocate a British 
ini tiative for a freeze on further deployment by 
the West - those in place, however, should remain 
because of the need for Br i ta in to be seen to be 
playing a responsible role in NATO. On specifics 
the commission tended towards the SOP's position 
-endorsement of a battlefield nuclear weapons-free 
zone in Europe but not of a 'no first use' policy 
for NATO, for example, as well as the basic 
position on Cruise and Trident. Liberal interna-
tionalism was reflected in the commission's vision 
of a Europe free of the, traditional East/West 
confrontation. Indeed, the report adopted a Euro-
pean perspective throughout; Polaris was conceptua-
l ised as a 'European contribution' to NATO, and 
much· was made of the need to develop European 
. cooperation in NATO to counterbalance American 
influence. The commission believed that this would 
be welcomed by the United States as evidence that 
Europe was willing to play a more active part in 
western defence. 
The European perspective took on an unexpected 
importance after the publication of the commis-
sion's report. To the surprise of some (although 
not Liberal CND activists), David Owen publicly 
rejected the report's recommendation that a 
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decision on a Polaris replacement be left open. 
Owen's initial reaction was to argue that the 
Alliance - or, if necessary, the SDP alone - should 
enter into a clear commitment to replace Polaris, 
albeit with some alternative to Trident. This was 
despite the fact that the commission's position on 
Polaris was virtually identical to that adopted by 
Owen during the early sixties. David steel, already 
faced with a substantial body of opinion among his 
own party activists who favoured no replacement at 
all for Polaris and who favoured the removal of 
Cruise rather than freezing it in place, made it 
clear that he was less than pleased with Owen' s 
reaction. The two leaders, realising the potential 
for a serious rift in the Alliance over the issue, 
attempted to compromise by way of exploring further 
Owen's preoccupation with the development of a 
European deterrent. Owen and Steel held talks with 
French government ministers and opposition leaders 
in September 1986. They returned and reported that 
the French responses to the prospect of Anglo-
French nuclear cooperation had ranged from cautious 
acceptance to enthusiastic endorsement, but that 
none of the leading French politicians actually 
rejected the idea(49). Such ideas are clearly only 
at an exploratory stage, but the political signifi-
cance of the move was that it allowed Steel and 
Owen to pull back from a position in which the 
Liberals would move towards rejecting any replace-
ment for Polaris and the SDP would commit itself to 
a 'British deterrent based on Cruise. Talk of 
Anglo-French cooperation offered the SDP the 
prospect of a continuing nuclear deterrent, whilst 
it circumvented Liberal resistance to an 'independ-
ent' British deterrent and appealed to the party's 
287 
long history of commitment to further European 
cooperation. 
This did not deflect another embarrassment for 
Steel at the 1986 Liberal Assembly. Steel could 
have pursued the compromise course of seeking 
endorsement for the joint commission report. 
Instead, he opted for the more challenging task of 
trying to get support for the idea of an Anglo-
French nuclear deterrent. This was opposed not 
only by Liberal CND and Liberal activists from the 
constituencies (especially London), but also by 
three Liberal M.P.s (Meadowcroft, Kirkwood and 
Hughes). This opposition just won the day, 
although only 1300 of the 2000 registered for the 
Assembly were present when the vote was taken. 
The Anglo-French initiative was not given much 
pUblicity by the Alliance during the 1987 election, 
when most of their effort went into attacking the 
other parties' defence policy, particularly that of 
Labour. David Owen repeatedly emphasised that 
defence was the crucial issue differentiating the 
Alliance from Labour, and castigated what he saw as 
the fundamental irresponsibility of Labour's 
unilateralist stance. The Alliance manifesto 
stated unequivocally that although Trident would be 
cancelled it would be replaced by a 'minimum 
British deterrent' unless multilateral negotiations 
on a global scale progressed to such a stage that 
Bri tain' s deterrent could be dispensed with. 
Although Owen took the leading role in stressing 
the defence issue (more and more as the election 
campaign went on and the Alliance slipped back in 
the opinion polls), there was little sign of any 
serious dissent from the Liberals. This only 
emerged after the election, when the Alliance 
parties engaged in discussion and at times bitter 
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argument over whether they should merge into a 
single body. At the time of writing, such a merger 
seems likely, which has prompted Owen to resign as 
leader of the SDP. He cites Liberal party thinking 
on nuclear weapons as a crucial factor in his 
opposition to any merger. 
The 'Minor' Parties 
If the Alliance's position on Polaris and 
Cruise is somewhat equivocal, the same cannot be 
said of the other contender for the role of 
'mould-breaker' in British politics, the Green 
Party. Al though very much a minority party in 
electoral terms, and numbering only some 6,000 
members in the mid-eighties, the Green Party has 
seen all the other major parties adapt their 
programmes to include more 'green' policies, so it 
is not without influence. Its position on nuclear 
weapons is - and always has been - unequivocal. Its 
1983 election manifesto set out the party's 
position with admirable brevity: 
Let's start with the basics. No Cruise. No 
trident. No Polaris. No nuclear 
any description. No chemical or 
weapons of 
biological 
weapons. No American bases. No involvement in 
NATO. 50) 
and these commitments were reiterated in the 1987 
general election.The Green Party does not stop at 
this comprehensive rejection of nuclear weapons, 
however, but is concerned to put the whole issue in 
a wider perspective. For the Greens, a non-nuclear 
defence policy is just one aspect of their approach 
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to defence and foreign relations. Nonalignment~ for 
example, is also endorsed: 
We need to adopt a defence posture which is 
neutral as regards both superpowers, and to 
distance ourselves from those who continue to 
promote the 'Cold War'. mentality. We should 
encourage other European countries to join 
with us in securing the removal of soviet and 
American military personnel and equipment from 
Europe, with a view to establishing a genu-
inely defensive, non-nuclear, non-aligned 
European Alliance, incorporating countries in 
both Eastern and Western Europe.(SI) 
Nuclear weapons, the arms race and the cold war all 
have their roots in the systematised exploitation 
and oppression which characterises our industrial 
society, according to the Greens, and they argue 
that only by changing basic assumptions about 
economic growth, materialism and our relationship 
wi th the Third World will the way to peace, as 
distinct from mere disarmament, become possible. 
Although they acknowledge a need for defensive 
conventional weaponry, the hope is expressed that 
even this need could be progressively diminished 
over time. In short, the Green party is in 
complete agreement with all of CND's aims, and 
indeed takes many of the issues further than CND. 
It's main argument with CND is not so much over 
what CND does as what it doesn't do. We have 
already 
for CND 
noted persistent pressure from the Greens 
to include opposition to nuclear energy in 
its constitution; Greens have also been among the 
most vociferous in encouraging CND to develop 
campaigns against the infringement of civil 
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liberties, and make frequent if abortive attempts 
to persuade CND to radically decentralise its own 
organisation and decision-making structure. 
The Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru 
are similarly in virtually total agreement with 
CND. Both espouse unilateral nuclear disarmament 
and withdrawal from NATO, for their respective 
countries, even though both have minority factions 
who would not priori tise withdrawal from NATO or 
would even oppose it. Prior to 1981, the SNP 
envisaged a non-nuclear Scotland remaining in NATO, 
but the direction of NATO strategy and its moderni-
sation programme have convinced the party to opt 
for straight withdrawal since then. The SNP is 
particularly opposed to Trident and the American 
bases in Scotland. The Communist Party of Great 
Britain also propounds a defence policy which is in 
accord with CND's aims, as it proposes non-nuclear 
defence and withdrawal from NATO. The internal 
splits in the CPGB during the eighties, between the 
traditionalists and the Euro-Communists, have been 
reflected in debates within CND (the traditional-
ists shunning CND's criticism of Soviet nuclear 
weapons, as they see them as purely defensive), but 
this internal disagreement has not affected the 
basic non-nuclear, non-NATO policy stance of the 
party. 
CND's Impact outside the Parties 
Given that a change in public policy is CND's 
ultimate goal, the Campaign's principal targets are 
naturally those institutions which have a direct 
input into the political system - the parties and 
the electorate. Other institutions in Britain's 
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political and social system are important to CND, 
however 1 for example, trade unions may have been 
frozen out of consultative status by the Thatcher 
administrations, but CND's campaigning in the 
Labour Party and over civil defence and nuclear-
free zones would be severely hampered without trade 
union support. Similarly, the Church has always 
been a significant institution for the Campaign. 
This is not because of any direct input it has into 
the political system (via the House of Lords,for 
example), but because of a combination of the 
nature of CND's message and the Church's position 
in British society. 
CND and the Churches 
The moral dimension is rarely absent from any 
of CND's activities, whether in the realm of 
protest or persuasion. It is possible to find 
those in the Campaign whose motivation and perspec-
tive is totally moral and un impeded by any consid-
eration of a pragmatic or political nature, but it 
is very rare to find arguments for unilateralism 
emanating from any part of the movement which do 
not make at least a passing reference to the moral 
dimension. A moral dimension is a necessary, if 
not usually sufficient, element in CND's campaign-
ing. The Churches in Britain may have become less 
salient in British public life, and less likely to 
be seen as the authoritative source of moral 
judgementl but they are still powerful contributors 
to any national debate on moral issues, and thus an 
important potential ally for any campaign wi th a 
moral dimension. The Churches, and especially the 
established Church of England, cannot dictate to 
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the political parties on moral issues as they could 
a century ago, but they still cannot be entirely 
discounted or ignored. 
Perhaps because the larger Churches are aware 
that they are not without influence, their posi-
tions on the questions of nuclear weapons and 
unilateralism tend to be more guarded than those of 
the smaller denominations. The non-established 
churches in Britain have moved towards stances 
which are broadly in line with that of CND. The 
Methodist Church is opposed to the deployment of 
Cruise and the acquisition of Trident: it favours a 
freeze on the development and deployment of any new 
weapons, and is opposed to the use (as distinct 
from possession) of nuclear weapons in any circum-
stances. The United Reform Church and the Church of 
Scotland favour unilateral nuclear disarmament by 
Britain: the Baptist church is also unilateralist, 
and does not accept that the phasing out of nuclear 
weapons requires any compensatory increase in 
conventional weaponry. The Quakers are, of course, 
completely opposed to nuclear weapons and have 
formed a small but stalwart contingent within CND 
since the fifties. The larger Churches are. more 
ambivalent on the matter however. The Roman 
Catholic Church has criticised the deployment of 
Cruise and argued in general terms that the use of 
nuclear weapons is wrong, but it has been 
ously silent on many of the specific 
conspicu-
political 
developments in this area, preferring to keep its 
judgments on a very general level. Unlike the other 
churches under consideration here, the Catholic 
Church is of course adopting a global rather than 
localised perspective on the issue, and thus feels 
constrained from adopting a high profile in the 
British debate. Despite intermittent criticism, 
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however, it continued to grant leave of absence to 
Monsignor Bruce Kent to allow him to work for the 
Campaign, before he himself decided to devote all 
his energies to the Campaign. 
The Church of England has become involved with 
specific issues in the mid-eighties, notably the 
controversy over the sale of Church land at 
Molesworth. It was in the early eighties, however, 
that it became embroiled in debate over the general 
issues raised by nuclear weapons. This debate was 
initiated by the 1979 General Synod of the Church 
of England, which commissioned its Board for Social 
Responsibility to establish a working party to 
examine the question of the Church's attitude 
towards nuclear weapons. The working party, 
chaired by the Bishop of Salisbury, produced its 
report in 1982(52). It examined the question from 
the perspective of theological thinking on the 
concept of a 'just war' - briefly, that war for a 
just cause, with a right intention, declared by 
lawful authority as a last resort, and fought 
within certain moral limitations, could be morally 
justified. Their report pointed to the inevitabil-
ity of widespread civilian casualties in any 
nuclear exchange, and argued that such indiscrimi-
nate killing contravened the moral 1 imi tat ions of 
any 'just' war. (It should be remembered that this 
argument was made before the concept of a 'nuclear 
winter'- the inevitability of a nuclear exchange 
wreaking havoc with climate and ecological balance 
on a virtually global scale - became widely known). 
They concluded that 
it is in our view proven beyond all reasonable 
doubt that the Just War Theory, as this has 
developed in Western civilisation and within 
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the Christian Church, rules out the use of 
nuclear weapons.(53) 
This rejection of use (and thus, implicitly, 
of any 'first use') of nuclear weapons was not 
unexpected. More controversially, the working party 
took its analysis further, arguing that not only 
use but also possession of nuclear weapons was 
wrong - in other words, that deterrence could not 
be justified on moral grounds, because deterrence 
implied a willingness (however conditional) to use 
nuclear weapons. Therefore, the working party 
concluded, Britain should adopt a policy of 
unilateral nuclear disarmament, phasing out 
existing weapons, cancelling new ones and removing 
American nuclear bases from the U.K. They recom-
mended, however, that Britain should remain a 
member of NATO, and that it was unrealistic to 
expect the superpowers to get rid of their nuclear 
capability in the short-term. Nevertheless, British 
unilateralism was seen as not only morally correct, 
but also a useful impetus to multilateral disarma-
ment between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. 
The report attracted considerable pUblicity in 
the media, and was seized upon by the peace 
movement as a significant validation of their 
arguments. When the report was presented to the 
General Synod, however, it attracted some heated 
criticism, unilateralism being associated with the 
evasion of moral responsibility to prevent war if 
possible. More restrained criticism pointed to the 
apparent inconsistency of unilateral nuclear 
disarmament and continued membership of NATO. The 
Archbishop of Canterbury argued that unilateralism 
could destabilise NATO and thus impede progress 
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towards global multilateral disarmament. In the 
event, the Synod rejected the working party's 
proposals by 338 votes to 100. A compromise policy 
advanced by the Bishop of Birmingham was accepted 
by 275 votes to 222; this opposed any first use of 
nuclear weapons, but accepted that possession of a 
nuclear deterrent was necessary, particularly in 
the light of potential nuclear blackmail. This 
remains the position of the Church of England, as 
the issue has only been discussed by the General 
Synod on one occasion since, when a motion to the 
1985 Synod on Cruise was talked out before a 
decision could be reached. The eruption of the 
nuclear disarmament issue into the forefront of 
party politics in Britain in the eighties has 
presumably discouraged the established Church from 
becoming too closely involved in the specifics of 
the debate. 
CND and Public Opinion 
Whatever its impact on institutions, the 
Campaign is convinced of the necessity of reinforc-
ing this by creating a broad cross-section of 
public opinion in its favour. Its experiences in 
the sixties have persuaded CND that the actual 
implementation of nuclear disarmament is unlikely 
to come about unless such support exists and is 
expressed, both through the political institutions 
and outside them. In the early days of its 'second 
phase' CND had reason to be. pleased with the impact 
it was making, with up to a third of respondents in 
public opinion polls favouring unilateral nuclear 
disarmament by 1981. The 1983 election, however, 
saw a dramatic down-turn in the popularity of the 
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Campaign's message. In 
polling data, Ivor Crewe 
an overview of national 
has charted the rise and 
fall of the unilateralist message during the early 
eighties (54) • He makes the point that one very 
significant achievement by CND and other peace 
campaigners was to put the issue firmly on the 
poli tical agenda; from barely registering in the 
public's consciousness since the early sixties, 
defence and foreign affairs rocketed in the early 
eighties to the point where it was the second most 
important issue in the 1983 election. However, 
whilst support nationally for unilateral disarma-
ment rose to a high of around 33 per cent during 
1981, it dropped to just over 20 per cent by 1983, 
and went down to around 16 per cent during the 1983 
election campaign. Similarly, although in 1982 no 
less than 42 per cent thought that having American 
missiles based in Britain increased the ~hances of 
a nuclear attack on the U.K. (as against 29 per 
cent who thought they provided greater protection), 
the 1983 election campaign saw supporters of cruise 
outnumbering opponents - and this shift, moreover, 
occurred throughout the electorate, not just among 
Conservative supporters responding to calls for 
party unity. Examining Labour voters during the 
eighties, Crewe notes that support for nuclear 
disarmament has ranged between 30 per cent and 40 
per cent, never reaching a majority. By .the 1983 
election, even among those who stayed loyal to 
Labour, unilateralism was rejected by 59 per cent 
to 33 per cent (comparative figures for Conserva-
tive votes being 92 per cent to 5 per cent, for 
Alliance voters 82 per cent to 14 per cent) - Crewe 
notes, 
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those sticking with Labour did so despite 
Labour's defence policy: those deserting 
Labour did so, at least partly, because of the 
policy. 
On the issue of leaving NATO, Crewe argues that 
this has never been popular with the British 
electorate, and became even less so by 1983; in 
1981, around 10 per cent were in favour of leaving 
NATO, but during the 1983 election campaign this 
dropped to only 6 per cent. Interestingly, 
however ,Crewe discerns some unease among the 
British electorate about defence links with America 
not because the British people think America 
cannot be relied upon in times of crisis, but 
because there is a feeling that America shows a 
'reckless abundance' of will to get involved. As 
Crewe puts it, 'the United States is a dependable 
defender of Britain, but also a reason why Britain 
needs defending'. 
In general terms, the 1983 election marked a 
watershed in British public opinion about unilater-
alism and existing defence policy. Crewe's summary 
is as follows -
The 1983 election campaign decisively shifted 
opinion, among supporters of all the parties, 
towards positions favourable to NATO and the 
Atlantic Alliance. The relatively favourable 
impact of the unilateralist anti-cruise 
missile demonstrations in early 1983 was 
obliterated by the campaigns of the Conserva-
tive government and the Alliance during the 
election. The specific issues of Cruise 
missiles and Trident were smothered by the 
general question of whether Britain should 
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have 'strong' or 'weak' defences; which came 
to be synonymous with 'nuclear' and 'non-
nuclear'; that question was resolved by the 
uni ty and conviction of the pro-nuclear 
parties, in contrast to the confusion and 
divisions within the Labour party. (55) 
There is some consolation for CND in this conclud-
ing comment. 
inability to 
Crewe seems convinced 
unite around its 
tha t Labour's 
unilateralist 
manifesto was a most significant factor. Labour's 
leader, Michael Foot, lacked credibility as a 
potential Prime Minister, and this may well have 
diminished the appeal of the unilateralist cause, 
with which he has always been closely identified. 
There is little evidence of bitterness among the 
national membership over Labour's performance in 
the election, however. In the 1985 survey, 
respondents were given an open-ended question 
asking them what lessons (if any) they thought CND 
should learn from the 1983 election. Only just 
over half of respondents gave an answer to this, 
and, of those that did, only some 15 per cent (8 
per cent of all respondents) suggested that CND 
should in future distance itself more from the 
Labour party - while 13 per cent thought that even 
closer links should be establ ished. A third of 
those answering this question thought that the only 
lesson to be learnt was that CND improve the 
presentation of its arguments rather than change 
them, and a further 25 per cent that the only moral 
to be drawn from the 1983 election was to work 
harder in the future. 
Crewe offers some evidence of public sympathy 
for CND and its allies. During 1983, some 25 per 
cent approved not only of the objectives of the 
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peace movement, but 
per cent approved 
also its tacticsl a 
of the objectives, 
further 25 
but were 
sceptical of the methods employed (demonstrations 
and peace camps like Greenham Common figuring 
largely in the public's conception of the peace 
movement) and would not participate. Some 40 per 
cent disapproved of both tactics and objectives, 
and 10 per cent did not have any opinion - as Crewe 
comments, 'that the later figure is so small is 
testimony to the impact of the peace movement'. 
Two further points of interest emerge from 
Crewe's account of public opinion. Firstly, having 
disaggregated the data to look for attitudinal 
differences among different social groups, Crewe 
found that sex, age and class made for virtually no 
significant differences in opinions on nuclear and 
defence issues. The one significant differentiator 
was education 1 on the basis of~dmittedly limited 
data, Crewe argues that the better educated (i.e. 
university graduates) are the best informed about 
nuclear and defence issues, the most apprehensive 
and the most likely to take an anti-nuclear 
position. This factor is reflected in the 1985 
survey of CND's national membership. Secondly, and 
more disconcertingly for the peace movement, Crewe 
detects a resigned indifference to nuclear weapons 
already in place, but unease about accepting new 
weapons. He argues that this accounts for the rise 
in unilateralist opinion in the early eighties, but 
infers that the 1983 election marked the acceptance 
by most of the British public of the inevitability 
of a new generation of weapons particularly 
Cruise. Discussing the 1983 election, he concludes 
that 'except for the shouting (literally), the 
issue of Cruise missiles had effectively been 
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killed in Britain, even before the weapons were 
installed. 
Since 1983, there has been some restoration of 
support among the public for CND's arguments. 
Indeed, by 1986 there was some evidence to suggest 
that support for unilateralism was surpassing even 
the levels set in the early eighties, but it still 
fell short of a majority. The 1985 report on 
Bri tish Social Attitudes (based on 1984 data) (56) 
found that support for unilateral nuclear disarma-
ment had risen to 23 per cent, compared with 19 per 
cent in the previous year's survey. 57 per cent of 
those favouring unilateralism were Labour support-
ers, but just over half of all Labour supporters 
thought that Britain should only pursue a multi-
lateralist path to disarmament. A Gallup poll in 
1986, however, (commissioned by CND) recorded 44 
per cent in favour of unilateralism, and a NOP poll 
taken earlier in 1986 also produced some 42 per 
cent responding positively to the idea of unilater-
alism(S7). There has been a similar, although less 
dramatic increase in opposition to the siting of 
American missiles in Britain: the 1985 Social 
Attitudes report found 51 per cent who considered 
that such missiles made Britain less safe, compared 
with 48 per cent the year before. As far as 
'British' missiles were concerned, however, 56 per 
cent thought that they made Britain a safer place, 
although this did represent a slight drop from the 
preceding year. Membership of NATO has remained 
consistently popular, with 79 per cent backing it 
in the 1985 report - even among Labour voters, 70 
per cent favoured continuing membership. Suspicion 
or apprehension about the United States defence 
policy remains, however; the Social Attitudes 
report found that 53 per cent thought that 
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Britain's interests would be better served by 
developing closer links with Western Europe, whilst 
only 21 per cent thought closer links with America 
would serve this purpose. No less than 54 per cent 
thought that the United States represented just as 
much of a threat to world peace as the Soviet Union 
- as the 1985 report comments, 
given that the United States is a close ally 
of Britain and shares a common language, 
common institutions and a similar culture, 
these attitudes are quite remarkable.(58) 
It should also be remembered that this data was 
gathered prior to the American action in Libya in 
1986. 
unilateral de-commissioning of British nuclear 
weapons still failed to find majority support among 
the electorate however, and this was confirmed by 
the 1987 election. In his analysis of the results, 
Crewe noted that defence was one of the issues 
which swung voters away from Labour, and that this 
disadvantage outweighed the advantages Labour held 
on the issues of health, education and employment. 
Slightly fewer people nominated defence as one of 
the most important influences on their voting 
choice, but, among the 35 per cent who did, Labour 
lagged behind the Conservatives by an even greater 
majority than it had in 1983.(59) 
CND and the Media 
The Campaign's impact on public opinion is, of 
course, influenced by the extent and type of 
coverage that the media devotes to the subject. CND 
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faces two obstacles in this respect: most of 
Britain's national newspapers subscribe to a 
political orientation which is inimical to the idea 
of unilateral nuclear disarmament, and po1icy-
makers in British television are wary of giving 
exposure to viewpoints which will render them open 
to charges of bias and 'imbalance'. It was 
apprehension over this latter point which in part 
prompted the BBC to firstly decline to transmit an 
Open University 'Open Lecture' in 1980 by Professor 
Michae1 Pentz, a leading member of the Campaign; 
and secondly, amid considerable public controversy, 
to withdraw its invitation to E.P. Thompson to 
deliver the 1981 Dimb1eby Lectures. When Channel 
Four found that a series around the nuclear theme 
scheduled for transmission in. May 1983 was to 
coincide with the election campaign, it quickly 
arranged for the mu1ti1atera1ist argument to be put 
in a series of 'Opinion' slots to evade any 
suggestion of advocating pro-unilateralist views. 
(Similar apprehensions lay behind the BBC's refusal 
to transmit The War Game until some twenty years 
after it was made.) The impact of the peace 
movement in the early eighties, however, was such 
that television could no longer ignore the nuclear 
issue, and several major documentaries were shown 
in 1984(60). 
One reason for this greater will ingness to 
broach a formerly 'taboo' area was the salience the 
nuclear issue had attained during the 1983 e1ec-
tion. Another was the exposure peace campaigners 
had received on news programmes. CND's marches and 
demonstrations, and the action of the Greenham 
women, all received wide coverage during 1982 and 
1983, although this decreased dramatically after 
the election and has remained at a much lower level 
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since. Television news pictures can have an 
appreciable impact on public attitudes the 
Vietnam War and Ethiopian famine being classic 
examples but television news coverage of the 
peace movement tended to concentrate on what had 
happened rather than why it happened. As part of a 
lengthy study of media coverage of defence-related 
issues, 'the Glasgow University Media Group examined 
television news coverage of CND demonstrations and 
commented -
Demonstrations are in themselves ritualised 
events, expressions of the deep feelings which 
thousands of people have about the nuclear 
issue deep enough to make them want to 
identify with the movement. However, it is 
not an obvious vehicle for the expression of 
rational argument, especially if coverage of 
the speeches is restricted. It becomes easy 
for opponents to depict this as an emotional 
movement rather than as a reasoned opposition 
containing people who are at best well meaning 
but naive, and at worst subversives playing on 
the fears of the population. If coverage of 
CND tends to be restricted to such occasions 
as television news, 
as Bruce Kent's 
along with incidents such 
address to the British 
Communist Party or his supposed difficulties 
with his Church or with Cardinal Hume, then 
the central argument of the peace movement, 
that the system of deterrence is unstable and 
precarious, is unlikely to be articulated 
consistently and clearly in any regular 
way. (61) 
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The Glasgow group cite many instances in which 
television appears to ignore the underlying reasons 
for actions in favour of concentration on person-
alities. In their defence, television news produc-
ers could presumably plead extreme scarcity of time 
on news programmes for individual items. This is 
not a defence the national press could make, but in 
general they have been even more prone to sensa-
tionalism and trivialise the activities of the 
peace movement. Only TiHil-GuariHan, The Morning Star 
and, to a lesser extent, The-Observer have devoted 
anything resembling regular coverage to:! CND's 
activities and the reasons for them. It is inter-
esting to note in this context that, when ques-
tioned in the 1985 survey about their main sources 
of information about nuclear weapons and disarma-
ment, no less than a quarter of respondents singled 
out The -Guardian. (62) It was noticeable during 
1986 and 1987 (including the general election 
period) that even The Guardian ceased to offer much 
coverage of the Campaign's activities. Although 
the tone has varied, the rest of Britain's national 
press (that is, in circulation terms, the vast 
majority) have made little or no effort to explain 
the peace movement's arguments, have consistently 
attributed virtually all forms of campaigning to 
CND regardless of whether the Campaign was actually 
involved or not (the Greenham Women are invariably 
presented as part of CND's campaign, for example) 
and has usually availed itself of any opportunity 
to highlight the more bizarre or unconventional 
side of campaigning while giving 
to the actual arguments which 
paigning. 
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a very low profile 
inspire that cam-
Conclusions 
It is impossible to pronounce with certainty 
about the impact of CND upon Britain's parties and 
electorate, because its campaigning has been only 
one of a number of factors affecting the way in 
which opinions have formed on the nuclear issue in 
the eighties. International developments, the 
changing policies of other countries and interna-
tional organisations, and intra-party and group 
disagreements over other issues have all contrib-
uted to thinking on the issue as well. It is just 
as impossible, however, to deny that the Campaign 
has had some effect. Given the electoral uncer-
tainties of unilateralism, it is hard to conceive 
of the labour movement making the fundamental shift 
away from a nuclear-based defence policy without 
the persistent lobbying and persuasion that CND has 
mounted. Similarly, had it not been for the 
organisation of protest acti vi ty by the Campaign 
and its allies, it is unlikely that unilateralism 
would have assumed the status of being one of the 
essential credentials of the left in British 
politics in the eighties. 
As we noted in Chapter One, CND is seek ing 
changes in public policy which can only come about 
through parties and governments being convinced of 
the case for unilateralism. Arguably the only 
impact the Campaign has had on the Conservative 
governments of the eighties has been to harden 
their pro-nuclear attitudes. Perceiving the need 
to counter the unilateralist message, the Conserva-
tives have spelt out much more clearly than they 
did in the seventies their view that the nuclear 
deterrent has not only kept the peace in Europe 
since 1945, but is the only realistic means of 
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averting the threat of 'nuclear blackmail' in the 
future. Similarly, the SDP has fastened upon the 
nuclear issue as a key element in its strategy of 
presenting itself as a more 'responsible' party 
than the Labour Party and indeed - especially in 
the aftermath of the 1987 election - than their 
erstwhile partners, the Liberals. As with the 
Conservatives, support for some kind of nuclear 
capability was to all intents and purposes effec-
tively non-negotiable for the SDP, at least as long 
as it was led by David Owen. 
As the time of writing, the future of the 
Alliance is uncertain, as the SDP and the Liberals 
try to decide whether and how to merge. If such a 
merger were to take place, and if the Liberals were 
to become the dominant force in the 'new' party, 
then CND would certainly be encouraged by its past 
successes with the Liberal Party to continue trying 
to persuade them. The Liberal Party in 1987 is far 
from being wholly persuaded by the Campaign's 
arguments, its only concrete commitments being to 
cancel Trident and to seek, via multi-lateral 
agreement, the removal of Cruise. The important 
change, however, is that there is now a minority of 
Liberal activists who are prepared to argue the 
case for full unilateral disarmament, and who at> 
least receive a hearing from the leadership. David 
Steel's own attitude may be one of opposition to 
unilateralism, but there is a distinct possibility 
that were he to be succeeded by, for example, Paddy 
Ashdown, then the party as a whole might well move 
closer to CND's position although Ashdown's 
record suggests that it is unlikely that the 
Liberals will adopt a non-nuclear defence policy 
without real progress being made on a multilateral 
basis. 
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It is; of course, within the Labour and trade 
union movement that CND has seen the major changes 
take place. Al though still differing on the 
questions of conventional weaponry and membership 
of NATO, Labour and some of Britain's major trade 
unions have now adopted policies and broadly 
stuck by those policies during two difficult 
elections which are very similar to those 
advocated by the Campaign. It must be said that at 
least some of the credit for this belongs to those 
who were active in the first wave of CND's activity 
in the fifties and sixties. Although the Campaign 
has managed to attract the support of many grass-
roots activists in the Labour Party, there is very 
little evidence that such attitudes are shared by 
many of the 'ordinary' members of trade unions; it 
is their leaders who have been convinced, and many 
of them seem to have been converted to the uni-
lateralist cause early in their political lives 
rather than in the eighties. However, whatever the 
cause, the major institutions on the left in 
British politics are now set upon the non-nuclear 
path, and seem unlikely to deviate from that, at 
least while they remain in opposition. 
Whether a future Labour government (or even 
some form of Labour/Liberal coalition) would 
actually implement a non-nuclear policy once in 
power is questionable, given Labour's past record. 
CND itself is well aware of this, and consistently 
maintains that whilst it is necessary to persuade 
parties of its case, it is not sufficient, and must 
be backed up by real impact upon other social 
institutions and public opinion as well. One 
problem for the Campaign has been that, as parties 
have adopted clear-cut attitudes, so the nuclear 
issue has taken on a partisan dimension which has 
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led other institutions to draw back. It is 
noticeable that the major churches have become much 
more circumspect now that the nuclear issue is so 
obviously one which polarises the major parties. 
Much the same can be said of the electronic media, 
whilst· at the other extreme most of the national 
press has been even more forthright in its repudia-
tion of the Campaign and its message once it was 
clear that the left was committed to the idea. The 
net effect of this upon public opinion is hard to 
assess unless one is prepared to place considerable 
faith in public opinion surveys, which - generally 
speaking - suggest a minority in favour of British 
unilateral nuclear disarmament, but something close 
to a narrow majority in favour of ejecting American 
nuclear weaponry from Britain. 
On the other hand, the exact state of public 
opinion is perhaps of secondary importance, in that 
what really matters is that the issue is discussed 
at all in contemporary British politics. Govern-
ments can no longer assume, as they did in the 
seventies, that a nuclear-based defence policy is 
immutable and not open to discussion outside of the 
executive branch of government. The major change 
in the eighties is that the issue is now firmly on 
the political agenda 1 moreover, the evidence from 
the 1987 election suggests that the electorate is 
slowly becoming used to the idea of the possibility 
of some form of disarmament, at least in so far as 
fewer people see the issue as a main determinant of 
their voting choice. Admittedly, the idea is 
commonly associated with left-wing attitudes and 
parties, but the Campaign's efforts to win over the 
Liberals, the Churches and other social institu-
tions has meant that unilateralism is not seen as 
the exclusive preserve of the left. CND may only 
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have been the catalyst rather than the sole cause 
of this change in the political agenda, but it is a 
development in 
which the role 
counted. 
the practice of British politics in 
of the Campaign cannot be dis-
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Chapter Nine 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is a sense in which CND's continued existence 
is its most notable achievement. It has mobilised 
hundreds of thousands of people to risk punitive 
action by engaging in protest, which is more than 
any other group in British politics in the eighties 
can claim. It has done so, moreover, in a climate 
in which the possibilities of concrete changes in 
governmental policy on nuclear weapons have 
consistently been slight. Its supporters have not 
been motivated to participate by any kind of 
material self-interest. The Campaign does not 
have any selective rewards or incentives to offer 
its supporters. Activity within the Campaign does 
not even offer some kind of entry route into 
national party po1 i tics. Joan Ruddock' selection 
to Parliament in 1987 is very much the exception 
(and had little to do with her role in the Campaign 
anyway) 1 there has been no trend for other leading 
figures in CND to move onto the national political 
stage. 
The Campaign's success in recrui ting support 
is a classic example of mobilising 'conscience 
constituents'. If one seeks to explain this 
success, then it is necessary to distinguish 
between active and passive supporters. As far as 
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the more active are concerned, then it may well be 
the case that they derive a personal satisfaction 
from engaging in collective activity with like-
minded individuals, almost irrespective of whether 
such activity produces any progress towards the 
goals of the Campaign. As our survey suggests, 
however, such activists comprise only a minority of 
the Campaign's supporters. This leaves us with the 
problem of explaining the motivation of 'sympa-
thisers', who register their support but (through 
choice or necessity) forgo the opportunity to rein-
. force their commitment and sense of solidarity 
through active participation. 
This is a problem confronted by Parkin in his 
account of the Campaign's first wave of acti v-
ity(l). Reduced to its essentials, Parkin's 
explanation is that such people are likely to 
s"ubscribe to 'deviant' values, cannot find an 
outlet among conventional and established institu-
tions in which to express this, and so support 
groups like CND as a way of affirming their 
generally 'progressive' attitudes and values. This 
is an acute insight into the nature of British 
society in the fifties and sixties, but the 
question remains as to whether it still holds true 
for Britain in the eighties. Clearly, we cannot 
simply apply Parkin's argument as it stands, as 
significant changes have occurred over the last 
twenty five years in both the specifics of the 
party system and the generalities of the political 
culture. Thus, for example, in discussing the 
notion of 'deviant' values, Parkin identifies 
'dominant' values as being support for nationalism, 
capi talism, the monarchy and the establ ished 
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church. Whilst the first two of these are arguably 
still relevant in the contemporary British politi-
cal culture, 
to have lost 
relevance. 
the latter two are generally accepted 
much of their 
Similarly, at 
former importance and 
the time Parkin was 
writing, the Labour Party was more of an 'outsider' 
in the political system than it is in the eighties. 
In the early sixties, Labour had only formed one 
majority government and had suffered three election 
defeats in a row, leading to the supposition among 
some of its supporters as well as its opponents 
that it was destined to be in virtually permanent 
opposition. Admittedly, Labour's position in 1987 
might not be considered to be a great improvement 
upon thi~. At the time of CND's major expansion in 
the early eighties, however, this was not apparent 
and Labour's electoral record from the mid-sixties 
onwards had established it much more clearly as a 
potential governing party than it was twenty years 
earlier. Parkin was able to argue that middle-class 
radicals could express their dissent from the 
prevailing norms of their class by lending support 
to the Labour. Party and, almost incidentally; to 
CND. By the eighties, middle-class support for 
Labour was no longer an unusual phenomenon. 
If the conjunctural circumstances have 
changed, however, the essence of CND's appeal has 
remained the same. It is, by its very nature, an 
oppositional grouping. The eighties have been the 
decade of Thatcherism and the ascendency of the 
'New Right'. There has been a fundamental shift 
engineered in the expectations held of government. 
The emphasis upon consultation between government 
and groups which led many to see a nascent corpora-
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tism developing in British politics in the seven-
ties has been swept away in favour of a belief 
in the workings of a market economy which would 
only be distorted by government seeking accommoda-
tion with groups. The Thatcher governments have, 
at one and the same time, reduced the role and 
scope of the public sector in many areas, and 
emphasised and increased the role and authority of 
central government in those few areas where it is 
considered to have an appropriate role - of which 
defence is a notable example. There is no doubt 
that many members of the middle-class have bene-
fited materially from this, and those employed in 
the private sector have had their role in economy 
and society given repeated validation by the 
Conservative governments. For those in the public 
sector and other non-commercial occupations, 
however, this has been noticeable by its absence, 
and must have encouraged many to feel relatively 
undervalued in contemporary British society. 
For those wishing to express dissent from this 
prevailing trend in the political culture, CND has 
proved an attractive option. It offers the 
psycholog ical satisfaction of a moral absolutism 
which, unlike the environmental movement, does not 
entail a conflict with those on the left committed 
to continuing economic growth. At the same time, 
its focus upon the very question of human survival 
gives it a greater claim to urgency and relevance 
than that of other moral concerns. Singled out for 
opprobrium by the Conservative governments, it is 
not surprising that CND has once again become the 
medium through which many of the more radical-
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incl ined of Britain I s middle class have chosen to 
signify their opposition to prevailing norms. 
, 
This opposition has been most effectively 
expressed in protest activity, as it is this which 
has received the most publicity and contributed the 
most to provoking public discussion of the issue of 
nuclear disarmament. Had it not been for the 
large-scale demonstrations, peace camps and similar 
activities which were the prominent features of the 
Campaign between 1979 and 1985, it is hard to 
imagine that the concomitant efforts made in 
lobbying and persuasion would have had much impact. 
Such protest requires targets, however. The 
deployment of Cruise at Greenham, and the erection 
of the fence at Molesworth, meant that protest at 
these bases lost much of its orig inal meaning, 
whilst the predominantly English membership of the 
Campaign has yet to show much enthusiasm for 
participating in actions centred around Trident in 
Scotland. The first deployment of Cruise at the 
end of 1983 marked a turning point for the Campaign 
and its choice of tactics. Seeing the unilatera-
list option go down to such a disastrous defeat in 
the 1983 election was no doubt a disappointment, 
but the Campaign I s supporters were accustomed to 
thinking of themselves as a battling opposition, so 
if anything it served to increase their resolve. 
The arrival of Cruise, however, marked the first 
concrete set-back for the Campaign, and could have 
led to a gradual loss of enthusiasm and commitment, 
which might well have accelerated as the plans to 
mount similar actions at Molesworth were thrown 
into confusion by the erection of the fence. 
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Such actions by the authorities as occurred at 
Greenham and Molesworth pose a dilemma for the 
Campaign, as it is inevitably a reactive organisa-
tion. It cannot determine its own targets, but 
must react to developments which results from 
decisions made by others, notably British and other 
governments. By 1985, CND was in danger of becoming 
marginalised as a protest group, with no simple and 
easy targets around which it could mobil ise its 
actions. It could have shifted its ground by 
redefining and perhaps moderating its goals in the 
light of the new circumstances it was facing but, 
as we have noted, too many of the Campaign's 
supporters view different parts of its existing 
ideology to be non-negotiable for goals to be 
changed without a very real risk of serious 
internal dissent. 
Instead, CND has survived by making a virtue 
of necessity. Since 1985, it has thrown much of 
its energy and resources into a campaign of 
persuasion and lobbying around the much more 
general theme of unilateral nuclear disarmament, 
rather than the protests against the specific 
weapons systems of Trident and Cruise which marked 
the early eighties. Al though this has meant a 
diminution in activity, it has sufficed to give 
the membership new initiatives to maintain their 
interest and, more importantly, has enabled the 
Campaign to retain its image as a dynamic organis-
ation in the eyes of the media and the public. 
CND's organisational structure 
advantage in this kind of situation. 
is a great 
The hallmark 
of proceedings and decision-making within national 
CND is informality: although its structure bears 
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more than a passing resemblence to that of the 
Labour party, it conducts its affairs in a less 
authoritarian and bureaucratic manner than Labour. 
Compared with the Peace Movement as a whole, 
however, national CND is a centralised, bureau-
cratic and formal organisation, and as such it 
enjoys the great advantage of permanence. Peace 
Movement activists may complain bitterly about the 
time and money spent on the drafting and passing of 
paper resolutions at National Conference and 
Council meetings, but it is this formalised 
structure which ensures that the organisation stays 
in existence, ready to act as a rallying point and 
focus whenever the stimuli for protest activity 
presents itself. If such a formal structure did 
not exist, then protest would have to be mounted 
from scratch every time events such as the American 
action in Libya or the Chernobyl disaster occurred. 
Survival is a necessary prerequisite for 
success, but it is not sufficient. As we have 
noted, the nature of the issue with which the 
Campaign is concerned is such that concrete changes 
can only occur as a result of actions by the 
established memhers of the political system. To 
assess whether this has happened, we need to take a 
broad overview of developments since the seventies. 
Throughout that decade, the necessi ty for a 
nuclear dimension in Britain's defence policy was 
an assumption shared by virtually all the important 
actors and institutions in the political system. 
Successive governments felt that they were acting 
quite legitimately in spending considerable sums of 
money on maintaining and 
nuclear capability without 
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modernising Britain's 
first discussing the 
matter within the full Cabinet, nor did they 
perceive any necessity to consult Parliament or the 
public on such decisions. opposition to the nuclear 
deterrent was voiced only by small minority groups 
who were either on the far left of the political 
spectrum (for example, the Communist Party) or who 
espoused outright pacifism on moral grounds (for 
example, the Quakers) with CND itself only 
surviving because of the support of such groups • 
• 
The political agenda was dominated by economic 
issues, and it seemed inconceivable that any major 
changes to the I independent I deterrent would be 
envisaged, let alone implemented. 
Between 1979 and 1983, all such assumptions 
were brought into question, and for the first time 
a major party included a form of unilateral nuclear 
disarmament in its general election manifesto. At 
least partly because of this, the Labour Party 
suffered a resounding defeat in the 1983 election. 
Rather than dropping its commitment, however, it 
actually strengthened and clarified it, chose a 
unilateralist as its new leader, and even persuaded 
well-known multi-lateralists like Dennis Healey to 
declare their support for unilateralist measures. 
Whilst the Conservatives and SDP reiterated their 
support for the nuclear deterrent, activists in the 
extra-parI iamentary wing of the Liberal Party 
embarrassed their leadership by objecting to the 
deployment of Cruise missiles as well as the 
acquisition of Trident. By the time of the 1987 
general election, Labour had resolved many if not 
all of the ambiguities in its non-nuclear defence 
pol icy, and it was the SDP/Liberal Alliance which 
was experiencing serious internal dissent over the 
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issue. Although there was little in the 1987 
results to suggest that unilateral nuclear disarma-
ment had become more popular with the electorate, 
there were indications that fewer voters were 
preoccupied with the potential disadvantages of a 
radical change in defence policy. 
To some extent these changes in domestic 
politics were a result of developments 
international scene. The defence and 
policies of the Reagan administrations, 
on the 
foreign 
and the 
Thatcher governments' support for them, caused more 
people in Britain to question the desirability of 
the AnglO-American connection. More important, 
however, was the apparently fundamental change in 
the attitude of the soviet Union after the acces-
sion of Gorbachev. Prior to this, the Soviet 
union's stance on unilateral action was best 
summarised by President Andropov's statement in 
1982 - 'Let nobody expect us to disarm unilater-
ally. We are not naive.' Gorbachev, however, 
announced a unilateral ban on nuclear tests by the 
Soviet union in 1986, and accompanied this by first 
proposing a bi-lateral agreement to remove interme-
diate-range nuclear weapons from Europe and then 
extended this proposal to incorporate short-range 
nuclear weapons as well - the 'double-zero' option. 
At the time of writing, negotiations are still 
continuing on this. Whilst there is no guarantee 
that it will not meet the same fate as the previous 
attempt to reach agreement on the elimination of 
medium-range weapons in 1982, there is informed 
speculation in the press that an agreement is 
imminent. Even if agreement fails to materialise, 
Gorbachev's initiatives have made a generally 
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favourable impression on public opinion in the 
West.(2) 
Should some agreement be reached, it makes 
possible the following (speculative) scenario. By 
the end of the decade, Cruise missiles could have 
been removed as part of a bi-Iateral agreement on 
intermediate weapons. Trident could be cancelled, 
either because its acquisition would entail too 
heavy a burden on the defence budget (leaving 
insufficient funds for expenditure on conventional 
weaponry), or because the United States might 
renege on its agreement with Britain to supply 
Trident as part of some bi-Iateral agreement with 
the Soviet Union, or simply because the interna-
tional climate had changed such that a system as 
powerful as Trident was no longer perceived to be 
necessary. Even if it seems unl ikely that the 
present Conservative government would voluntarily 
reverse its decision to introduce Trident, the 
early nineties could see a Labour government (or 
possibly some form of Liberal/Labour coalition 
government) coming to power, in which case Trident 
will be cancelled unless there are powerful 
economic reasons for keeping it in place. It is 
even possible that a maj ori ty Labour government 
would not only implement a non-nuclear defence 
policy, but also pursue multi-lateral agreement on 
substantial reductions in conventional forces. 
None of this may happen, of course. The 
interesting point, however, is that such develop-
ments - inconceivable at the end of the seventies -
are now realistic possibilities. Should such 
changes occur, they would represent the kind of 
concrete modifications to defence policy that CND 
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has advocated for so long. Yet it would require a 
very sympathetic observer of the Campaign to argue 
that CND and its counterparts in Europe had been 
primarily responsible for bringing about such a 
transformation. The Gorbachev initiatives may well 
revitalise the Campaign. Not only do they seem to 
substantiate the Campaign's argument that unilat-
eral actions can lead on to multilateral progress. 
They also mean that unilateral actions by Britain 
take on a new and more important meaning, as they 
could speed up or impede progress towards agreement 
on intermediate and short-range weapons. As in the 
fifties, CND can now claim that 'Britain can make a 
difference' an argument that had a somewhat 
hollow ring to it during the preceding twenty five 
years. It is hard to imagine, however, that 
Gorbachev has been motivated to make these radical 
proposals solely or even .mainly by the weight and 
force of arguments enunciated by western peace 
movements. 
This is not to dismiss the impact of the 
Campaign, or to suggest 
Indeed, whatever the 
that it has no future. 
outcome of 
super-power negotiations, the Campaign 
continue. Should the· talks fail, or 
the present 
is likely to 
result in new 
deployments (for example, sea and air-launched 
Cruise missiles), then this would represent the 
same sort of stimulus for protest activity that 
NATO's twin-track decision did at the end of the 
seventies - particularly if the Soviet Union is 
able to lay much of the blame for failure at the 
door of western governments. If the talks succeed, 
the size and. activities of the Campaign are likely 
to diminish in the same kind of way that they did 
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in the early sixties. This time~ however, the 
Campaign has amongst its leading figures a number 
of individuals who, as part of their international-
ist perspective and links with END, have a commit-
ment to developing ideas about an alternative 
foreign policy which is much wider in scope than 
just opposition to nuclear weapons. There is every 
possibility that such figures, who have exercised 
increasing influence in the Campaign since 1985 
anyway, would keep CND alive even if it was as less 
of a protest group and more of an intellectual 
pressure group. 
Whatever the future holds, the Campaign and 
its allies in the broader peace movement can lay 
claim to one major achievement. They have been 
instrumental in creating a climate in which the 
policy of nuclear deterrence is now open to 
question. It is true that the only established 
members of the polity to have been converted to the 
idea of· a non-nuclear defence policy (the Labour 
Party,some trade unions and some local authorities) 
have all done so at a time when they were in a 
relatively weak position in national politics. In 
the case of the most important of these, the Labour 
Party, its conversion has contributed to its 
present weak political position, but it has not 
sought to reverse its stance and there is some 
evidence that it is becoming less of an electoral 
liability. In 1987, the chances of Britain 
implementing a fully non-nuclear defence policy by 
the end of the century still seem rather slight, at 
least so long as the left and centre-left in 
British politics remain divided among a number of 
political parties. This should not detract from the 
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fundamental change that has occurred in the status 
of a nuclear-based defence policy on the political 
agenda. From being a policy on which discussion of 
alternatives was effectively restricted to the 
governmental and mil i tary elite, it has become one 
on which there is genuine popular and widespread 
discussion. The idea of non-nuclear defence -has, 
in short, entered into the realm of the politically 
negotiable - and for that the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament must be given due credit. 
CND and Social Movement Theory 
In conclusion, it is to be hoped that our 
contention at the beginning of this thesis - that 
CND in the eighties can most usefully be conceptua-
lised as a social movement rather than a conven-
tional pressure group, and most fruitfully analysed 
from a resource mobilisation perspective rather 
than one based upon ideas of relative deprivation -
has been substantiated. As we have seen, CND IS 
organisation, tactics and strategy are signifi-
cantly different from those of protectional and 
promotional groups, and much closer to those of 
other social movements. The resource mobilisation 
perspective has been useful, in that its focus upon 
the interaction which occurs between social 
movements and other institutions has drawn our 
attention to the competition for resources between 
different social movements. This is crucial to an 
understanding of the success of CND, at least in 
terms of attracting support if not in seeking its 
aims translated into public policy. 
In this competition for resources, CND has 
been able to offer a cause which does not require 
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renunciation of other party or group loyal ties, 
which is not linked to sectional self-interest or 
(at least in theory) restricted to one particular 
political philosophy, which is clear and, in 
essence, simple rather than complicated, which 
provides the opportunity to express opposition 
(either actively or with considerable passivity) to 
the swing to the right which has characterised 
politics in the western world during the eighties, 
and which lays claim to a high degree of moral 
recti tude. These have proved decisive advantages 
for CND in its competition with other movements and 
groups (particularly in the environmental sphere) 
to secure the support, time, energy and money of 
that section of the British population which is 
minded to reject Conservative thinking. Admit-
tedly, this success has been only partial, the 
appeal of the Campaign not having extended to any 
significant degree beyond the educated middle-
class, and there is little evidence of its managing 
to politicise those who were not previously 
interested in and informed about politics gener-
ally. This, however, does not invalidate the 
resource mobilisation perspective, which seeks only 
to draw our attention to the phenomenon of competi-
tion. 
There is one aspect in which resource mobili-
sation theory does not appear to accord with the 
experience of CND, and that is its assumption that 
discontents and grievances lie dormant in society, 
and are awoken by the efforts of social movements 
to mobilise them. In the case of the peace 
movement, specific events such as NATO's twin-track 
decision and the Conservatives' commitment to 
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acquire Trident 
discontents which 
would appear to have created 
had not existed for much of the 
prev ious two decades. Having said that, however, 
resource mobilisation theory goes a long way to 
explaining how this initial discontent which arose 
in 1979/80 was given the momentum to grow and 
survive throughout the eighties. 
Resource mobilisation, however, is a very 
generalised perspective, with a somewhat imprecise 
terminology 1 as such, any criticisms of it can be 
refuted simply by employing different definitions 
of its basic concepts - 'resources', for example, 
being open to a number of different interpretatio-
ns. As stated in Chapter one, however, this thesis 
is concerned not only 
of the broad sweep of 
but also with the 
with the utility or otherwise 
resource mobilisation theory, 
more specific theoretical 
arguments which relate to social movements. 
Some of these arguments are corroborated by 
this study, even where they appear to be mutuallY 
exclusive. Thus, for example, although we have 
posited the arguments of Gamson and Gerlach and 
Hine as two opposing poles in the thinking on the 
organisational structure of social movements, this 
thesis contains empirical evidence which partly if 
not wholly substantiates them both - it all depends 
upon where one focuses attention. Gamson's argument 
that centralisation and bureaucratisation enhance a 
social movement's chances of success is borne out 
to some extent if applied only to national CND 
rather than the peace movement as a whole. 
Admittedly, his contention that a formal organisa-
tional structure will enhance a movement's chances 
of being accepted by its antagonists as a valid 
mouthpiece for a legitimate set of interests has 
not been substantiated by the Thatcher governments' 
331 
atti tudes towards CND. This has been because of 
the nature of the issue which CND engages, and 
Gamson, in common with a number of other social 
movement theorists, does not pay sufficient regard 
to the importance of the kind of issue a soc ial 
movement pursues ~a variable in his model; this is 
a point to which we shall return. 
Apart from this, however, Gamson' s argument 
that centralisation and a degree of formal organis-
ation enable a movement to minimise internal 
conflict is applicable to national CND. The 
decision-making system adopted by national CND -
based on the Annual Conference, the National 
Council and the various national commi ttees - has 
provided its leadership with a sufficiently 
powerful authority structure to repel attempted 
infiltration by far-left groups, to keep the 
Campaign committed to tactics of persuasion as well 
as protest, and to present to 'bystander publics' 
an image of the Campaign as a coherent and truly 
national body all factors which must have 
enhanced the survival chances of the movement in 
the absence of any concrete achievements in the 
sphere of public policy. 
Gerlach and Hine's SPR model is also relevant, 
but to the peace movement as a whole (taking this 
to mean local CND and other peace groups, and 
quasi-autonomous groups like Cruisewatch and the 
Greenham Movement) rather than national CND. The 
relationship between national CND and the wider 
peace movement does demonstrate many of the 
advantages which Gerlach and Hine identify. They 
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, 
argue that a decentralised and informal organisa-
tion",l structure gives a movement the ability to e.v,Jc. 
suppression by political authorities, and to 
survive if parts of the organisation fail or become 
discredited. These possibilities have been fully 
exploited by the leadership of national CND. 
Whilst understandably incensed at what they have 
seen as attempts by the political authorities to 
covertly investigate the movement's activities, 
they have been able to take comfort in the fact 
that monitoring everything that happens in the 
Campaign cannot be accomplished merely by infil-
trating it at the national level. When faced with 
pressure from within the Campaign for it to adopt 
more confrontational NVDA tactics which they 
thought might detract from its impact on public 
opinion, the leadership has often been able to 
divert this onto sub-groupings within the peace 
movement - the Action '84 episode being a notable 
exception. 
Indeed, what is striking about national CND is 
the extent to which potentially divisive issues and 
decisions can be 'exported' - either to within the 
broader peace movement or outwards to other 
institutions, such as political parties or 
subdued by calls for unity. Debate over what should 
replace nuclear weapons to provide for Britain's 
defence is discouraged on the grounds that politi-
cal parties are the appropriate institutions to 
formulate such policy. Practitioners of NVDA who 
express frustration that considerable time and 
money is spent on lobbying MP's and organising 
conferences to discuss policy resolutions, and 
advocates of reasoned persuasion who feel that 
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their arguments will not be taken seriously when 
they are associated with unconventional protest, 
are persuaded to co-exist in relative harmony by 
appeals which stress the need to maintain solidar-
ity in the fact of a hostile government, and the 
moral rectitude of the Campaign's fundamental aims. 
Such appeals might well be less effective if 
national CND had a different organisation struc-
ture, because power relations within its present 
structure make it difficult for the mass membership 
to exercise any significant degree of accountabil-
ity over their leadership. As we have seen, 
activists who favour protest rather than persua-
sion, and who wish to base their protest upon 
issues which enjoy even less popularity with the 
electorate than unilateralism itself (withdrawal 
from NATO being the best example), are able to take 
advantage of CND's organisational structure to the 
extent of winning formal endorsement of their aims 
by the whole Campaign. What they cannot do, 
however, is find a means of bringing sufficient 
pressure to bear upon those who are responsible for 
day-to-day decision-making to ensure that they 
actually pursue these aims with real commitment and 
enthusiasm. In many ways, the anti-NATO/pro-NVDA 
activists are reminiscent of left-wing activists in 
the Labour party of the sixties and seventies -
able (after some considerable struggle) to win 
endorsement of their aims from the Annual Confer-
ence, but then frustrated by their inability to 
make the parliamentary Labour Party and Labour 
these commitments in Governments prioritise 
practice. Unfortunately for the activists in CND, 
the organisational structure of the Campaign has no 
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equivalent of re-selection as a way of bringing 
pressure to bear outside of the Annual Conference. 
There is another parallel: just as the electoral 
system means that disgruntled labour activists have 
no other viable left-wing party to turn to, so the 
Campaign's predominant position in the public's 
perception of the peace movement means that there 
is no other grouping on the national stage through 
which peace movement activists could expect to work 
so effectively. 
Freeman's arguments about the impact of prior 
experiences and contemporary reference groups upon 
the attitudes and expectations of social movement 
participants has some relevance in this context. 
Admittedly, there is little evidence in CND of the 
clear distinction between 'old' and 'new' activists 
that she found in the women's movement. Of all the 
cross-cutting memberships and allegiances which we 
have identified among the Campaign's membership, 
only the Communist Party and the Green movement 
appear to inspire loyalties which lead their 
adherents to try to manipulate the Campaign in a 
certain direction the small Communist element 
arguing against stances which appear critical of 
the Soviet union (with little discernable impact), 
and the larger Green element exercising more 
effective pressure to get the Campaign committed 
against nuclear energy as well as weapons and to 
adopt a much m ore decentralised structure. As we 
have seen from our survey, many of the Campaign's 
, 
supporters also subscribe to the Labour Party and 
Trade Union Movement and/or to other 'moral' 
campaigning groups. It is problematic whether 
Freeman's argument applies to these people. On the 
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one hand~ 
internal 
evidence 
one might argue that the relative lack of 
dissension suggested by our survey is 
that such people do not allow cross-
pressures to influence them. On the other hand, 
one might equally well argue that these other 
loyalties complement rather than conflict with the 
aims and practices of the Campaign. Those with a 
background in the Labour movement are accustomed. to 
exhortations to prioritise unity above faction-
alism, and those who are drawn to 'moral'campaigns 
are similarly used to working with people from a 
variety of backgrounds in the name of a higher 
moral imperative. As with resource mobil isation 
theory generally, Freeman's argument is useful for 
focusing our attention upon important influences on 
social movements, but open to different interpreta-
tions when that focus is narrowed down to specific 
variables. 
So far, we have been looking at aspects of our 
study which appear to substantiate, at least 
partly, the arguments of social movement theorists. 
There are some important respects, however, in 
which the Campaign differs from the model provided 
by social movement theory. These are that there is 
just one important SMO within the peace movement 
rather than several, that this SMO is more formally 
organised than its counterparts in other social 
movements, and that it employs conventional tactics 
as well as the more unconventional and places 
greater importance on these than one might expect 
from social movement theory. Why, then, is this? 
The answer I ies in the nature of the issue which 
the Campaign is engaging. 
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CND's aims can only be met by convincing 
established members of the polity, particularly one 
or more of the major political parties. The 
'personal' dimension which is such a distinctive 
feature of other social movements, giving them 
momentum and enhancing their chances of survival, 
is lacking. In this context, it is instructive to 
speculate on the form the peace movement might take 
were it to be committed to outright rather than 
just nuclear pacifism. Were this to be the case, 
the movement might well be smaller, but it would 
have a personal dimension - in that adherents could 
practice pacifism in the private as well as public 
sphere -and would be must more likely to organise 
itself upon an unstructured, informal and network-
ing basis. Pacifists would be less concerned to 
make an issue-specific impact, and more concerned 
to propagate their message by personal example 7 
less interested in gaining the support and affilia-
tion of established institutions like trade unions 
and local authorities, and more interested in 
converting individuals to the cause. The peace 
movement would become a social movement in its 
'purest' form. 
As it is, however, the peace movement is 
primarily interested in making an issue-specific 
impact - at least, in the short to medium term. It 
is se,eking to influence policy in an area which is 
dominated by the executive branch of government, 
and which has no history or tradition of consulta-
tion or open debate - and in a pol i tical system 
noted for its secrecy generally. Britain's 
political culture offers certain advantages for 
such campaigning - freedom of speech and assembly 
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remain 
recent 
established values, despite 
years to impose limitations 
attempts 
but 
in 
its 
emphasis upon pragmatism does not provide fertile 
ground for causes which rest upon moral principles. 
Opposition to government and even protest are seen 
in a positive light by at least some of the 
electorate, but direct action usually attracts 
negative comment and presentation from the media. 
All of these factors combine to make CND 
different from other social movements. it is more 
formally organised, because this facilitates 
relationships with established members of the 
-
polity. It complements its moral case with 
strictly pragmatic arguments, because this is the 
only way it can hope to convince parties and an 
electorate accustomed to thinking in such terms. 
Similarly, it pursues tactics that are conventional 
as well as the more unconventional which attract 
many of its 
spectabil i ty 
activists, because a degree of re-
is a necessary condition for it to be 
perceived as a serious contender in the nuclear 
debate. It is our contention that it is the nature 
of the issue which CND is engaging which is the 
fundamental cause of these differences. Were it 
not seeking to influence public policy in an area 
which is commonly accepted to be one of the basic 
functions of the state - the defence of the nation 
then it would not be subject to the mix of 
constraints and opportunities which have resulted 
in its adopting a form and practices which differs 
from most other social movements. Whilst social 
movement theory is based on concepts which offer 
the potential for a much better understanding of a 
group such as CND than conventional pressure group 
338 
theorising; the finding that emerges from this 
study is that it pays inadequate attention to the 
nature of the issue that a social movement takes 
up. It is to be hoped that this thesis makes some 
contribution to establishing the need for such a 
perspective in future studies of social movement 
activity. 
NOTES 
1. F. Parkin, Middli"Cliii"Ridic~lii~~ 
2. For example, the results of an opinion 
survey conducted in nine Western European countries 
in June 1987, suggested that most Western Europeans 
approved of Soviet policies on disarmament - see 
Thi" Iridipiridirit, 19.6.87. 
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APPENDIX 
The survey comprised the following questionnaire 
and a covering letter from the General Secretary of 
CND assuring respondents of confidentiality. The 
survey was distributed by post, national CND 
undertaking the task of generating a stratified 
random sample of 1% of the national membership, 
based on a. regional breakdown. A total of lOll" 
surveys were distributed~ 620 replies were re-
ceived, representing a response rate of 61%. The 
survey has a sample error of +/-4% • 
" 
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J 
" 
.t:XD ~TIONAl. MDe£RSHIP $lMYEY 
Ple.,e afts.er t~e ~uestlOfts by • tIck aftd/or'bt 
writing In. Cif th ... Is a ho.uholll Of' a cou,r. 
... bershl, of OCD, ~Ir Ofte penon should ens • .,. the 
survey.' 
fiRST! S()IE G£HERAL OUESTIONS 
t. In .hlch region do you live (pl.as. state 
county If unsur.) l' 
2. In which 8g' group are yout 
3. Are you _I, or h_le1' 
16 Of' under 
17-24 
2~"O 
41-5. 
60 or" over 
4. Are ,you at school or i stud.ntt 
At school 
Stud..,t 
If,not, .t what age. did you~ full-tiDe 
~ucatlon end? 
. 
00 you hold. dlplolM or degrae? Yes_-
No 
" What Is your occupation (or pravlous occupation 
If not currantly In paid e.ploymentJ1' 
a. It you ara In full or pert-tl •• M9IOYft1ent, 
are you aaployed In ••• 
the priVata sector 
or" th. public sector 
7. If th .... wes a g.n.ra' elKtlon tomorrow, how 
would you vote? 
LlberallSOP alllanc. 
Labour 
Conservatlv. 
Ecology 
Oth.r (pl.as. say) 
'Don't Know 
Wouldn It Yote 
SECOND, SOME OUESTIOfIIS A80UT om AHO OTHER GROUPS 
8. In .hlch year did you Join or r.Joln 
national Ct«:l? 
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9 •• Are you a • ..o.r of·a local OD, anti-nuclear 
.... pons or .'_llar pNce group? 
Y .. 
No 
No local 9"ou, 
9tt. If you a,.a a ..... ber of a lOCI I group. I\ow Nny 
tlllles oYe,. the past y.ar bav. you taken part In 
.vents or ... tlngs organls.d by that group? 
Non. 
1-3 
4-6 _ 
7-. 
Ov,r 9 
to. Do you partlclpata In any'of the following 
actlvltl.s on behalf of CND? 
Public sp.aklng 
DMOns1Tatlonsl 
Morch .. 
PNce CaIB9S 
Canvosslng the 
-. public 
Lobbying politicians 
Leafl.ftlng 
Cofttectlng t~a local 
press 
W ... rlng bedg" 
Oft." I SometlINs 
I 
I 
I 
It. A,.. you a •• mb.r of a political party! 
If yes, plees. say which 
Y .. 
No 
I 
If no, have you ever ~" a .emb.r of a 
political pO"'y (pl.ese say whleh) 
N.vr 
12. Ar. you a pnctlclng .... mber of any church 
er religious deno_lnotlon? 
Y •• 
No 
If yes. pleese sey whlc.h __ ....;:..... ____ _ 
1'_ Ar. you a Membe,. Ofl 
a trade un I on 
• women I s group 
a professional association 
• voluntary organisation 
" 
'4. If you ar •• MIIIb." of any of th. g"o"", In 
questIons 11-13. do you actlv.ly WOl"k for 
nuclear dlsarma-.nt within th •• ' 
1'. In recent yeers, have you support.d any public 
campaigns oth.r than CNDl 
Yo. 
N. 
If yes. pie ... Say whlch ________ _ 
Are any of th.,. .cr. ''"Portant than CM) Is t. y ... , _____________ _ 
TN I AD, YOUR YI E'WS ON CM) 
16. Who or .~at what ~ Influenced you In yout" 
decision to· Join ~, 
'7 •• Llsted below are six possible activities and 
she pClsslbl. eaftlpalSlnlng .,. ... w"lch 0() could 
pu"sue. Ple .. e tick ~ f,.OII ~ list 
whlcb you cons I de" a,.. th. MOSt 'mportant. 
Ae1'lvltles 
Educational WOl"k 
_ BIg public events 
Ccnslde,.ed non-violent 
___ Illegal direct action 
_ Small public events 
and loca I wOl"k 
___ LObbying politicIans 
and declslon-maker, 
_ Oeveloplng Interna .. 
tlona' contacts 
Camoalgnlng a"eas 
Nue ... " Civil Oefence 
_ prag,... 
T,,'dent 
B,.ltl,,, unilateral 
nucl"r dlsa,.III.11ment 
e,.lt'sh withdrawal 
fro. NATO 
Cr'ulu 
Removal of all USA 
bases In B"lt.ln 
17b.lf thera ara othe'" which you consider .,.a 
MOre Important than these, pleas. ~entlon 
th.m. 
17c.Are th.,.. any of the'. activities or ClMp.lgns 
th.t you would not want to take pa"t In 
you"selfl (pl •• s. soy which) 
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I7d.Should CND cOlllpalgn Il10'' •• etl .... ,y 11'Ian ,t 
e,,,.';dy does ag.lnst the nuc' .. r WNPonS 
pollel s f • • I 
Yos NoI Oon't 
.... 
tuS' I 
I USSR I 
18. How ~uc:h Influence wou.d you say the follow.ng 
ha v • .!l!!!.!.!!. eN)' 
Too A""ut Too 000" 
""e' rloht ll'ttle . ... 
Chrlstlen cm I 
Touth CM) I 
.""' .. G"een 010 I 
lebour Pa,..,., I 
Other Pa.-tle~ I 
r,.ade Unions I 
CND o.ld stafft 
ENO 
Tou yourse' f I 
FOtRnt, $CJIfE ctRtEXT ISSUES: 
19. Old you suPPort unl late"al nucleer dlsa"lDIment 
(tIck on_ onlyh 
As soon as you bKame sedous Iy Interastedl 
Involved 
Intultlv.,y frC)lll t1'Ie wot'd go. but took a .hll_ 
to wcrk otrt why __ 
·After • lot of conslde"etlort of pro and 
couRter arguments __ 
~ stili conslderlRg this Issue 
20. Which a"guments agalRst unllaterel dls.raameRt 
do yOll find herde" to ,..fute - elthe,. IR your 
own .Ind Of" In discussion with ~thers (you ne.d 
not say whyJ1 
21. Which.!!!!. of the following four flrgulllents· 
against British ponesslon of nuclMr w.apons 
CI",.I .. the g"eat.st weight .Ith you 
pe"sona 1I y' 
It Is an 'nefflclent meens of defenc. 
They fI". 1IIOI"'.lly "nacceptable wecpons 
It Is 11 weste of econOllllc ,..sourcn 
It would enable Britain to glYe 11 .oral 
I.ad to other nations; 
'. 
22. What prlot'fty do you think CNlshould glv. 
to eallloalonlna ••• I ••• 
I HI9hl L .. ..... Oco' • :Know 
Nue I ear e"e,.a., 
Ch_lcal ."d 
Sloloolcal Weaoo"s 
13. Wha do you think be.rs the .aln responsibility 
fot' the arms race In recant yearst 
USA 
USSR 
USA & USSR aqua II y 
Othe" Cpleas. say) 
Den't know 
24. Ple.s. say whathe" you .g,. .. Or' dlsagr.e 
.Ith the following st.t .. ents. 
A9"" Dlsag,. .. 
S"lt,ln should la.ve WATO 
If Britain gives up all 
,.clo .......... h. should I 
"'eve lIIOI"e convent! ona'- .... 
e,.ltaln should leave the EEC 
Money saved by nuclear 
dl,erJlalllent shou fd go 
Drllllll"lI .. on o.,er,eaS aid 
3.-ft.ln should substan-
tl.lly r.duce Its present 
d.fence and foreign policy 
links with the USA 
The Soviet Union doe. not 
pOSe a .e,.lou, .flltary 
threat to Britain 
erltaln should pur,ue a 
strictly non-aligned 
defence and foreign 
lIollev 
I am, "aclflst 
Donlt 
.... 
2'. In your opinIon, what ,. the .ffect of 
non-violent, Illegal direct action upon CM)ts 
caMpaigning gene,.ally. 
Strengthen. the eam"algn 
Weakens the caMpaign 
Dontt know 
26. What are you,. .!!!.l.!!. sources of Information ebj:)ut 
nuclear weapons and dlsarme .... tt 
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'. 
·ll ________________ '~I~H~AL~L~YL. ______ ~ ______ ~ 
27. Since becoming a ~,. of national C~, ft4s 
your general 'eve' of polltlca' Interut and 
activity 
Incre.sed 
Decreased 
Rema Ined the 
.... 
28. Out.ld. of your Involvement with CND, do you 
Often I 50'11etlllles Nevar 
Reed· about politics 
In the ",.ass 
DIscuss politics .Ith 
friends 
ConvInce fr-Iencls to 
\IOte as vou do 
Work to sol.,. CI:lInftunlt) 
oroblams 
Attend political 
lIMte1'lnas 
Con1'act officials er 
1lI0lltlclans 
Campaign for • candl· 
. date In national er 
local elec:tlons 
29. Thinking In general terms, hcw much do you 
trust. British Governeent to do wh.t f. rlght2 
Complehly 
Mcst of th. time 
Somlrt'lmes 
N." .... 
Don'" Know 
30. finally, what lessons (If any) do yOl.l think QC 
.hould leern frem the ~p.rlence of the 1983 
general electlont 
PLEASE REYUIUI TlIIS IM THE REPLY-I'AlD UYEUPE. TlIAI« 
YOU VERT ,.UCH FOR TOtM; TIK AM) COOP'ERATlOM. 
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